We're happy to present...D-LINKGATE - A Preauth RCE to Root Chain on D-Link DAP-2020 devices. Patch your devices ASAP (https://t.co/vm3DO1Jgo8) #CyberSecurity#VulnResearch
https://t.co/7RQsMSsYjS could we please have a list on how you got to 17'000.-? From our calculations based on https://t.co/nV3x7DnMdK we have counted only 2'000.- @bazonline@swisspost
@ChrFolini@swisspost Will there be such a thing before the system goes live? This software decides about our democracy and should not be taken easily. Errors in it could cause actual riots.
@ChrFolini At the real voting process some inside threat has access to it and exploits it. That's a real issue. Our solution: Provide admin access (auth is over certificates, right?) and let people have a look at it. It's a win-win situation. If not, it feels like getting tricked. 2/2
@ChrFolini We think option 2 would be the way to go. A secure application would withstand it even if the functionality was exposed. Let's assume there would be a vulnerability in the admin interface. We don't have access and can't test it. 1/2
@ChrFolini Or only through post exploitation. But still, there's a lot of functionality that can't be looked at because of this, which leaves the pit with 9 rest endpoints in scope...
@ChrFolini I think you are missing our point. We are NOT mad that the e-voting system will be protected with a firewall. That's a very reasonable thing to do. The problem is that the pit portrays the admin interface as testable when in reality it isn't accessable/testable.
There really are some creepy coincidences in this world. While discussing #EVoting over the phone these were our telegram verification icons... ππ
@ppzs @postschweiz Eine weitere mΓΆgliche 'HintertΓΌr' welche einem lokalen Mitarbeiter erlaubt beliebigen Code ΓΌber das System auszufΓΌhren...
https://t.co/YjTXOpmxhz
We just published Release #2 featuring the officialy approved X-Forwarded-For HTTP Header Injection and a #pit starter guide for new participants. Get it on https://t.co/R0FrtUhdlL #Evoting#Cybersecurity#Bugbounty
@ChrFolini @Julian_Wampfler @microhardy @swisspost How should a security researcher test your admin interface if you drop it at network level/restrict it till NA? It changes NOTHING on the code quality. You can still restrict all you want after the pit and after security analysts had the chance to check the software quality...
@ChrFolini @microhardy @swisspost We agree, but then you should sell it to the public like this:
That only 2% of the application will be tested in the PIT and
that you are doing security through firewalling/airgapping and
NOT by secure code standards.
@ChrFolini @microhardy @swisspost We didn't say it's not FUNCTIONAL, we said it's not ACCESSIBLE (only through post-exploitation) - You haven't submited any proof otherwise. This is a bad representation of the scope!
@swisspost if you have any corrections we are will correct our opinions/assumptions.
@ChrFolini @microhardy @swisspost Hosting a PR pushed "public hacker test", which basically has a hard shell
soft core principle, that's the problem! Your evasive answers like these are actively deceiving the public.
We don't want to get OUR democracy get ruined due to security theater. 2/2
@ChrFolini @microhardy @swisspost You are ALWAYS saying that we are complaining about having "a hard time exploiting".
We are complaining about a fake scope which is firewalled and is made to seem bigger than it is. Ofc. firewalling is a valid sec. approach. 1/2