🧠 Decoding Logical Fallacies: A Thread 🧵 Logical fallacies often distort truth in arguments and debates. Understanding them is key for clear thinking and effective communication. Let's dive into some common ones. #LogicalFallacies
“The cognitive warfare concept… faces an uphill fight for acceptance within the US military,” writes Mark Ginsberg in this #SWJperspectivepiece.
Yet “Israel’s experience since October 2023 suggests the fight is already over for anyone paying attention. The tools are deployed, the effects are measurable, and the cost of inaction is visible."
📑Read “When Perception Becomes the Battlefield” for lessons the US should be learning, now.
#CognitiveWarfare #Israel
https://t.co/HZ06MehwD5
#SWJTheDiscourse: The emerging armamentarium of cognitive warfare with Dr. James Giordano (Video) | Cognitive Security Institute Talks #19
In this clip from #SWJTheDiscourse, Dr. James Giordano (Institute for National Strategic Studies (@INSSatNDU), National Defense University) explores how advances in #neuroscience, #biotechnology, and converging technologies are reshaping the character of conflict. 🧠
Dr. Giordano asserts that emerging capabilities enable more precise, scalable, and integrated effects on human performance and decision-making.
This clip highlights:
🧪 🦠 The evolution from conventional chemical and biological agents toward increasingly sophisticated neurobiological and cognitive effects.
🧬 🤖 The convergence of neuroscience, biotechnology, #ArtificialIntelligence, and information systems as a new force multiplier.
👁️ 🤝 The growing importance of the #HumanDomain, where #perception, #judgment, #trust, and decision-making become operational objectives.
🪖 💭 Why military and national security professionals must think beyond kinetic effects to understand how adversaries may seek to influence cognition before, during, and after conflict.
These themes resonate across today's strategic environment. Whether examining Russian information confrontation, Chinese cognitive warfare concepts, #InfluenceOperations by state and non-state actors, or the broader competition for narrative advantage, the cognitive dimension is a central component of both irregular and conventional warfare.
Success increasingly depends on shaping how individuals and societies perceive reality, assess risk, and make decisions.
As we continue to integrate cyber, information, electromagnetic, and biological capabilities, understanding #cognition as an operational domain is becoming essential for policymakers, practitioners, and scholars alike.
📺 Watch the full lecture and view the presentation slides in #SWJTheDiscourse: https://t.co/4vOpGLgrXg
📖 Read "Cognitive Warfare at the Crossroads: Defining and Developing Capabilities" by Dr. Robert Schmidle and Dr. James Giordano: https://t.co/jlk1BqQCKd
#SmallWarsJournal #CognitiveSecurity #CognitiveWarfare #IrregularWarfare #InformationWarfare #IWar #NationalSecurity #Biodeterrence #Deterrence #Bioeconomy #EmergingTechnology #GrayZone #StrategicCompetition #Cybernetics #Neuroweapons #SynBio @Future_of_War@ASU@SecWar@DeptofWar
🚨 Neville Roy Singham’s Niece Says DSA’s New York Wins Could Lead to a Socialist Presidential Campaign
Alicia Singham Goodwin, the niece of far-left billionaire financier Neville Roy Singham, is a member of NYC DSA’s Steering Committee. She joined tonight’s DSA call celebrating its New York victories to discuss where the organization goes next.
Goodwin said DSA’s electoral wins are “just one piece” of building the power needed to “transform people’s lives.” She laid out the next phase: freezing the rent, fighting for fast and free buses, moving from Zohran’s 2,000-childcare pilot to universal childcare, and using 2027 in Albany to tax the rich.
She made clear this will require pressure from DSA members on the ground:
“We’ll have the same uphill battle that we’ve had every year we fought to tax the rich, but we’re going in with double the number of our socialists in office and hopefully double the number of DSA members on the ground to really keep the pressure up.”
Then she pointed to 2028...
“If we grow and we build enough between now and then, the next year in 2028, we might be working on a campaign for a democratic socialist for president.”
Goodwin closed by asking people not just to join DSA or pay local dues, but to “become an organizer.”
Not gonna lie, after everything I know and everything I’ve seen, seeing her of all people on that call was a genuine holy-crap moment. Especially when she’s the one delivering the socialist presidency message.
Western media is quietly scrubbing the raw truth about China from your newsfeed, all to keep the CCP happy.
Here is what is actually happening. The CCP is using a devastating silent weapon against global newsrooms: access. If an international news outlet exposes human rights abuses or elite corruption, Beijing threatens to cancel reporter visas and block lucrative corporate profits in the Chinese market.
The concrete evidence is damning. Mega-outlets like Bloomberg have previously spiked deep investigations into the hidden wealth of China's ruling elite just to protect corporate revenue. Networks like the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation were forced to shut down bureaus entirely after Beijing quietly refused to issue visas to their correspondents. Even the BBC’s veteran reporter John Sudworth had to flee to Taiwan following severe safety threats over his coverage of Xinjiang detention camps.
To save their bottom lines, other major networks are folding. They are choosing to engage in what experts call "linguistic laundering," swapping out accurate words like "authoritarian" for harmless euphemisms preferred by Beijing.
University of Alberta Professor Reza Hasmath exposed this systemic blackmail in the current affairs magazine The Diplomat. The data completely backs it up. The Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China, a professional association representing international journalists, reported that an astonishing 98 percent of correspondents say reporting conditions fail to meet international standards, with 86 percent experiencing declined or canceled interviews.
Corporate media is trading accuracy for access, letting an autocratic regime dictate exactly what you are allowed to read.
#PressFreedom #China #Censorship #Media #CCP #FreeSpeech #GlobalNews #Journalism
https://t.co/qxH4NKg7rM
The Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) has just issued the Measures on Network Data Security Risk Assessment (网络数据安全风险评估办法). In practical terms, this means that a very large portion of the important data held by companies operating in China is now potentially accessible to the Ministry of State Security (MSS) through the following mechanisms:
First, under Article 3, the Network Data Security Risk Assessment Special Working Mechanism (网络数据安全风险评估专项工作机制) operates under the leadership of the National Data Security Coordination Mechanism (国家数据安全工作协调机制). Under China’s Data Security Law, this overarching coordination mechanism is led by the MSS. This institutional arrangement is further reinforced by Article 4, which explicitly requires the CAC to share national data security work plans with the MSS.
Second, although the formal risk assessment process can in principle be conducted internally by the company itself or outsourced to a third-party assessment institution (第三方评估机构), Articles 16 to 18 significantly expand state access powers. These provisions expressly authorize cyberspace authorities at provincial-level and above, telecommunications regulators, public security organs, state security organs, and other relevant agencies to verify and inspect the authenticity and accuracy of the risk assessment reports submitted by entities processing important data.
More importantly, where regulators determine that data processing activities present significant security risks or may endanger national security or the public interest, authorities may require the company to engage a government-certified assessment institution to conduct a fresh assessment. In such cases, the company is legally obligated to provide assessment personnel with necessary access rights, including access to network data infrastructure, underlying datasets, internal systems, and operational log records.
In plain English, this means that if the authorities decide to invoke a network data security risk assessment, much of your company’s commercially sensitive data can become fully accessible to the MSS.
This creates massive new compliance burdens and introduces substantial security risks for companies operating in China, particularly foreign firms whose China operations remain deeply integrated with global data systems. The MSS now has a legally sanctioned pathway to access highly sensitive corporate data under the broad justification of conducting network data security assessments.
But this should hardly come as a surprise, as this is exactly what I have been warning about for years. If companies are still not moving to fully segregate their China operations by now, then realistically their only remaining option may soon be to exit the Chinese market altogether.
The Mechanism of Asymmetric Warfare Games is Changing
Author: Kong Rui
Source: PLA Daily
Date: 2026-06-16
Link: https://t.co/pRZRwbS8Sf
introduction
Currently, the development of intelligent technologies is profoundly reshaping the nature of warfare. In particular, the underlying mechanisms of asymmetric warfare, where the weaker side confronts the stronger side, are undergoing systemic changes. Specifically, in traditional warfare, the weaker side primarily relies on the spatiotemporal misalignment of its combat forces to build a decisive advantage. However, intelligent technologies have broken the rules of force aggregation, reconstructed the boundaries of combat time and space, and altered the fundamental logic of war attrition, providing a completely new practical path for transforming the balance of power and reversing the offensive and defensive postures. Against this backdrop, in-depth research into the specific manifestations of intelligent technologies reshaping the mechanisms of asymmetric warfare is of great significance for winning future wars.
From "Power Balance" to "Algorithmic Battle"
In traditional warfare, the winning logic of asymmetric warfare is based on the dynamic changes in the balance of material power: the weaker side, through skillful tactical application, concentrates superior forces at key times and locations, creating local power asymmetry and gradually altering the overall balance of power. In this model, material elements such as troop numbers, equipment quality, and logistical capabilities constitute the core indicators of combat capability. The acquisition of asymmetric advantage mainly depends on the precise allocation and concentrated use of these combat forces: the two sides are at opposite ends of a "scale," and the process of combat is a continuous process of adding and subtracting weights from the "scale." The side that can utilize its material power more efficiently will tip the scales of victory in that direction.
Since the advent of information-based and intelligent warfare, the influence of algorithms on the battlefield has gradually surpassed traditional combat elements such as troop strength, firepower density, and fortifications, becoming the core variable determining the outcome of wars. This has shifted the focus of asymmetric warfare from physical force confrontation to algorithmic confrontation in the virtual domain. Specifically, the advantages of algorithms in confrontation are mainly reflected in two aspects. In terms of speed advantage, advanced algorithms can complete massive data analysis, complex battlefield decisions, and efficient precision strikes in a very short time, ushering in the era of "instant kills" in warfare. In terms of adaptive advantage, advanced algorithms have self-learning capabilities and can continuously adjust combat plans according to changes in the battlefield environment. This allows the weaker side to compensate for the "power gap" with more scientific combat planning, forming a local or even global asymmetric advantage. From this perspective, the combat effectiveness generated by an excellent algorithm model is no longer the sum of "weights" of combat forces in traditional warfare, but rather a change in the weighing rules of the "scale" itself. The weaker side can influence the course of the battle at a lower cost, faster speed, and higher quality.
At the practical level, a distributed algorithmic adversarial system can be constructed to gain an asymmetric algorithmic advantage. First, modular and composable algorithmic units should be developed, allowing different algorithmic models to be adapted to different battlefield environments. Second, a rapid algorithm iteration mechanism should be established, transforming battlefield data into "nutrients" for algorithm optimization, enabling algorithms to continuously improve based on the battlefield situation, ensuring that the operational plans output by the algorithms are always "targeted." Third, the construction of an algorithmic security protection system should be strengthened, building a multi-layered, multi-dimensional algorithmic defense barrier to ensure the safe and stable operation of one's own algorithmic system.
From "time-based scheduling" to "global synchronization"
The so-called "timing and control" in asymmetric warfare refers to the weaker side using tactics such as rapid maneuver, infiltration, and flanking maneuvers to find, create, and seize opportunities based on "time differences" and "space differences," thereby achieving "speed over speed" and "point-to-area control," and depleting the overall strength of the superior side. Throughout world military history, countless brilliant military strategists have used this method to create numerous miracles of victory against overwhelming odds. However, in the era of informationized and intelligent warfare, the difficulty of "timing and control" has increased dramatically, and its effectiveness has been greatly reduced. This is because effective "timing and control" often relies on the speed of physical transport vehicles and the information asymmetry brought about by covert marches. However, the development of intelligent technologies has profoundly changed this game mechanism.
Specifically, intelligent technology compresses the "time difference": relying on information networks, key links such as modern reconnaissance and early warning, command and control, and weapon strikes are closely integrated, forming a near real-time battlefield perception and response capability. The superior side, with its powerful information network, can quickly detect the maneuver intentions of the inferior side, greatly compressing the window of opportunity for the inferior side to use the "time difference" for covert maneuvering and launching surprise attacks. The traditional advantage of "speed over slowness" is overtaken by the superior side's faster "decision-action" cycle. Intelligent technology weakens the "spatial difference": intelligent technology makes the battlefield space highly transparent, and the regional concealment effect on which the traditional "spatial difference" depends is greatly weakened. The battlefield exhibits non-linear characteristics, and the boundaries between the front and depth, and between the front and the rear, are becoming increasingly blurred. It is difficult for the inferior side to find truly safe "maneuver corridors" or concealed "vacuum zones" to create a favorable situation. In this context, "full-domain synchronization" has replaced "time-space scheduling" as a new way to gain asymmetric warfare spatiotemporal advantage: relying on intelligent combat systems, the weaker side can achieve seamless connection and mutual cooperation among various combat domains, launch attacks on the enemy simultaneously in multiple combat domains, and form all-round, multi-dimensional asymmetric pressure, making the enemy unable to cope effectively.
To achieve effective "synchronous operations across all domains," a unified operational command system can be constructed, breaking down the boundaries and command levels of various military branches and establishing a flat, networked command structure to achieve centralized and unified command of operational forces across all domains. Furthermore, cross-domain collaborative operational capabilities can be developed to promote the interconnection and interoperability of weapons, equipment, and operational units in different operational domains, thereby achieving cross-domain aggregation of operational capabilities and forming a powerful overall operational effectiveness.
From "linear consumption" to "nonlinear paralysis"
Traditional asymmetric warfare follows the fundamental law of linear attrition, where the course of war is characterized by the gradual depletion of both sides' manpower and war potential, with victory or defeat largely depending on which side can hold out longer. In this model, the relationship between operational effectiveness and the resources invested is approximately linear; to achieve a certain level of effectiveness, a corresponding amount of resources must be committed. The weaker side often needs to bear several times the cost of the enemy to achieve final victory, gradually weakening the enemy's strength through a protracted war of attrition, thus reversing the balance of power. This linear attrition warfare model can make war exceptionally brutal and protracted, placing extremely high demands on the war potential, resilience, and willpower of both sides.
In intelligent warfare, the game mechanism based on attrition has undergone significant changes, with nonlinear destruction becoming the primary method of asymmetric warfare. The outcome of war no longer depends on the rate of attrition between the two sides, but rather on which side can destroy the enemy's operational system more quickly. An intelligent operational system is a highly complex organic whole, composed of numerous interconnected and interacting nodes. The destruction of any key node can trigger the collapse of the entire system. Furthermore, the widespread use of inexpensive and numerous intelligent unmanned platforms has created conditions for destroying key enemy nodes at low cost and high efficiency. This method of attack exhibits significant nonlinear characteristics; a small investment of operational resources can produce enormous combat effects, achieving an asymmetric advantage of "using minimal force to achieve maximum effect." Like toppling dominoes, a precise system disruption can trigger a chain reaction, instantly paralyzing the enemy's massive war machine.
A thorough analysis of the vulnerabilities of the enemy's operational system is a crucial prerequisite for conducting nonlinear destructive warfare. First, a comprehensive analysis of the enemy's operational system's structure, function, and operational mechanisms must be conducted using systems science methods to identify its weakest links and most critical nodes. Second, precision strike and system-breaking capabilities must be developed, and high-precision, high-damage, and intelligent weapons and equipment must be developed to improve the accuracy and destructive effect of strikes against key enemy nodes. Finally, a rapid assessment and effect feedback mechanism must be established to evaluate strike effects in real time and adjust strike plans promptly based on the assessment results to ensure the effectiveness of system-breaking operations.
From "human-driven" to "human-machine integration"
In traditional battlefields where information is relatively scarce and the situation is relatively ambiguous, the effectiveness of asymmetric warfare largely depends on the experience and wisdom of commanders, especially for the weaker side, which relies heavily on the exceptional abilities of its commanders to compensate for the disparity in military strength. They rely on personal experience, intuitive judgment, and battlefield experience to accurately grasp favorable opportunities and the enemy's psychology and intentions, disrupting the enemy's rhythm through unexpected tactical deployments and creating opportunities to turn the tide of battle. Military history is replete with classic examples of commanders' wisdom that have been widely discussed. However, it must be clearly recognized that experience-based decision-making is essentially "sample-driven" inductive reasoning. Experience-dominated decision-making models are highly flexible and random, often struggling to effectively handle complex situations beyond the scope of historical experience. Furthermore, the speed and accuracy of decision-making are limited by human physiological limits, making them prone to misjudgment in high-intensity, intelligent confrontations.
In modern warfare, with the rapid development of intelligent technology, human-machine symbiotic decision-making is gradually replacing experience-driven decision-making, becoming the core decision-making model for asymmetric warfare. This doesn't mean that the commander's experience and wisdom are no longer important, but rather that their role and focus have shifted, forming a new division of labor model of "machine calculation, human decision-making": intelligent technology can process massive amounts of battlefield data in milliseconds, identifying battlefield patterns and potential threats that are difficult for humans to perceive, providing commanders with multi-dimensional and multi-plan decision support. Under this division of labor, the acquisition of asymmetric advantages no longer relies solely on the "genius inspiration" of individual commanders, but rather on the collective intelligence generated by human-machine integration. Even commanders who are not yet battle-hardened, as long as they can deeply understand and skillfully utilize powerful intelligent decision-making tools, are highly likely to formulate operational plans that surpass traditional experience levels, providing opportunities for the weaker side to narrow or even close the gap in military strength.
Therefore, building a human-machine integrated combat force system is an inevitable requirement for adapting to intelligent warfare. On the one hand, it is necessary to optimize the structure and composition of combat forces according to the principle of human-machine division of labor and complementary advantages, rationally allocate manned combat units and unmanned combat platforms, and improve the intelligence level of the combat system. On the other hand, it is necessary to cultivate compound military talents with interdisciplinary knowledge backgrounds, mastery of artificial intelligence technology, and ability to conduct human-machine collaborative operations, so as to provide solid talent support for intelligent warfare.
THREAD: PLA articles on cognitive domain operations.
This is going to be something that seems a bit peculiar and may not land with everyone at first but there is currently a war of the minds and thought going on whether you realize it or not.
I implore you to read the articles below and determine for yourself if the first sentence holds merit. I pulled the articles from China's military network. I may have posted some of these in the past, but they are useful, so I'll post them again. These articles can help us comprehend the thought process and operational theories of the greatest threat to free thought and the liberal world order.
It is important that people understand the systematic campaign that is being carried out. It is dystopian with parallels to George Orwell's 1984. It's a threat to the foundational values we hold in the west no matter what political affiliation you hold. We run the threat of living in a world where we don't have truths if we don't identify the problem and address it.
(Continued)
3. Close relationship with national security studies
The white paper, "China's National Security in the New Era," points out that emerging domains represent new frontiers in national security. Cognitive security has become a new dimension of national security. Research on cognitive security revolves around security issues within this emerging field of cognitive domain. In recent years, an increasing number of scholars have analyzed cognitive security issues from a national security perspective, and some have used the term "national cognitive security." However, further research and work related to "national cognitive security" require further validation within the framework of national security theory.
3.1 It basically conforms to the logical characteristics of national security studies.
National security studies adhere to a problem-oriented approach, stemming from the need to solve national security issues. The inherent logic of national security studies is that national security issues are an organic unity of objectivity and subjectivity; they are not the origin of national security but rather a derivative of it. National security issues give rise to national security studies.
Based on the preceding analysis, cognitive security issues objectively exist from the perspectives of technology, content, and dissemination, reflecting their objective nature. Simultaneously, due to the unique subjective characteristics of the cognitive domain, cognitive security issues are the result of the subjective perception of the security subject, reflecting their subjective nature. Therefore, cognitive security issues also embody the organic unity of objectivity and subjectivity.
At the same time, cognitive security issues are derived from security issues in various fields. They are both the result of the long-term evolution of problems in one or several fields and the result of the security actors' securitization. Therefore, cognitive security issues are not original but derivative.
In short, cognitive security issues embody the organic unity of objectivity and subjectivity, and are not original but derived. Cognitive security issues have spurred cognitive security research, which is basically in line with the logical characteristics of national security studies and lays the foundation for carrying out research on "national cognitive security".
3.2 Cognitive security issues need to be recognized as national security issues.
National security issues refer to "issues that pose a danger or threat to national interests, especially core interests and other major interests, and are included in the national security agenda, as well as issues arising from the prevention, mitigation, or resolution of these issues." This determines three criteria for determining whether an issue constitutes a national security issue: "whether it involves national interests, whether it poses a danger or threat, and whether it is included in the national security agenda." These are necessary conditions for an issue to become a national security issue.
However, based on the preceding analysis, current domestic and international research has not clearly defined why cognitive security issues reach dangerous and threatening security limits, how they threaten national interests, whether they should be included in the national security agenda, and thus become national security issues, or, as some scholars have argued, national-level cognitive security issues. This means that cognitive security issues lack the necessary conditions to become national security issues.
3.3 The evolutionary path of cognitive security issues requires further investigation.
National security issues evolve along two paths: one is "problem—security problem—national security problem"; the other is "problem—national security problem". The first path refers to a situation where a problem, once its danger and threat reach a critical threshold, first transforms into a security problem. When its danger and threat target national interests and is included in the national security agenda, it becomes a national security problem. The second path refers to a situation where a problem, after reaching a critical threshold of danger and threat, directly targets national interests and is included in the national security agenda, thus directly transforming into a national security problem. This is the path by which a domain security issue escalates into a national security issue.
Cognitive security issues evolve from domain-specific problems, a common characteristic of both cognitive security and national security issues. However, differences also exist. First, the cognitive domain is not yet included in the 20 domains covered by the overall national security concept. Research on cognitive security in my country started late and is still in the exploratory stage; compared to the domains covered by the overall national security concept, the theoretical system of cognitive security still needs improvement. Second, cognitive security is a broad concept, manifested in almost all areas of national security. As mentioned earlier, cognitive security issues also involve cognitive problems in strategy, management, and technology, which are instrumental national security issues, and their evolutionary path is not yet clear. Therefore, the evolutionary path of cognitive security issues into "national cognitive security" issues requires further investigation.
4. The Development Prospects of Cognitive Security Research
As mentioned earlier, a growing body of research indicates that cognitive security issues may pose dangers and threats to national interests. The development of cognitive security research concerning national interests into the field of "national cognitive security" represents a promising future for this area of study.
4.1 The possibility of cognitive security research rising to the level of "national cognitive security" research
National security issues are the logical premise for the emergence of national security studies . Existing research shows that cognitive security issues can indeed threaten national interests, and the prevention and mitigation of such issues also inevitably lead to cognitive security problems.
Cognitive security issues can influence leaders' decision-making and threaten national security interests. For example, Gorbachev's flawed understanding of the international situation and his own country's circumstances led to a series of erroneous judgments and decisions, ultimately becoming a significant factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union . Simultaneously, cognitive security issues can affect the investigations and decisions of defense, national security, and public security personnel, posing a threat to national interests. Cognitive security issues can also influence public perception, causing cognitive biases and confusion, inducing social instability, and even threatening political security. Furthermore, cognitive security issues arising from external factors such as the influx of disinformation and cognitive warfare by the US and the West also threaten national interests. These all meet the preconditions for the formation of national security problems. Therefore, it is possible for research on cognitive security concerning national interests to rise to the level of "national cognitive security" research.
4.2 The necessity of including cognitive security issues in the national security agenda
The preceding text mentioned three criteria for constituting a national security issue, distinguishing it from security issues in the general sense, clarifying the boundaries of national security studies, and preventing the overgeneralization of national security research. Security issues in the general sense also need to meet the specific condition of being "included in the national security agenda" to become national security issues. If a perceived security issue concerning national interests is included in the national security agenda, it means that the main actors in national security governance need to discuss and address the issue at national security meetings.
However, a search of the websites of major central news organizations under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council, such as People's Daily Online, China Government Network, and Xinhua News Agency, has not yet yielded any important meetings, documents, or speeches containing statements related to "national cognitive security," and in particular, no information has been found that has been recognized by relevant departments through the national security agenda. This necessitates joint efforts from relevant departments, academia, media, and think tanks to include cognitive security issues in the national security agenda. Furthermore, maintaining a problem-oriented approach and conducting cross-disciplinary analysis of national-level cognitive security issues also requires concerted efforts from all parties.
Conclusion
In recent years, frequent geopolitical conflicts and ongoing cognitive confrontations have highlighted the growing importance of cognitive security. Countries and regions such as the US and Europe have invested heavily in modeling and practical research to provide advisory services to their governments. US think tank researchers have proposed, from a national strategic perspective, a "whole-society" approach that integrates government departments, media, think tanks, and NGOs to actively counter other countries' false narratives and maintain a competitive edge in cognitive security capabilities.
As mentioned earlier, my country's research on cognitive security started late, and the system needs further improvement. It is also necessary to adhere to a problem-oriented approach, organize experts to conduct comprehensive cross-disciplinary research from the perspectives of strategy, tactics, and safeguards, and jointly promote the inclusion of relevant issues in the national security agenda to enhance the national level's attention to this issue.
More importantly, addressing cognitive security issues requires strengthening top-level design, creating and improving relevant laws and policies, and working together with departments such as publicity, cyberspace affairs, security, diplomacy, and defense, as well as media, universities, and think tanks to promote the modernization of the national cognitive security system and capabilities.
Cuba’s military and intelligence services undermine U.S. national security across the Western Hemisphere. Sec. 1266 of the Senate FY27 NDAA requires DOW, State, and ODNI to report to Congress on these activities and Cuba’s intel cooperation with China and narco-terrorist groups.
A literal blueprint of China’s strategy to export Maoism during the height of the Cold War.
The deliberate, state-sponsored internationalization of violent subversion.
Coming out in 1967, this map was published just one year after the Havana Conference. At this time, the Sino-Soviet Split was in full swing. The Soviet Union (and its ally, Cuba) and Communist China were engaged in a bitter rivalry over who would lead the global communist movement.
The 1966 Havana Tricontinental Conference was overwhelmingly dominated by the Soviet Union and Fidel Castro. Mao Zedong despised this. Beijing viewed the Soviets as "social imperialists" and "revisionists," and deeply resented Cuba for acting as Moscow's proxy in the Third World.
While Fidel Castro and the USSR were building their network via the Tricontinental(Havana) Conference, Mao Zedong was aggressively pushing China as the true vanguard of anti-imperialism for Asia, Africa, Latin America, and even here in North America.
This wasn't just a war of words. In places like Angola in the 1970s, China actually funded and armed rival guerrilla groups to fight against the Marxist factions backed by the Soviets and Cuban troops. They actively fought each other over the claim to be the true vanguard.
The markers scattered across Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Americas aren't just symbolic; they represent very real material backing.
During this era, Beijing was funding and arming groups like the Viet Cong, PLO, Black Panthers, the Malayan Communist Party, and various anti-colonial rebel factions in Africa (such as UNITA in Angola).
Ultimately, the Soviet Union collapsed, and Cuba is economically ruined. China is the last one standing with the influence and capital. Singham, who lives in Shanghai and operates within the CCP's orbit, provides the millions of dollars required to keep this global network of activists and media organizations afloat.
For figures like Vijay Prashad and Neville Roy Singham, historical consistency takes a backseat to modern geopolitics. Their primary ideological driver today is anti-Americanism and opposing Western hegemony. Because China is currently the only superpower capable of challenging the US and the Western financial system, modern Marxist networks such as the Tricontinental Institute have largely aligned behind Beijing.
The Tricontinental Institute's "Our History" page shows, the institute views itself as the ideological successor to the 1966 Havana Tricontinental Conference. While critics view that 1966 conference as the birth of a global terror network, the Institute frames it as a heroic gathering of "anti-colonial wars of national liberation" aiming for "peace and socialism."
The network goes far beyond publishing think-tank PDFs. Singham's money heavily bankrolls aggressive street-level activist groups in the US(like The People's Forum and Code Pink). When you see highly coordinated, well-funded protests erupting overnight that coincidentally align perfectly with Beijing's foreign policy goals (or aim to broadly destabilize American institutions), you are often looking at the modern, street-level execution of the exact strategy mapped out in 1967.
The Tricontinental Institute essentially hijacked the romantic, revolutionary aesthetics of 1960s Havana—the imagery of Che Guevara, Frantz Fanon, and anti-colonial liberation to launder the image of a modern and socially progressive China. They use the vocabulary of 20th-century grassroots revolution to defend 21st-century Chinese state capitalism, including the Belt and Road Initiative and the denial of human rights abuses in Xinjiang.