This is pretty hilarious: Modi's media in India constantly frame China as fundamentally untrustworthy but, when push comes to shove, it's obviously the one neighbor that he personally trusts with his own life 😏
Deeply moved by the heartfelt condolences and solidarity extended by President Xi Jinping and the people of China. In this hour of national grief, PRC’s prompt support once again reaffirms the enduring strength of our time-tested bilateral friendship.
Ironically, the primary purpose of the Three Gorges Dam is flood control, not power production, although that is of course an important secondary function of the facility.
The question "what if the dam fails?" is an incomplete hypothetical. Any engineering project, from a bridge to a skyscraper to a power plant, has some small risk of failure. The probabilistic question that should be asked is: "what is the risk if the dam isn't there?"
For that, we don't have to look for hypothetical counterfactuals. Before the Three Gorges Dam was built, major flooding events along the Yangtze occurred in 1998, 1954, 1935, and 1931, to name just the 20th century ones. Hundreds of thousands drowned across these events, plus several million deaths more attributed to subsequent disease and starvation.
If there is rainfall downstream at the same time as snowmelt or rainfall upstream, the combined water ingress can cause rivers and lakes to burst their banks, flooding communities and croplands. The reservoir functions as a huge sponge, absorbing upstream water to shield bodies of water downstream. It can also release water at strategic times later, for example to stabilize water supply during droughts.
Since the dam's construction, there have been two major flood seasons on the Yangtze, in 2010 and 2020, and neither produced mortality anywhere close to the past. So the 3GD is not just NOT a "really terrible" idea; it is probably among the most life-saving hydraulic engineering projects ever undertaken...AND it produces power.
Many hydroelectric facilities worldwide share this design logic, including Egypt's Aswan Dam, built to control the flooding of the Nile River, and India's Hirakud Dam, built to control the flooding of the Mahanadi River. To a lesser extent, the USA's Hoover Dam and TVA dam projects as well. All were conceived as water management projects first and power projects second.
Ox Alpha was doing 100T tokens/day, so many thought it was Gemini.
Turns out it's GLM-5.3-Flash on Chinese chips.
Jensen was right on Dwarkesh podcast: export controls may accelerate China’s NVIDIA-independent AI stack.
Quite right. There is a fundamental reason the Western hegemonic view feels certain from one side and almost unnecessary from the Chinese: we evolved along drastically different paths, to the extent that it is very difficult for western mindset to grapple with the Chinese one.
Western foreign policy is crafted by Western experience. Its polities passed through kingdoms and princedoms, the Westphalian settlement, and only later the modern Bismarckian nation-state. For much of that history, sovereignty over a territory was treated as property that could pass between houses. E.g. after abjuring Spain, the United Provinces offered theirs in turn to the Duke of Anjou, to Henri III, and in 1585 to Elizabeth I. Borders moved by war, marriage, and diplomacy.
But China is not only a nation-state. It is a self-contained ethno-civilisation that has been mapped onto a contiguous landmass since prehistoric times. We might have turned out to have the European multi-state experience were we not unified by the Qin in 221BC. What followed instead were intervals of peace under one rule, broken by stretches of disunity in which fragmented powers fought inside a shared frame. Thats why, in this political memory, the worst outcome is the fracture of a nation that ends in chaos and warlordism. All our wars were fought amongst ourselves, within our own broader turf. Ultimately, we remain one big, if messy, family.
Western political philosophy starts from a thought experiment: societies begin in anarchy, and the state exists because individuals consent to give up some natural liberty in exchange for protection. The Chinese sequence is the reverse. It begins with kinship groups on the Yellow River that thickened into polities. A collective preceded the individual; the state did not have to be imagined into being by contract.
Two histories yield two personalities. The West, pluralist in origin and contractual in self-conception, is extrovert. Sovereignty is permission the governed grant the state. If people elsewhere are seen as brutalised, intervention can become a moral obligation. Kennedy’s inaugural compresses the self-image: pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe. Hence the interventionist reflex. China, in its classic self-image, is introvert. It has little interest to dominate or rule, it is content with its own affairs. And this runs deep enough to be cultural: when Chinese emigrate to foreign lands, they build Chinatowns, not constituencies.