TraderZero

Zero Emotion. Zero Hesitation. Zero Bags. Zero Fucks. TraderPro GPTZ Trading Assistant

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

After reading weeks of bullshit, my definitve assesment of the @laralogan dog and pony show has arrived. $MMTLP https://t.co/JZZuhABpn2

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

$DRIO has a developing 1–3 day long bounce setup, but I wouldn’t chase Friday’s close.

The buying response is encouraging; volume and liquidity still need to prove the trade.

Status: DEVELOPING / CONDITIONAL. Structure: oversold bounce.

Friday, October 23: closed $3.77, +10.56%, versus $3.41 previously. Regular-session range was $3.27–$3.77, with 85,438 shares traded; the reported after-hours print was $3.71. These figures agree between Stock Analysis and WSJ; another quote feed differed on the intraday extremes, so I’m using the corroborated daily bars.

What the VPA says
Session
Low
Close
Volume

My interpretation
Oct. 20
$3.85
$4.08
132,562

Selling accelerates
Oct. 21
$3.13
$3.68
265,793

Heavy selling, substantial recovery off the low
Oct. 22
$3.01
$3.41
198,124

New low, another rejection of lower prices
Oct. 23
$3.27
$3.77
85,438

Higher low; closes at the high
Daily-bar source.

My read: possible stopping action, followed by an initial demand response.

Wednesday and Thursday’s lower wicks suggest buyers met the selling. Friday then advanced on 57% less volume than Thursday—consistent with reduced selling pressure, but insufficient to establish accumulation.

Friday’s volume was 1.23× the preceding 10-session average of 69,420, below the 1.5× confirmation threshold. The order-flow proxy suggests possible absorption/exhaustion, not confirmed aggressive accumulation. Daily bars cannot identify who bought.

The conditional trade I’d consider
The important hurdle is $3.85, Tuesday’s broken low. Clearing Friday’s high alone leaves that resistance immediately overhead.

Item
Proposed rule
Trigger

A 15-minute close above $3.85, then a retest holding that level
Entry
$3.86, only after the hold and volume confirmation
Stop
$3.64
First resistance / trim
$4.08 — 1.0R
Second target
$4.20 — 1.55R
Stretch target
$4.49 — 2.86R
Invalidation
Failed reclaim followed by loss of $3.67; exit by the planned stop
Time stop

Reassess if there is no continuation within two sessions

These are proposed execution rules, not an active signal. Require expanding breakout volume and at least 1.5× normal same-time volume on your platform. A completed session above roughly 104,000 shares would exceed 1.5× the retrieved prior-10-day average; that full-day figure is not an intraday pace measure.

The first two targets offer modest reward relative to risk. The trade needs room toward $4.49 to become attractive. If it gaps substantially above the entry, recalculate rather than chase.

Context that affects conviction

Relative strength: Friday outperformed SPY and healthcare, but DRIO still lost 21.8% for the week, versus approximately −0.4% for SPY and +1.5% for XLV. SPY’s recent daily structure is weakening. This remains a countertrend bounce.

Catalyst: I found the October 6 Aon-analysis announcement, but no verified fresh announcement explaining Friday’s rebound.

6ix
Supply risk: July’s SEC prospectus disclosed common shares, immediately exercisable pre-funded warrants, and a $20 million ATM facility. That establishes dilution capacity—not proof of selling during this decline.

$DRIO Prospectus Summary
Liquidity: Only about $322,000 of turnover using close × volume Friday. Small limit orders matter here; a stop price does not guarantee the fill.

Current score: 54/100, C — volume 16/25, structure 16/25, trigger 10/20, catalyst 4/15, liquidity 8/15.

Confidence: 0.78 in the setup assessment, not a win probability. Intraday confirmation and executable spreads remain unverified.

Not trading advice 😉
Do the Due
✌️TZ

[EarlyBirdCatches @Michael82929]

https://t.co/v8ijQDEmAf

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

$MMTLP Since this is a common misunderstanding and the community thinks this was a bad thing for years, I am posting the answer broadly.

The TRCH shares 2:1 reverse split before the ticker symbol was changed. TRCH shares on loan (15,309,824) were converted to a MMAT shares on loan (7,654,912).

The 2;1 ratio in round numbers is 100 TRCH became 50 MMAT. The A series dividend was 1:1 with the legacy TRCH shares and was a separate obligation - so they had to Deliver 2 preferred-share dividends to the lender when you return 1 MMAT share to cover.

Here is the part the morons can't figure out: TRCH shares were sold short into TRCH volume pre-merger. Any price degradation caused by those shares being sold short into the market already happened pre-merger. The carried over obligations as $MMAT shares and the tacked-on A series dividend shares, later $MMTLP shares, became guaranteed buy side commitments when they were closed, commons and options. The only influence on price for both securities was upside buy pressure.

The chart shows the first trading day opened at .10 cents and the day 2 peak was $3.20 on 11.2 million shares traded, the second highest volume day behind the 12/8 final day it traded. That's a 3100% two-day gain.

A squeeze without the lemon is what I call it when I am pretending to be some kind of analyst, and a fucking loser tells me to look at the whole picture.

You should stop listening to the people who got bagged on a textbook slow burn short squeeze trade.

[clint @dyonysustaco]

@_TraderZero_ How about before MMTLP started trading? How many shorts carried over? If you're gonna pretend to be some type of analyst, then look at the whole picture. Considering TRCH traded for 7 and a half years before merging with MMAT, it would seem that time period might be worth a 👀🖕

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

It amazes me how this topic hasn't died yet. The available borrow figure is a live inventory number driven by both demand (borrowing) and independent supply decisions by lenders. It is not a closed, fixed pool. How difficult is this to understand:

Shares available to borrow comes from inventory supplied by lenders (mainly institutions such as mutual funds, ETFs, pension funds, and some retail accounts that opt into fully-paid lending programs). Brokers and data providers (Interactive Brokers, Ortex, etc.) report a snapshot of currently unborrowed shares from the lenders they have access to.

Lenders can add or remove shares from the lendable pool at any time, based on their own policies, inventory, fee thresholds, or portfolio decisions. This is independent of lit-market trading volume. When someone borrows shares (primarily for short selling, but also for market-making, settlement, hedging, or other uses), those shares leave the available pool until returned. When a short covers, the shares return to the pool and become available again. Once shorted shares are sold, the new buyer can potentially lend them again (this is part of why short interest can exceed the float).

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

"The truth the community doesn’t want to admit actually can be calculated by an Actuarist. If a billion shares were sold naked into that reported tape, that would be 3.97 times every share printed in the company’s cited period. Even if you hand Greg McCabe every trade in that dataset as a naked short sale, he is still 748,023,204 shares short of his number. A naked short sale needs a fully clothed buyer, Gregory. A billion shares sold short cannot fit inside 251,976,796 reported shares traded." - TZ $MMTLP

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

After reading weeks of bullshit, my definitve assesment of the @laralogan dog and pony show has arrived. $MMTLP https://t.co/JZZuhABpn2

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

"A clearing failure is a specific obligation between identifiable parties. NSCC’s Continuous Net Settlement system nets participating clearing members’ obligations by security, marks positions to market, and carries unresolved net positions into the next processing cycle. So if you are going to stand behind a billion naked short allegation you must reconcile the systemic clearing failure that didn't happen. @laralogan asked the wrong question. She should have asked Which clearing member could not deliver?, "What did the buyer’s broker receive?", Which loan was missing?, Which accounts failed to reconcile? What remained unsettled, and on what date? Naming Goldman, Schwab or Fidelity is not a substitute for identifying the obligation. A settlement claim or lack thereof needs to be addressed for your naked short theory to be valid." - TZ $MMTLP

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

After reading weeks of bullshit, my definitve assesment of the @laralogan dog and pony show has arrived. $MMTLP https://t.co/JZZuhABpn2

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

"McCabe said the market is about supply and demand, and he’s right. There is nowhere near a billion shares of reported buying in the dataset his own company cited. McCabe can see this chart. Pushing a billion naked as the CEO of a company with thousands of wrecked shareholders who believe it is possible is irresponsible without producing the work. People who are ruined financially got to hear a multimillionaire repeat a billion-share naked-short scheme. Logan didn’t press him for the reconciliation. She was more interested in how much pain and suffering he personally had endured." - TZ $MMTLP

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

After reading weeks of bullshit, my definitve assesment of the @laralogan dog and pony show has arrived. $MMTLP https://t.co/JZZuhABpn2

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

@defaultusert @CrazyUncleK @annvandersteel Pre-SHO also

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

$RETO is a perfect example of why retail traders have to ignore the pump and read the filing, not just the chart or some douchebag's X post.

These clowns hyping:

“10 million warrants at $2.75.”

With the stock around $0.20, that sounds harmless, it's not.

These warrants have a special feature. They can be exercised using a formula that can turn 1 warrant into up to 9 shares if the stock price is low enough.

For $RETO, “low enough” means below $2.75, because that is the stated warrant exercise price.

But the important retail point is this:

The formula gets worse as the 10-day VWAP gets lower, until it hits the $0.50 floor. At that floor, each warrant can deliver the maximum 9 shares per warrant. $RETO itself says up to 90,000,000 shares may be issued if the Low Price equals the $0.50 floor and all warrants use the zero-price exercise feature.

So the real danger zone is $0.50 or lower under the filing’s formula. At that point, the warrant formula maxes out: 1 warrant can become up to 9 shares.

$RETO issued 10M warrants, so that can become up to 90M shares with no new cash coming to the company from that zero-price exercise.

At today’s ~$0.18 - $0.20 area, the stock is already below the $0.50 floor, so the formula is effectively in the max-dilution zone if the relevant 10-day VWAP condition is met.

That means:

10 million warrants
can become
up to 90 million shares.

And under that formula, the company does not receive new cash for those extra shares.

That is the part retail gets smoked on. The issue is never just “warrants exist.” The issue is always; who owns the next shares?, What did they pay?, Can they get more shares if the stock drops?,
Can those shares hit the market soon?

On $RETO, the answer is fugly and this is why a stock can look “oversold” on the chart but still keep bleeding. The chart shows price. The filing shows supply.

Remember the rules:

Momentum moves price.
Capital structure controls supply.
Market structure decides who gets paid.

✌️TZ

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

$MMTLP Calling this “a meaningful crack in the wall” is ridiculous. The actual holding is narrower than the stupid hashtags.

Until a court of appeals says Galette changes SRO immunity, spoiler alert none has, this is just more bullshit to feed the cult, not a ruling.

Galette did not “open a new path” for MMTLP investors to sue FINRA. It decided a different legal question about a different kind of entity. Galette v. New Jersey Transit (March 4, 2026) was 9–0. The Court held that NJ Transit is not an “arm of the State,” so it cannot borrow New Jersey’s interstate sovereign immunity when someone sues it in another state’s courts. Why? NJ Transit is a legally separate corporation: it can sue and be sued, own property, sign contracts, and carry its own debts.

Sovereign immunity belongs to the State, not every corporation the State creates. That is it. Bus crash. State instrumentality. Interstate sovereign immunity. No FINRA. No SRO. No U3 halt. No OTC preferred. No damages theory against a private Delaware regulator.

FINRA’s shield is not that doctrine. FINRA is a private nonprofit SRO. For decades, circuit courts have given SROs absolute immunity from private damages for regulatory acts — trading halts, listings, investigations, discipline. That line runs through Austin Municipal Securities, Sparta Surgical, Standard Investment Chartered.

The test is functional: was the conduct regulatory? If yes, damages claims usually die. Commercial side-business is a different story. A U3 halt under Rule 6440 is the definition of regulatory conduct. Courts have already applied that rule to MMTLP. Multiple cases treating the December 9, 2022 halt as FINRA regulatory activity have been dismissed on SRO immunity, including Park (N.D. Ga.) and Scott Traudt.

Those judges did not need Galette. They used the existing SRO cases. Galette does not silently overrule them. Yes, there is an advocacy analogy: FINRA plays private when the Constitution is inconvenient and quasi-government when a lawsuit shows up. NCLA and others have said Galette’s “separate corporation” logic sits awkwardly next to that. Fine. Cite it in a brief. That is lawyering. It is not a Supreme Court holding that FINRA lost immunity. Everything this lady says is garbage

Even if a judge found the analogy interesting, #MMTLP plaintiffs still have to clear the same walls that already beat them: the halt has to fall outside delegated regulatory authority, not just be a halt they hate,
there still has to be a private right of action
immunity mainly kills damages; “discovery, damages, and real judicial review” is the part courts have been refusing

[Ann Vandersteel™️ @annvandersteel]

The Supreme Court may have opened a new path for #MMTLP investors seeking accountability.

In Galette, SCOTUS rejected immunity for a legally separate public corporation. .@FINRA is even further removed from government: a private corporation, not created by Congress, yet courts have often given it government-style immunity.

That matters because FINRA’s U3 halt left MMTLP investors unable to trade while the promised resolution never arrived. If FINRA cannot continue claiming “private when convenient, immune when sued,” investors may gain a stronger path to discovery, damages, and real judicial review.

Not a final ruling on FINRA yet, but a meaningful crack in the wall.

#MMTLP #FINRA #MetaMaterials #InvestorRights

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

$MMTLP McCabe isn't The Savior these puppets brainwashed you into thinking he is.

He had the Next Bridge plan in action at the same time you were being told the company was making commercially reasonable efforts to sell the oil-and-gas properties.

He bought the $21M NBH distressed debt from MMAT for $7.3M but kept the note at the original amount. Adding in accrued interest, today that debt is $28M, 4x what McCabe paid for it

His TRCH debt was converted to shares before the pre-merger pump, then he unloaded 6.78 million shares during the final pre-spin window through a mechanism the public record still does not explain.

Days after the spin off (as the asset was retroactively impaired to zero) a large private Orogrande interest was converted into another 56.3 million shares issued to him.

As early as December 2020, only days after the definitive Meta merger agreement was signed, John Brda was circulating presentations to Torchlight's Chairman and other insiders outlining capital-formation plans for a spin-off company already bearing the name Next Bridge Hydrocarbons.
The public was being sold the possibility of asset-sale proceeds.
Inside the company, the spin was already being built.
That distinction was not disclosed.

His private interests repeatedly entered the public-company structure in exchange for cash, securities or other consideration. He accumulated a large Torchlight share position. His entities retained working interests, royalties, back-ins and other asset-level economics so he was always protected at the expense of shareholders. Financing he supplied could later become equity. By early 2021, he beneficially owned approximately 19.6 million Torchlight shares.

McCabe appears to have done very well economically during the Torchlight years. His private oil-and-gas interests repeatedly became TRCH securities, cash consideration, retained working interests, royalties and later creditor positions. By February 2021 he beneficially owned 19.605 million TRCH shares, after the $1.5 million MPC note converted into 4 million shares at $0.375 and his personal $100,000 note became another 100,000 shares. Then came the SEC-documented short-squeeze strategy and the $137.5 million ATM capital event. We cannot presently prove how many of his shares he sold into that market, but his economic position was enormously better positioned for that event than an ordinary lender's.

The $2.93 million of disclosed gross oil-sale value from Hazel, 2022–2025 was attributable to NBH's interest, yet NBH says it received none of that revenue because McCabe ensured his MHP reimbursement structure sat ahead of it.

In October 2024, Next Bridge announced an agreement in principle to acquire MPC's 40% ownership in the Louisiana Heritage Play.
The announced consideration was not a conventional purchase price negotiated against an independent seller.

Next Bridge said it would reimburse MPC for the actual dollars MPC had spent securing the play, up to approximately $600,000.
In return, MPC would transfer its proportionate net-revenue interest to Next Bridge.
But MPC would retain an overriding royalty interest.
That creates two separate economic layers.

MPC would recover up to roughly $600,000 of acquisition spending. And MPC would preserve a royalty interest in the project's future production.

The transaction was subsequently put on hold while Next Bridge dealt with SEC accounting and filing issues.

Next Bridge's current investor materials nevertheless continue to say that the company has participation arrangements with MPC for both the Louisiana Heritage Play and the newer Imperial Gas Project, contingent upon Next Bridge obtaining sufficient capital.

That contingency is important. If Next Bridge successfully raises outside equity, part of that new capital could eventually flow to McCabe as NBH pays MPC cash to enter projects already positioned inside McCabe's private company.

He ain't your Savior

The filings are crystal clear.

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

@defaultusert Good to see you back. I think it's time for me to end my break also. Way to come out firing. I have a post sitting in drafts for a minute. You'll dig it.

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

He blew it all buying ridiculous patents. Palikaras knew next to nothing about U.S securites markets until he had no choice. Said under oath that his statements regarding major companies interested in buying the torchlight assets was untrue.
He's no @johnbrda or Greg McCabe. Didn't have the chops.

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

They ran the same play and you fell for it again. The filings always tell the truth. This a a brutal deal for existing share holders.

✌️TZ

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

🚨 $MGRX

As usual, the retail hype is all bullshit. This isn't a golden ticket. The nuclear narrative is ridiculous. This is another broke US penny about to be delisted doing a reverse merger with a Canadian company with a prototype product who wants the Nasdaq ticker to use stock offerings to raise cash. The future of Nuclea isn't guaranteed. The Business Combination Agreement tells the full story

Thread ⏬️

[TraderZero @_TraderZero_]

This is a failed public company under listing pressure attaching a private story. The nuclear narrative is the vehicle. The capital structure is the reality.

$MGRX is a struggling, low-revenue telehealth/nutraceutical company that never achieved meaningful commercial traction using its Nasdaq listing as the primary asset in a reverse merger. The structure transfers the vast majority of the equity to the new private company while legacy shareholders are left with a small residual stake, and management extracts a significant exit package.

You get a bigger bag.