AKMSecure

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

Freezers at ~6 U.S. military commissaries failed in a suspected cyberattack, after ~700 French supermarkets lost refrigeration control. The common thread: controllers that act on any command they receive. #OTSecurity 
https://t.co/zLmaufUNP1

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

Most PLCs accept commands from anything that can reach them. When ransomware lands one hop away on the IT side, that gap is what turns an IT incident into an operational outage. https://t.co/6oxNJQBfye  #ICS

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

AKMSecure welcomes Jim Carlini, Leidos CTO Emeritus and founding director of DARPA's Special Projects Office, to its Board of Advisors. @CarliniJames #DefenseTech #NationalSecurity
https://t.co/pd4KoEZn1i

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

Read AA26-293A closely: SafePay resets backup NAS devices to factory settings before it encrypts. If your backups are reachable from the domain, they are part of the blast radius. https://t.co/iR6USSbh27  #Cybersecurity

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

34 questions OT engineers ask about encrypting a control network, from latency and SIS independence to FIPS 140-3 and fail-open behavior, with our answers. https://t.co/GoXSFOWsIr

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

The FEC took its e-filing system offline after an attempted breach a week before the midterms. Shutting down was likely the right call, and that is the problem: when you can't verify what to trust, going dark is the only containment option.
https://t.co/Cz7NPZilCN

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

One flawed key-ceremony script at one CA created a forgery capability against every client that trusted the chain. That is not just a vendor failure, it is how PKI concentrates risk. https://t.co/ELyjHZgOw2

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

Revocation only protects software someone is maintaining. eMudhra shows the gap: browsers patched in days, while OS cert bundles, runtimes and embedded devices lag behind. https://t.co/3PQSdpLafI

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

Eight eMudhra intermediate CAs ran for 18 months on private keys anyone could recover by testing 256 values. Browsers blocked them in days. Devices with frozen trust stores may trust them for years. https://t.co/2wKwgSDwrC 
https://t.co/LoCOq2xmsj

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

Segmentation controls where an OT frame can go, but not what the frame says. Our new technical article covers where encryption fits on a well pad, a pipeline and a refinery. https://t.co/cmLgcCJmps

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

Eight eMudhra intermediate CAs ran for 18 months on private keys anyone could recover by testing 256 values. Browsers blocked them in days. Devices with frozen trust stores may trust them for years.
https://t.co/TPCOja5uWf

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

PKI never fit PLCs and SCADA, so water utilities fell back on shared and default passwords. AKM delivers per-session verified encryption where PKI was never viable. https://t.co/GnNxz7pByx  #ICS

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

In oil and gas, most PLCs that support certificates never have them turned on. AKM encrypts OT traffic with no certificates, no key server and no PLC changes, running on the switch, inline, or embedded in new devices.
https://t.co/s70tFCZnRT

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

Autonomous Key Management replaces static certificates and keys with symmetric keys that refresh every session, so there is no long-lived credential on the server to copy. Our take on the reported FBI breach: https://t.co/QVS1VTeoJH

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

FBI and EPA: water systems in seven states lost monitoring and control to attackers in July 2026. EPA found 97 systems serving 26.6M people with critical or high-risk vulnerabilities in 2024. https://t.co/cspEkEpIdq  #CriticalInfrastructure

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

In July 2026, attackers changed passwords on internet-facing PLCs and locked operators out of water systems in 30+ Minnesota communities. Oldsmar showed the same weakness in 2021. https://t.co/fquy9lqc2t  #OTSecurity 
https://t.co/fquy9lqc2t

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

Zero Trust assumes the verifier cannot be bypassed. Last week the verifier was bypassed. https://t.co/WxRGzSDcbR

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

Zero-days in internet-facing apps will keep happening. The size of the breach depends on what the compromised server is trusted to reach. Our early read on the reported FBI breach: https://t.co/hptOJm1WO2

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

Type 1 cannot connect two radios nobody planned to connect, and it cannot put a coalition partner on the network. 

Both limits come from how the keys get onto the radios. https://t.co/cWdreNpZy9

[AKMSecure @akmcyber]

Policy servers. Certificate authorities. Directory services. Firewall management consoles. Four compromises in one week, all of them centralized trust infrastructure. Patching does not change the architecture. https://t.co/eYT48Ugdyo