Burak

İnan

[CoinW @CoinWOfficial]

GM

[CoinW @CoinWOfficial]

Fast alone. Faster together.

[Burak @X_WILSO]

@loopooYT la chance sera enfin de mon côté. Bonne chance à tous !

Participons @mander_m16964 @MikaelGnaho

[Burak @X_WILSO]

@Stake Stake usrename: Nolitoo

[CoinW @CoinWOfficial]

GM

[Burak @X_WILSO]

@CoinWOfficial Gm everyone

[CoinW @CoinWOfficial]

Winners, can we start now?

[Burak @X_WILSO]

@CoinWOfficial Now

[CoinW @CoinWOfficial]

💡 Understanding Today's Crypto Market: Trends, Risks, and Opportunities with CoinW

Our CSO Nassar Al Achkar, @NassarCoinW, will be joining the panel to unpack where we are in the cycle, what's driving sentiment, and where opportunities are emerging for traders and investors today.

📅 July 4, 2026 | 12 PM (UTC)
📍 RSVP: https://t.co/B8XOaobm3p

🎁 Join, Chat, and WIN! $250 Bonus giveaway to the 5 best questions!

[CoinW @CoinWOfficial]

One bad habit you left behind as a trader?👇

[CoinW @CoinWOfficial]

The market has no limits. Why should you?

[CoinW @CoinWOfficial]

Control the ball, control the moment. ⚽️

Win together! 💜

#WorldCup2026

[Evan @EvanWritesOnX]

For roughly thirty years the world ran on a single operating system.

American military reach, the dollar as the settlement layer for global trade, Western financial institutions setting the terms of credit, and a network of alliances and proxies that extended Washington’s writ into every region.

That system is not collapsing.

It is being shed.

The private capital networks that profited from it are quietly building positions inside the next arrangement while the old one still functions.

Understanding the shift means looking at what’s moving underneath.

The unipolar order was less about American virtue than American chokepoints. Trade settled in dollars, which meant nearly every cross-border transaction touched the US financial system, which gave Washington the power to cut off any actor it chose.

Sanctions were the enforcement mechanism, and they worked because there was no alternative. A country pushed out of the dollar system had nowhere else to go. Resource flows, shipping insurance, the courts that adjudicated disputes, the benchmark for pricing all debt on earth all ran through Western infrastructure.

That concentration is what made the system both stable and extractive at the same time.

Today, we have China processing the majority of the world’s rare earths, alternative payment rails like CIPS, bilateral trade settled outside the dollar, central banks buying gold because gold cannot be frozen by anyone’s legal system.

None of this happened overnight, and none of it has replaced the dollar yet. But the existence of even partial alternatives changes the leverage math.

A sanctioned state with a buyer in Beijing and a settlement channel that skips New York is no longer isolated. It is inconvenienced.

The freezing of Russian reserves in 2022 did more to advance this shift than two decades of summits. It proved that reserves held in another country’s currency are sovereign only until that country decides otherwise. Every central bank with an independent foreign policy took the lesson.

The tool of dollar dominance depletes its own potency each time it is used.

A multipolar world distributes power, and distributed power has a structural advantage in one respect. When several actors each hold real leverage, no single actor can impose outcomes without negotiation.

That tends to produce bargaining over coercion, and bargained outcomes are often more durable because every party has a stake in keeping them.

But the same distribution introduces fragility. A single hegemon, whatever its flaws, provided one set of rules and one enforcer. Multiple poles mean multiple rule sets, contested chokepoints, and far more places where miscalculation can happen.

The danger period is not the settled multipolar state. It is the transition itself, while the old enforcer is still strong enough to resist and the new arrangement is not yet built. That gap is where conflict concentrates, because the declining power is tempted to use its remaining leverage and the rising powers test how far they can push.

When external extraction slows, predatory systems turn inward. A power that can no longer profitably project abroad starts financializing its own population and applying tools built for foreign theaters at home. That produces domestic instability that spills outward in unpredictable ways.

I expect globally, the next ten to fifteen years to be more unstable, not less, even though the eventual multipolar equilibrium may prove more durable than the order it replaces.

The instability is front-loaded into the handover.

The decisive variable is whether the major powers treat the transition as a managed handover with everyone’s core interests preserved, or as a zero-sum fight over the wreckage.

The structural currents favor the former, because no major player actually benefits from a genuine systemic war.

But the transition window is exactly when miscalculation is most likely and most expensive.

[Burak @X_WILSO]

@loopooYT Dans la vie les choses vont et viens
Ça viendra à moi un jour

[@Geopolitics_is_like_AoE @Geopolitics_AoE]

If you read between the lines...

Even Netanyahu is giving both President Aoun and the Iranians a layup when he says:

"Hezbollah has no right to act as a state inside Lebanon."

That right there speaks volumes.

Netanyahu is basically saying:

"At some point, likely after I'm gone, then Israel is going to have to negotiate with the Lebanese government. Not the Axis.

All of the territory we seized while we fought under the pretext of going to war with the Axis will be for nought...

And Iran will get its chance to publicly distance from its most iconic, notorious proxy."

This is also at the same time that defense minister Katz is repeating the maximalist rhetoric about indefinite occupation in southern Lebanon.

You're able to see the agendas of both Netanyahu and his cabinet competing against each other in real time.

A cold war brewing if you will.

Because I don't think for even a moment that the Israeli cabinet is stupid enough *not* to see what their endgame is.

For them, it's trying to throw anything and everything they can at the wall to see what sticks.

And nothing is sticking.

[The Kobeissi Letter @KobeissiLetter]

No sector in history has ever been this large:

The Information Technology sector now accounts for a record 39% of the S&P 500's total market cap.

This percentage has more than doubled since the 2020 pandemic.

This figure is also now above the 2000 Dot-Com Bubble peak of ~33% and the ~31% peak reached by the Energy sector in the 1980s.

Including internet retailers and digital media platforms such as Amazon, $AMZN, and Netflix, $NFLX, tech now accounts for a record 50% of the S&P 500's market value.

By comparison, this same group accounted for just 29% of the index at the Dot-Com Bubble peak.

Tech is all that matters.

[Evan @EvanWritesOnX]

On Lebanon.

· Hezbollah will keep rejecting the deal loudly while quietly giving up on the ground.

· The Lebanese army takes over the south gradually, moving into space as Hezbollah fades or quietly integrates rather than fighting it for control.

· No civil war. The threat of one gets used as leverage and then walked back. Aoun will successfully manage Lebanon's transition.

· Hezbollah ends up as a political party that has lost its veto over the state, not as an armed force.

· A rival Shia movement grows around jobs, services, and reconstruction, eating into Hezbollah's base.

· Israel pulls out of the 2 agreed areas, then stalls on the rest and points to incomplete disarmament as the reason.

· The buffer zone settles into a semi-permanent presence, and the gas waters off the coast are the real reason Israel never fully leaves. TPS leverage.

· Gulf states pay for most of the rebuild and buy lasting influence over Lebanese politics by doing it.

· The currency finds a floor and the economy will stabilize, but recovery runs over years, not months.

· Aoun holds his position despite the treason accusations and gains standing with Washington and the Gulf.

· Low-level Israeli strikes continue, framed as enforcement, without tipping back into open war.

· Iran stays out of Lebanon and does not re-arm Hezbollah, holding to the June deal.

· Iran keeps the Strait of Hormuz as a pressure tool, with occasional incidents but no closure that holds.

· The US keeps the deal alive with limited, calibrated strikes on Iran rather than a return to full war.

· Saudi normalization with Israel stays blocked until there is a credible path to a Palestinian state.

I said almost all of this 18 months ago.

All remains unchanged.

[Burak @X_WILSO]

@CoinWOfficial Answer: Cali Cali 11
I'd be happy to take advantage of that.

Thank you.

UID : 26698133

[CoinW @CoinWOfficial]

🎁 USDT Giveaway 🥳

Think you have eagle eyes 👀

One, Two, Three, Or more? 👇

Be fast 😁

✅ Comment your answer + UID
✅ Follow @CoinWOfficial
✅ Like & Repost

[Evan @EvanWritesOnX]

Lebanon looks like a country about to explode.

A peace deal signed in Washington and rejected within hours. A US airstrike on Iran the same afternoon. An Israeli army camped on a fifth of the country with no plans to leave.

And the entire timeline is depicting president Aoun as a Zionist, selling Lebanon to Israel and tearing the country apart to do it.

For 40 years Iran has fought its enemies through other people. Rather than send its own army, it funded, armed and trained militias across the Middle East;

Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, factions in Iraq, and the biggest of them all, Hezbollah in Lebanon. They did Iran's fighting for it, its reach and its deterrent, a way to pressure Israel without ever putting an Iranian soldier on the ground.

Hezbollah was the crown jewel. A state within a state. Better armed than the Lebanese army, with its own missiles, its own money, its own foreign policy. For years nothing moved in Lebanon without its say-so.

That era is ending, and the way it's ending is not what the headlines say.

This year the US and Iran went to "war". When it stopped, Iran signed a deal on June 17 to halt fighting "on all fronts, including in Lebanon."

Iran named Lebanon. It put in writing that it was stepping back from the country where its most important proxy lives.

When the sponsor signs that, the proxy is being abandoned, not armed for a last stand.

Which brings me to Aoun, and the claim that he's a traitor doing Israel's bidding.

He signed a deal brokered by the Americans, with Israeli troops still sitting on a fifth of his country and no date set for them to leave. The deal asks Lebanon to disarm Hezbollah first, and only then does Israel pull back. From inside the resistance, that looks like a Lebanese president doing Israel's paperwork, taking the guns off the one force that ever made Israel pay a price.

But what he's actually signing for, is not Israeli troops in Beirut. Not a surrender. He is signing for the Lebanese army to be the only armed force in the country. One nation, one army. That isn't a Zionist demand.

It's the definition of a state, the thing Lebanon has not been for 40 years, because a militia stronger than the national army sat inside it and answered to Tehran.

And notice who the word "Zionist" is really working for. For decades Hezbollah fused itself to the country, until its weapons became "the resistance," and the resistance became Lebanon itself, so that anyone who wanted the state to hold the only guns was branded a traitor to the nation.

Calling the president a Zionist for wanting one army, means that you see the militia, not the state, as the real Lebanon.

Aoun answered the charge himself when he declared the army sovereign in the south "despite doubts, accusations of treason, insults and slander." He knows exactly what he's being called.

Then ask who is tearing the country apart.

The Lebanon with one army holds together.

Or the Lebanon with two, a state and a militia that drags it into wars its people never voted for and leaves 80% of them in poverty in a country torn for generations.

The accusation flips the cause and the effect.

Aoun's bet is not safe. If he's pushed to disarm Hezbollah by force before it fades on its own, that's the civil war his critics warn about, and he would own that disaster. But putting the state above the militia isn't treason. It's the first serious attempt in decades to make Lebanon a country instead of a launchpad.

Once again, no one here benefits from a war. Israel doesn't, it already gets what it wants. Iran doesn't, it just signed its way out. The US wants the deal to hold. The Gulf states want Lebanon calm enough to rebuild and profit.

And Hezbollah can't win one, because everything that made it strong, Iranian resupply, a street it could fill in an afternoon, a community that spoke through it alone, has drained away at the same time.

When nobody at the table wins by fighting, the fighting is theatre. The war threats are the last bargaining chip of a group that knows it's being dismantled.

Zoom out.

One by one Iran's proxies have been wound down, Hamas, the Houthis, the Iraqi militias, now Hezbollah. Iran isn't surrendering. It kept its government and walked away with one lever it still controls, the Strait of Hormuz, where a fifth of the world's oil passes.

It's merely trading the fighters it can no longer afford for power it can keep, oil, money, a seat at the table that rebuilds the region.

The age of Iran's proxies is ending, along with Israels ambitions.