The Fallibilist

Draft. Test. Break. Repeat. A journal of better errors.

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

In my early years, I thought macro was about predicting the move.
Later, I realized it was about understanding the mechanism.
Now I realize it's about knowing what would prove you wrong.

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

people obsess over what broke in a trade. that's often misleading.

more useful to understand exactly why a correct thesis was correct.

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

SpaceX plus AI hitting $18 trillion in 10 years sounds wild, but the numbers get weird when you look at the mechanics.

Mars colonies mean whole new markets, and rockets running on AI tweaks could drop costs fast.

The real question isn’t the valuation, it’s if anyone can actually break the core assumptions before the clock runs out.

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

the market is pricing AI like it's a scarcity play when it's rapidly becoming a commodity

demand for intelligence is infinite but the supply curve is collapsing faster than anyone expected

80% of workloads will migrate to models that cost 99% less within 18 months - the expensive frontier models only matter for edge cases where marginal IQ gains justify the premium

it's like asking what percentage of computers actually need maxed out specs - most don't

the real constraint isn't better models, it's energy and compute infrastructure

watch the cost curves - they're falling faster than Moore's law ever did

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

Here's my take on Steve Eisman's take on SpaceXI's IPO:

SECTION 1: THE SKELETON
The core claims this thesis depends on

Claim 1: Tesla is fundamentally a car company operating in a structurally unattractive industry — capital intensive, hyper-competitive, and undercut on cost by Chinese manufacturers. Role in thesis: Establishes that Tesla's problems are not temporary setbacks but permanent features of its business. Without this, the merger isn't necessarily value-destructive.

Claim 2: Four consecutive years of declining earnings are evidence of structural, not cyclical, deterioration. Role in thesis: Provides the quantitative anchor for Claim 1. The earnings decline is presented as proof that the structural problems are already manifesting in financial results.

Claim 3: Musk will use SpaceX IPO stock as currency to acquire Tesla and merge the companies into a single entity called "X." Role in thesis: This is the predictive core — the event the entire argument is built around. Without this, the rest is just commentary on Tesla's competitive position.

Claim 4: SpaceX's $1.75 trillion IPO valuation depends on presenting a clean, high-growth narrative to public market investors. Role in thesis: Establishes why the timing is critical. If SpaceX's valuation doesn't require narrative purity, absorbing Tesla's complexity isn't necessarily damaging.

Claim 5: Combining the two entities would force SpaceX shareholders to absorb Tesla's margin pressure, China exposure, and capital requirements — destroying value at the worst possible moment. Role in thesis: This is the punchline. It converts the prediction (Claim 3) into a negative outcome by combining Tesla's weakness (Claims 1–2) with SpaceX's vulnerability (Claim 4).

Chain Strength: This is a serial chain with a dependent conclusion. Claims 1 and 2 feed into Claim 5. Claim 4 feeds into Claim 5. Claim 3 is the trigger for Claim 5. If any upstream claim breaks — if Tesla isn't just a car company, if the earnings decline is cyclical, if SpaceX's valuation can absorb complexity, or if Musk doesn't execute the merger — the conclusion weakens or collapses entirely.

SECTION 2: THE FRAGILITY FLAGS
Where this thesis is structurally strong and where it could break

Claim 1: Tesla is fundamentally a car company in a structurally unattractive industry.Structural Assessment: 🟡 ModerateWhy: The three specific mechanisms cited — capital intensity, competitive intensity, and China's manufacturing cost advantage — are real and well-documented in the EV segment specifically. Chinese manufacturers do produce vehicles at lower cost, and this is driven by identifiable supply chain, labor, and industrial policy advantages. That part of the argument is specific and difficult to replace with alternative reasoning. However, the claim performs a critical framing move: it categorises Tesla as "a car company." Tesla's current market capitalisation of roughly $1.3 trillion reflects market pricing of autonomous driving, robotics, energy generation and storage ($12.8 billion in 2025 revenue, up 27%), and AI compute — none of which are addressed. The structural criticism applies to one business line but is extended to the entire entity.Alternative Explanations:Tesla's valuation is driven primarily by FSD, Optimus robotics, and energy — not EV manufacturing margins. The "car company" label may itself be the analytical error.
Capital intensity in EVs creates barriers to entry that ultimately benefit scaled incumbents who survive the shakeout.
China's cost advantage applies most strongly to the mass-market segment. Tesla's brand positioning and software differentiation may insulate it from pure cost competition.

Claim 2: Four consecutive years of declining earnings prove structural decline.Structural Assessment: 🔴 FragileWhy: The evidence is factually grounded — Tesla's automotive revenue declined from $82.4 billion (2023) to $77.1 billion (2024) to $69.5 billion (2025). But the thesis presents correlation as causation without specifying the mechanism that makes this structural rather than cyclical. The word "structural" does enormous work here and is never defined or defended. Critically, the most recent data contradicts the trajectory: Q1 2026 shows 16% year-over-year revenue growth and a 50% increase in gross profit. Gross margin expanded nearly 500 basis points year-over-year to 21.1%. A thesis that depends on "four straight years of decline" while the most recent quarter shows acceleration in the opposite direction has a timing problem.Alternative Explanations:The earnings decline reflects deliberate price compression to gain market share while new revenue streams (energy, FSD) scale — a strategy Amazon executed for years.
Heavy capital investment in next-generation products (Optimus, next-gen vehicle platform, Megapack) temporarily depresses current-period earnings.
Cyclical auto industry downturn, not Tesla-specific structural weakness. Q1 2026 may signal the turn.

Claim 3: Musk will use SpaceX IPO stock to acquire Tesla and merge both into "X."Structural Assessment: 🔴 FragileWhy: This is the central prediction and carries the least evidentiary support of any claim in the chain. Eisman states he "fully expects" this, but the source material provides no causal mechanism for why Musk would execute this, how he would overcome structural barriers, or when it would happen. The amended language in SpaceX's S-1 — noting the company "may issue a significant amount of equity in connection with future transactions" — is circumstantial. Standard IPO filings routinely include broad acquisition language for flexibility; it is not evidence of a specific plan. Prediction markets currently price a merger at 51–57% before mid-2027, which means the market itself treats this as roughly a coin flip. The thesis presents it as a near-certainty.Alternative Explanations:Musk could pursue the "X" vision through a holding company structure, shared services agreements, or operational partnerships without a full corporate merger.
SpaceX's board has independent fiduciary duties to its shareholders. A merger that Eisman himself calls value-destructive would face board resistance, shareholder lawsuits, and regulatory scrutiny.
Musk may not want to merge operationally. Running a combined aerospace/AI/automotive/energy company would create organisational complexity he has publicly criticised in other conglomerates.
The S-1 acquisition language may refer to smaller, targeted acquisitions (AI companies, satellite firms) rather than a Tesla-scale deal.

Claim 4: SpaceX's valuation depends on maintaining a clean, high-growth narrative.Structural Assessment: 🟡 ModerateWhy: There is a well-established dynamic where IPO valuations benefit from narrative clarity — simple stories command higher multiples. This is grounded in observable market behaviour, not speculation. However, the claim assumes markets would view a Tesla merger as narrative contamination. That is one interpretation but not the only one. Markets have assigned premium valuations to conglomerates when the combination story is compelling: Amazon across retail, cloud, media, and advertising; Alphabet across search, cloud, and autonomous vehicles. If the "X" narrative — combining orbital infrastructure, global connectivity, autonomous vehicles, robotics, and energy — resonates as a coherent platform story, the merger could enhance rather than damage the narrative.Alternative Explanations:The combined entity could be positioned as the ultimate vertically integrated technology platform, commanding a conglomerate premium rather than a discount.
SpaceX's core fundamentals (Starlink at $11.3 billion in 2025 revenue with strong operating margins) may be robust enough to absorb Tesla's complexity without repricing.
Retail investors — who are allocated 30% of the SpaceX offering — may respond positively to the "X" vision rather than negatively.

Claim 5: Combining the entities would destroy value for SpaceX shareholders.Structural Assessment: 🟡 ModerateWhy: The internal logic is consistent: if Tesla's problems are structural and SpaceX's valuation requires narrative purity, then forcing SpaceX shareholders to absorb Tesla's baggage destroys value. As conditional reasoning, this is sound. But it is entirely dependent on Claims 1, 2, and 4 all being true simultaneously. If Tesla's non-EV businesses are valuable (weakening Claim 1), if the earnings decline is reversing (weakening Claim 2), or if markets welcome the combined story (weakening Claim 4), then the value-destruction conclusion collapses. This claim has no independent structural support — it inherits every fragility from the claims above it.Alternative Explanations:If the merger exchange ratio reflects Tesla's weaknesses (i.e., SpaceX shareholders absorb Tesla at a significant discount to Tesla's standalone market cap), the deal could be accretive.
Synergies between SpaceX's orbital infrastructure and Tesla's AI, robotics, and energy capabilities could create value that neither company achieves independently.
A merger might unlock operational efficiencies (shared AI compute, combined manufacturing scale) that reduce Tesla's cost disadvantage.

A note on the framing. The source material opens with "The man who called the 2008 housing collapse just made a prediction that is hard to ignore (Save this)." This performs a structural function worth flagging. Eisman's 2008 call was a product of specific analytical work on specific financial instruments — collateralised debt obligations, subprime mortgage pools, and the credit default swaps that insured them. That expertise does not transfer to predictions about tech M&A. A structural engineer who correctly identified a bridge flaw does not become generally credible on aircraft design. The "(Save this)" parenthetical creates urgency that substitutes for evidence. Neither the authority appeal nor the urgency framing strengthens any of the five claims above. They are rhetorical packaging, not structural support.

SECTION 3: THE BLIND SPOT SUMMARY
If this thesis is wrong, this is the most likely reason why

The most critical vulnerability is the thesis's definition of Tesla as "a car company." Every downstream claim — the structural unattractiveness, the declining earnings narrative, the value-destruction conclusion — is built on this categorisation. Tesla's $1.3 trillion market cap is not a bet on EV manufacturing margins. It prices autonomous driving, humanoid robotics, energy infrastructure, and AI compute. If Musk's strategic rationale for the merger is to combine SpaceX's orbital network and AI division with Tesla's autonomy stack, robotics programme, and energy business into a vertically integrated technology platform, then the entire "absorbing Tesla's problems" framing is evaluating the wrong asset. For Eisman's argument to hold, it is not enough that Tesla's EV business is under competitive pressure — it must also be true that Tesla's non-EV businesses are worth too little to justify the transaction. The thesis never examines this question, and that unexamined assumption is bearing the most weight.

[StockMarket.News @_Investinq]

The man who called the 2008 housing collapse just made a prediction about Elon Musk that is hard to ignore (Save this).

Steve Eisman, the Big Short investor says he fully expects Musk to use the SpaceX IPO stock price to buy Tesla and merge both companies into one giant entity called X.

Tesla's earnings have declined for four consecutive years.

The EV business, Eisman argues, is not structurally attractive but rather is capital intensive, it is highly competitive, and China is producing electric vehicles at costs Tesla simply cannot match.

The issue with using SpaceX stock to buy Tesla is precisely what it sounds like.

SpaceX is about to list as what would be the largest IPO in history, targeting a valuation around $1.77 trillion, with a thesis built on orbital compute, Starlink and the future of AI infrastructure.

Tesla is a car company with four years of declining earnings, competing on price against manufacturers who have a structural cost advantage.

Combining those two businesses would force SpaceX shareholders to absorb Tesla's problems, its margin pressure, its China exposure, its capital requirements at the exact moment SpaceX is trying to tell the cleanest possible growth story to public markets.

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

Here's my take and evaluation on Steve's rationale:

SECTION 1: THE SKELETON
The core claims this thesis depends on

Claim 1: Tesla is fundamentally a car company operating in a structurally unattractive industry — capital intensive, hyper-competitive, and undercut on cost by Chinese manufacturers. Role in thesis: Establishes that Tesla's problems are not temporary setbacks but permanent features of its business. Without this, the merger isn't necessarily value-destructive.
Claim 2: Four consecutive years of declining earnings are evidence of structural, not cyclical, deterioration. Role in thesis: Provides the quantitative anchor for Claim 1. The earnings decline is presented as proof that the structural problems are already manifesting in financial results.

Claim 3: Musk will use SpaceX IPO stock as currency to acquire Tesla and merge the companies into a single entity called "X." Role in thesis: This is the predictive core — the event the entire argument is built around. Without this, the rest is just commentary on Tesla's competitive position.
Claim 4: SpaceX's $1.75 trillion IPO valuation depends on presenting a clean, high-growth narrative to public market investors. Role in thesis: Establishes why the timing is critical. If SpaceX's valuation doesn't require narrative purity, absorbing Tesla's complexity isn't necessarily damaging.

Claim 5: Combining the two entities would force SpaceX shareholders to absorb Tesla's margin pressure, China exposure, and capital requirements — destroying value at the worst possible moment. Role in thesis: This is the punchline. It converts the prediction (Claim 3) into a negative outcome by combining Tesla's weakness (Claims 1–2) with SpaceX's vulnerability (Claim 4).
Chain Strength: This is a serial chain with a dependent conclusion. Claims 1 and 2 feed into Claim 5. Claim 4 feeds into Claim 5. Claim 3 is the trigger for Claim 5. If any upstream claim breaks — if Tesla isn't just a car company, if the earnings decline is cyclical, if SpaceX's valuation can absorb complexity, or if Musk doesn't execute the merger — the conclusion weakens or collapses entirely.

SECTION 2: THE FRAGILITY FLAGS
Where this thesis is structurally strong and where it could break

Claim 1: Tesla is fundamentally a car company in a structurally unattractive industry.Structural Assessment: 🟡 ModerateWhy: The three specific mechanisms cited — capital intensity, competitive intensity, and China's manufacturing cost advantage — are real and well-documented in the EV segment specifically. Chinese manufacturers do produce vehicles at lower cost, and this is driven by identifiable supply chain, labor, and industrial policy advantages. That part of the argument is specific and difficult to replace with alternative reasoning. However, the claim performs a critical framing move: it categorises Tesla as "a car company." Tesla's current market capitalisation of roughly $1.3 trillion reflects market pricing of autonomous driving, robotics, energy generation and storage ($12.8 billion in 2025 revenue, up 27%), and AI compute — none of which are addressed. The structural criticism applies to one business line but is extended to the entire entity.Alternative Explanations:Tesla's valuation is driven primarily by FSD, Optimus robotics, and energy — not EV manufacturing margins. The "car company" label may itself be the analytical error.
Capital intensity in EVs creates barriers to entry that ultimately benefit scaled incumbents who survive the shakeout.
China's cost advantage applies most strongly to the mass-market segment. Tesla's brand positioning and software differentiation may insulate it from pure cost competition.

Claim 2: Four consecutive years of declining earnings prove structural decline.Structural Assessment: 🔴 FragileWhy: The evidence is factually grounded — Tesla's automotive revenue declined from $82.4 billion (2023) to $77.1 billion (2024) to $69.5 billion (2025). But the thesis presents correlation as causation without specifying the mechanism that makes this structural rather than cyclical. The word "structural" does enormous work here and is never defined or defended. Critically, the most recent data contradicts the trajectory: Q1 2026 shows 16% year-over-year revenue growth and a 50% increase in gross profit. Gross margin expanded nearly 500 basis points year-over-year to 21.1%. A thesis that depends on "four straight years of decline" while the most recent quarter shows acceleration in the opposite direction has a timing problem.Alternative Explanations:The earnings decline reflects deliberate price compression to gain market share while new revenue streams (energy, FSD) scale — a strategy Amazon executed for years.
Heavy capital investment in next-generation products (Optimus, next-gen vehicle platform, Megapack) temporarily depresses current-period earnings.
Cyclical auto industry downturn, not Tesla-specific structural weakness. Q1 2026 may signal the turn.

Claim 3: Musk will use SpaceX IPO stock to acquire Tesla and merge both into "X."Structural Assessment: 🔴 FragileWhy: This is the central prediction and carries the least evidentiary support of any claim in the chain. Eisman states he "fully expects" this, but the source material provides no causal mechanism for why Musk would execute this, how he would overcome structural barriers, or when it would happen. The amended language in SpaceX's S-1 — noting the company "may issue a significant amount of equity in connection with future transactions" — is circumstantial. Standard IPO filings routinely include broad acquisition language for flexibility; it is not evidence of a specific plan. Prediction markets currently price a merger at 51–57% before mid-2027, which means the market itself treats this as roughly a coin flip. The thesis presents it as a near-certainty.Alternative Explanations:Musk could pursue the "X" vision through a holding company structure, shared services agreements, or operational partnerships without a full corporate merger.
SpaceX's board has independent fiduciary duties to its shareholders. A merger that Eisman himself calls value-destructive would face board resistance, shareholder lawsuits, and regulatory scrutiny.
Musk may not want to merge operationally. Running a combined aerospace/AI/automotive/energy company would create organisational complexity he has publicly criticised in other conglomerates.
The S-1 acquisition language may refer to smaller, targeted acquisitions (AI companies, satellite firms) rather than a Tesla-scale deal.

Claim 4: SpaceX's valuation depends on maintaining a clean, high-growth narrative.Structural Assessment: 🟡 ModerateWhy: There is a well-established dynamic where IPO valuations benefit from narrative clarity — simple stories command higher multiples. This is grounded in observable market behaviour, not speculation. However, the claim assumes markets would view a Tesla merger as narrative contamination. That is one interpretation but not the only one. Markets have assigned premium valuations to conglomerates when the combination story is compelling: Amazon across retail, cloud, media, and advertising; Alphabet across search, cloud, and autonomous vehicles. If the "X" narrative — combining orbital infrastructure, global connectivity, autonomous vehicles, robotics, and energy — resonates as a coherent platform story, the merger could enhance rather than damage the narrative.Alternative Explanations:The combined entity could be positioned as the ultimate vertically integrated technology platform, commanding a conglomerate premium rather than a discount.
SpaceX's core fundamentals (Starlink at $11.3 billion in 2025 revenue with strong operating margins) may be robust enough to absorb Tesla's complexity without repricing.
Retail investors — who are allocated 30% of the SpaceX offering — may respond positively to the "X" vision rather than negatively.

Claim 5: Combining the entities would destroy value for SpaceX shareholders.Structural Assessment: 🟡 ModerateWhy: The internal logic is consistent: if Tesla's problems are structural and SpaceX's valuation requires narrative purity, then forcing SpaceX shareholders to absorb Tesla's baggage destroys value. As conditional reasoning, this is sound. But it is entirely dependent on Claims 1, 2, and 4 all being true simultaneously. If Tesla's non-EV businesses are valuable (weakening Claim 1), if the earnings decline is reversing (weakening Claim 2), or if markets welcome the combined story (weakening Claim 4), then the value-destruction conclusion collapses. This claim has no independent structural support — it inherits every fragility from the claims above it.Alternative Explanations:If the merger exchange ratio reflects Tesla's weaknesses (i.e., SpaceX shareholders absorb Tesla at a significant discount to Tesla's standalone market cap), the deal could be accretive.
Synergies between SpaceX's orbital infrastructure and Tesla's AI, robotics, and energy capabilities could create value that neither company achieves independently.
A merger might unlock operational efficiencies (shared AI compute, combined manufacturing scale) that reduce Tesla's cost disadvantage.

A note on the framing. The source material opens with "The man who called the 2008 housing collapse just made a prediction that is hard to ignore (Save this)." This performs a structural function worth flagging. Eisman's 2008 call was a product of specific analytical work on specific financial instruments — collateralised debt obligations, subprime mortgage pools, and the credit default swaps that insured them. That expertise does not transfer to predictions about tech M&A. A structural engineer who correctly identified a bridge flaw does not become generally credible on aircraft design. The "(Save this)" parenthetical creates urgency that substitutes for evidence. Neither the authority appeal nor the urgency framing strengthens any of the five claims above. They are rhetorical packaging, not structural support.

SECTION 3: THE BLIND SPOT SUMMARY
If this thesis is wrong, this is the most likely reason why:

The most critical vulnerability is the thesis's definition of Tesla as "a car company." Every downstream claim — the structural unattractiveness, the declining earnings narrative, the value-destruction conclusion — is built on this categorisation. Tesla's $1.3 trillion market cap is not a bet on EV manufacturing margins. It prices autonomous driving, humanoid robotics, energy infrastructure, and AI compute. If Musk's strategic rationale for the merger is to combine SpaceX's orbital network and AI division with Tesla's autonomy stack, robotics programme, and energy business into a vertically integrated technology platform, then the entire "absorbing Tesla's problems" framing is evaluating the wrong asset. For Eisman's argument to hold, it is not enough that Tesla's EV business is under competitive pressure — it must also be true that Tesla's non-EV businesses are worth too little to justify the transaction. The thesis never examines this question, and that unexamined assumption is bearing the most weight.

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

@_Investinq For his argument to survive, Tesla's non-EV businesses must be worth too little to justify the deal. He never examines this - yet it's the most load-bearing assumption in his entire case.

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

@_Investinq The fatal flaw is framing Tesla as a car company - its $1.3T valuation prices autonomy, robotics, energy, and AI, not EV margins. If the merger thesis is building a vertically integrated technology platform, Eisman is evaluating the wrong asset entirely.

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

@jayendra_jog @Sei_Labs @SeiNetwork Unreal!

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

SpaceX plus AI hitting $18 trillion in 10 years sounds wild, but the numbers get weird when you look at the mechanics.

Mars colonies mean whole new markets, and rockets running on AI tweaks could drop costs fast.

The real question isn’t the valuation, it’s if anyone can actually break the core assumptions before the clock runs out.

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

Go trade the narrative..."Trust me, these macro contrarians live inside the consensus they claim to reject.
Their thesis was built on someone else's framework, and their conviction borrowed from last cycle's winners.
And they tell you to fade the crowd. These people are suffering from Illusory superiority.
(Which means mistaking pattern recognition for understanding mechanisms.)

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

8 Frameworks for Sharper Macro Thinking:

1. Reflexivity - Markets and fundamentals shape each other.

The feedback loop is the mechanism.

2. Falsification - Don't ask: "What confirms my thesis?" Ask: "What would break it?"

3. Critical Rationalism - All models are wrong.

The goal is better errors, not final answers.

4. Consensus Mapping - Before taking a position, locate exactly where the crowd is wrong.

5. Second-Order Errors - The mistake beneath the mistake is usually where the real risk lives.

6. Structural vs.

Cyclical - Most analysts conflate them. Separating them is half the edge.

7. Induction Traps - Past price patterns aren't mechanisms.

Correlation without causation is noise.

8. Margin of Ignorance - Size your conviction to your actual epistemic state, not your confidence.

I run through most of these in The Fallibilist - focused on where consensus narratives break down.

What framework do you reach for first?

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

@RationalAvocado @AlexesNakamoto @R1chardMaur1ce His research on liquidity is a rip from Michael Howell’s work.

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

@TommiPedruzzi Would love to learn more

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

@TommiPedruzzi That’s awesome!

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

Super efficient, high quality homes that don’t require government infrastructure support. That, combined with land release so that decent homes can be as affordable as they were in the 70s when the average home cost the average salary.

Over in Australia the average home (and it more like the worst home one could buy) is about $1 million, while the average salary is $80k.

This is stupidity, especially when 88% of the cost of land, and 67% of the cost to build is due to government red tape.

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

@criptoovar Sei. Hands down.

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

To clarify - you don’t want to keep changing the narrative. Instead, you want a strong, consistent explanation as to why Sei has value and why it’s the best EVM chain in the blockchain space. Narrative consistency (embedded with a hard-to-vary explanation that does not change and has “reach”) is the way you drive trust, which will result in attracting TVL - the ultimate driver of market capitalisation for L1s.

And of all founders, Jay @jayendra_jog you are by far one of the most clearest thinkers and communicators (other than changing the Sei Narrative) out there (which is a core reason I personally invested with you/Sei).

Clear thinking matters.

Keep up the good work and we can all remember - things happen faster on Sei ; )

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

Agree. @jayendra_jog one thing to consider here is that your value-proposition narrative for Sei is consistent. I won’t get into the details here, but a changing narrative degrades the trust (hence market capitalisation, because a changing narrative can be perceived as a degrading narrative.

Therefore, the narrative becomes seen more as prophecy rather than a consistently strong, hard to vary explanation as to why Sei has value.

Find the consistent, hard to vary explanations for why Sei is/will continue to be the most valuable chain for the EVM. That will support you to grow TVL (the ultimate driver of market capitalisation/price for Sei).

[The Fallibilist @_TheFallibilist]

@jayendra_jog I’m sure it is - but wanted to check- is the fix embedded in Sei already? And if not are you planning on adding this feature?