“If we were to rank the Chinese Communist Party’s ‘overseas party schools,’ the one deserving top spot has to be Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government in the US.”
For decades, the CCP has sent thousands of mid-career and senior bureaucrats to pursue executive training and postgraduate studies on US campuses, with Harvard University a coveted destination described by some in China as the top “party school” outside the country.
Other US colleges that have offered executive training to Chinese officials include Syracuse, Stanford, the University of Maryland and Rutgers. Syracuse’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, for instance, helped set up postgraduate programs in public administration at Chinese universities in the early 2000s.
Beyond the US, Chinese officials have also flocked to leading universities in countries including Singapore, Japan and the UK.
Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University is among the most popular, having trained thousands of Chinese officials since the early 1990s, mostly through postgraduate programs colloquially known as the “Mayors’ Class.”
Harvard enjoys a sterling reputation among Chinese officials thanks to its record in training highflying bureaucrats who went on to take senior government roles and, in some cases, join the party’s elite Politburo. Some observers dubbed Harvard a de facto “party school,” as the party’s own training academies for promising bureaucrats are known.
Some children of top Communist Party officials have also attended Harvard for undergraduate and postgraduate studies.
Xi’s daughter, Mingze, attended Harvard as an undergraduate in the early 2010s under an assumed name, though Harvard administrators and some faculty members were aware of her identity. She had enrolled while her father was China’s vice president and leader-in-waiting and graduated after he took power.
Other Harvard alumni with elite backgrounds include Alvin Jiang, a grandson of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin, as well as Bo Guagua, the son of the former Politburo member Bo Xilai.
Bo Guagua attended Harvard Kennedy School from 2010 to 2012 and earned a master’s degree in public policy. His father was purged in 2012 and was sentenced to life imprisonment the following year on charges of bribery, embezzlement and abuse of power.
https://t.co/V0t56szWAp
The CCP thrives behind closed doors, making lofty promises it never intends to fulfill. It hides its duplicity beneath a thin mask of performative pride and moral outrage. Unlike cultures where honor is genuinely tied to keeping one's word, the Party’s “face” and phony entreaty for "respect" is a tool—weaponized to guilt, manipulate, and distract. Never forget: you are not dealing with diplomats; you are dealing with ideological operators trained in the dark arts of leverage, lying, and manipulation. Secret diplomacy with the CCP has always worked to the detriment of the U.S..
📚 台灣翻譯書名的「超譯」現象,你發現了嗎? 🤔
最近想把美國副總統JD Vance范斯寫的書推薦給台灣的朋友。原文書名是 Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis(可以翻譯成「鄉下人哀歌:一個家庭與文化危機的回憶錄」),結果發現台灣版的翻譯竟然是:《絕望者之歌:一個美國白人家族的悲劇與重生》。這讓我有點驚訝,因為這個標題其實跟原文差還蠻多的,甚至可以說是「加料翻譯」。
⚠️ 問題出在哪裡?
1️⃣ Hillbilly 是指美國阿巴拉契亞地區的鄉村白人,帶有文化和階級意涵,但台灣版卻直接翻成「絕望者」,完全改變了原意。你也可以當很驕傲Hillbilly(JD Vance就是這樣形容自己),不一定要「絕望」。還有這個詞很多情況下含有歧視的意思,跟中文裡面的「鄉巴佬」差不多,范斯故意用了這詞,對譯者來說確實需要一點技巧才能翻好,但是絕對沒有「絕望者」的含義。
2️⃣ 「一個美國白人家族的悲劇與重生」 這部分其實最讓人覺得翻譯得有點亂七八糟。原書名並沒有特別強調「白人」,而是更關注家庭與危機中的文化。「文化危機」”Culture in Crisis”完全被省略,這才是本書最核心的主題!
這樣的翻譯方式,讓許多台灣讀者在還沒買書之前,就已經對這本書可能產生了誤解。這種「超譯」的做法,可能扭曲原作者的真正意圖。
其實這不是個案,台灣很多外文書的翻譯標題都會「自帶劇透」,甚至直接換個意思。不知道大家有沒有看過哪些「超譯」得太誇張的書名呢?歡迎分享!📖
#台灣翻譯 #超譯現象 #HillbillyElegy #書名翻譯 #文化差異
President Trump’s recent remarks about Ukraine overlook crucial strategic realities. His description of Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a “modestly successful comedian” who tricked the U.S. into supporting his country downplays the stakes of this war and the importance of American leadership.
First, Ukraine is not just another country seeking aid—it is the front line of a global struggle against authoritarian expansion. If Ukraine falls, it will send a message to China, Iran, and other regimes that invasions and territorial grabs will go unchallenged. Even though Europe has acted very badly, and German policies (particularly climate hysteria) were the key reason for energy reliance of the continent on russia, this war is not just Europe’s problem. A russian victory would embolden China, particularly in its ambitions toward Taiwan, which should be a top concern for the U.S.
Second, the claim that Zelenskyy is a “dictator without elections” ignores the reality of war. Ukraine is in an existential fight for survival, with millions displaced and soldiers on the front lines. Holding elections under these conditions would be logistically impossible and unfair. Meanwhile, Putin, who has eliminated all real opposition, is the true dictator. Russia has elections in name only—his political rivals are imprisoned, exiled, or worse.
Third, the idea that this war “never had to start” and that only Trump can end it misrepresents the situation. Putin, not NATO or Ukraine, chose to invade. Any settlement that is without true security guarantees to Ukraine would not bring real peace—it would reward aggression and invite further conflicts. History has shown that appeasement does not work.
Finally, while Europe should contribute more, the idea that US support is wasted is misleading. A weakened Ukraine would be a strategic failure for America. It would damage US credibility, strengthen Russia’s influence, and benefit China, which would be happy to see the US retreat from global leadership.
Trump has a reputation for strong, deal-making leadership. But true leadership means standing with allies, ensuring long-term security, and preventing adversaries from gaining the upper hand. The U.S. has a clear interest in making sure Ukraine succeeds—not just for Ukraine, but for global stability.