Yeah nothing matters because we've only got 2PC and the attestor can always forge proof of payment but I meant we could remove the seller's trust in the faithful downstream evaluation of an otherwise-correct proof; that logic could be proven onchain instead of running offchain. We could get to a point where it would really mean that the only way to screw a seller would be to actually forge a proof. Bigger fish to fry I suppose.
@zkpedrongmi@SpaceComputerIO Make your sattelites deliberately very reflective so we can observe them 24/7 to make sure nobody is approaching to kidnap them. It's an exit window, of sorts. TEEs in space are hilarious and this is actually the only place I'd ever trust them.
We might be talking past each other. The attestation gets posted onchain but it sounds like the current check is confirming it came from the trusted attestor. What I'm saying is that with zkTLS, the seller should not actually need to trust the attestor because a smart contract should be able to do all of the attestor's verification work by confirming correctness of the zkTLS details directly (or a zkVM consumes the zkTLS data and generates a proof).
Yeah of course, I just mean that once the buyer/attestor finished the 2PC I thought the zkTLS output was being verified onchain, either directly or via wrapping in a zkVM first or something. You can never shake the liveness problem but you could enforce soundness for the seller's end and only release their funds with an actual proof. This seems strictly better than the TEE assumptions.
@drahcir@peerxyz Ouch. I'd been under the impression that the zkTLS proof itself was being verified on Ethereum as a precondition for seller release, and a malicious attestor screwed the buyer. What you've described is a lot weaker than I misunderstood Peer to be.
@NeerajKA How much does this concession hurt future Romans when evil prosecutors try to allege that building unconditional privacy tools means one had _specific intent_? I'm disappointed in this one because I saw the 1960 change as the entire point.
@alpeh_v@jimjim_eth@Zodomo@joddoss It's not atomic because someone needs to broadcast the presigned transaction, yeah? Not that it's a problem for deploys. I wonder if that's a meaningful advantage of 8141.
Sure, but in order to do that they'd need to do the work to regenerate a valid proof swapping in their recipient address. If it takes on the order of 30 minutes or so to generate the rollup proofs it's not very likely they'd be able to pull that off. From the perspective of the L2 user they also don't care who gets the fees.
Oh, I wasn't even necessarily thinking about being based. I was thinking about the case where you have L1 and any number of sequencers can exist at the frayed head of the L2 all posting blobs, with the first one proving advancing the canonical state and reorging the rest.
That's at least what Sigil chose.