A Melville

[Lena Argiri @lenaargiri]

Greece, Cyprus, Israel and the United States will officially launch the East Med Energy Center in Houston on Thursday, implementing a key provision of the EastMed Act and creating a new platform for energy, technology and strategic cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean. https://t.co/tqN7AXQWoy

[C.P. Cavafy @CCavafy]

“Cavafy passionately loves his great city, noisy, restless, rich, poor, too busy with its commerce and diversions to brood over a past fallen into dust. Here he has savoured his pleasure, known his victories and his failures, run his risks.”

–Marguerite Yourcenar, born #OTD 1903

[Lysander 🇬🇷 @Since_1944]

“I prefer the company of peasants because they have not been educated sufficiently to reason incorrectly.”

Montaigne

[elenasagiadinou @elenasagiadinou]

📌Μια άλλη διπλωματική πρωτοβουλία αρχίζει την προσεχή Τρίτη η υφυπουργός Εξωτερικών Αλεξάνδρα Παπαδοπούλου. Μεταβαίνει μέσω Καίρου στην Τρίπολη της Λιβύης για συνομιλίες που έχουν στόχο τον καθορισμό ΑΟΖ και θαλασσίων ζωνών.
Ξέρετε ποιο είναι το πιο εντυπωσιακό σε αυτήν την συνάντηση; Ότι οι Λίβυοι στην Τρίπολη θα είναι μαζί και οι δύο κυβερνήσεις, αυτής της Βεγγάζης και αυτή της Τρίπολης. Να ξέρετε επίσης ότι με τον καθορισμό ΑΟΖ το παράνομο τουρκολιβυκό μνημόνιο εξαφανίζεται !!!!

[Harris Samaras @HarrisSamaras]

France and Cyprus will sign on Monday a status of forces agreement allowing France to station troops in Cyprus.

Enraged, Turkey that illegally maintains an estimated 50,000 troops in the occupied by Turkey north part of Cyprus, warns France over the deployment.

| @POLITICOEurope @FranceaChypre @francediplo_EN @CYpresidency #France #Cyprus #Turkey
https://t.co/yV1E4kuUgs

[Shay Gal שי גל @ShayGal84]

In Cyprus, Ankara Turned Occupation into Permanence. Now Permanence Must Cost.

👇 An operational essay | @Sigmalive_EN.

Power obeys cost, not words.

On 20 July 1974, Turkey landed in Cyprus. The operation did not end. The clock started.

Between Attila I and Attila II, the world wrote language and Ankara wrote the map. A ceasefire became a corridor of preparation. Geneva became cover. Process became time.

Each actor had a file. Ankara had a plan.

That was the method then. It has remained the method since.

For half a century, the names changed; the structure did not: talks for the world, facts for Ankara; procedure for Europe, permanence for Turkey.

Process for the world. Permanence for Ankara.

That is the Cyprus file without ceremony.

Turkey did not freeze a conflict. It administered an occupation.

It took force and gave it time. It took a line and gave it machinery. It took illegality and wrapped it in process.

Facts on the ground need no recognition at birth. They need survival. First comes the line. Then administration, demography, dependency and demand.

Cyprus is not frozen.

It is being processed.

Partition survives not by being accepted, but by being processed.

A frozen conflict does not open sealed cities, test buffer zones, install cameras, build roads, alter registries, digitise property files, wire infrastructure into Ankara’s systems and then demand that Europe call the result a negotiation.

That is operational partition.

Varosha is not real estate. It is doctrine.

It is where Ankara tests Europe in increments: access, presence, claims, mechanisms, normalisation. Each move is presented as limited. Each one moves the baseline.

This is not ambiguity.

It is method.

Europe’s language is correct. Its mechanics are absent.

Right words without price are informed inaction.

Europe says federation. Ankara builds separation. Europe says Varosha. Ankara changes access. Europe says dialogue. Ankara measures territory.

Cyprus is not a local complication.

It is the Union looking at itself.

In 2026, the Republic of Cyprus holds the Presidency of the Council of the European Union while part of its territory remains occupied by a candidate country, a Customs Union partner, a NATO ally and a state demanding two states on EU soil.

That contradiction cannot be managed.

It must be priced.

A Union that conditions Russia over Ukraine cannot exempt Turkey over Cyprus. Russia assaults the European order from outside. Ankara violates it from within.

No Turkish upgrade while the occupation is upgraded.

No Customs Union modernisation, visa facilitation, trade privilege, defence integration or strategic status while Varosha advances, Pyla is tested, Strovilia remains unresolved and UNFICYP’s freedom of movement is treated as negotiable.

These are not punishments. They are coherence.

Cyprus does not need theatrical escalation. It needs thresholds. Every Turkish violation must pause a file, price a request, suspend a measure or reverse an instrument until the status quo ante is restored.

Deterrence is not escalation.

It is the prevention of permanence.

That is the only price Ankara understands.

🔗 https://t.co/WiIjXsiUPc

[C.P. Cavafy @CCavafy]

“Winter, summer, the watchman sat there looking out
from the roof of Atreus’ palace. Now he has
good news to report. In the distance he saw the fire light up.”

– Manuscript of Cavafy’s poem “When the Watchman Saw the Light”. Cavafy Archive.

[Andrew Michael Chugg @aniketos0]

On 5th June 2026 we commemorate the 2348th anniversary of the declaration of the death of Alexander the Great according to his Ephemerides. Today is the correct date in our Gregorian Calendar (10th June is the Julian Calendar which fails to keep the equinoxes on the same dates😯)

[Jonathan Schanzer @JSchanzer]

Where’s the memo on illegal settlements in occupied northern Cyprus? Asking for a friend.

[Ictinus ®️ @ictinus_x]

There’s a pattern among North European leaders who push hardest for Turkish membership: none of them pay the price.

Stubb wants Turkey in the EU.
Turkey doesn’t claim Finnish islands. Doesn’t occupy Finnish territory. Doesn’t challenge Finnish borders. Doesn’t dispute Finnish waters.
For Finland, Turkish membership costs nothing. For Greece and Cyprus, it costs everything.

If joining the EU “gains you power” and stabilizes the neighbourhood, why stop at Turkey?
Apply the same logic to Russia. Let’s hear Stubb explain, slowly, why one works and the other doesn’t.
@alexstubb

[Michael Rubin @mrubin1971]

Այսօրվա Կոնգրեսում տրված իմ ցուցմունքից․ Եթե Թուրքիան թույլ չտա հունական համայնքին առանց միջամտության կամ կամայական վիզային սահմանափակումների նշանակել իր սեփական հոգևորականներին, ապա Միացյալ Նահանգները պետք է պատասխանի պատժամիջոցներով և հարցականի տակ դնի Ստամբուլի պատմական վայրերի նկատմամբ Թուրքիայի խնամակալության և ինքնիշխանության ճանաչումը։

Ինչպես Հորդանանն է ֆինանսավորում և նշանակում Երուսաղեմի Վաքֆի կառավարիչներին, այնպես էլ Միացյալ Նահանգները պետք է ճանաչի նմանատիպ մեխանիզմ, որով Տիեզերական Պատրիարքարանը կկարողանա նշանակել և կառավարել Սուրբ Սոֆիան, Կենսատու Աղբյուրի (Զոոդոխոս Պիգե) վանքն ու եկեղեցին, ինչպես նաև Հալկիի Սուրբ Աստվածաբանական Դպրոցը։

Նույն կերպ, Հայ Առաքելական Եկեղեցու գերագույն առաջնորդը՝ ներկայումս Գարեգին Բ Ամենայն Հայոց Կաթողիկոսը, պետք է վերստանձնի Թուրքիայի ողջ տարածքում գտնվող հայկական եկեղեցական ունեցվածքի կառավարումը։

https://t.co/H5RPRPwHmR

[UnHerd @unherd]

The plot for a British caliphate, by Ben Cobley (@bencobley)

After decades of large-scale immigration, the Muslim Brotherhood as a movement, ideology and style is now firmly established within Western countries.

Its positions on such things as decolonisation, Islamophobia and Palestine-Israel are now mainstream positions in the West. But the Brotherhood itself, as a body, remains under the radar, clearly present but rarely overt.

It operates in the shadows, with assertions about its influence easily written off as conspiracy-mongering.

Read more below ⬇️

https://t.co/beFURO3nFo

[C.P. Cavafy @CCavafy]

“This is the last year. He is the last
of the Greek emperors.”

– C.P. Cavafy “Theophilos Palaeologos”, translated by Rae Dalven.

[Defence News Of INDIA @DefenceNewsOfIN]

♦️Turkish defense analyst Ardan Zentürk warned that if Greece acquires India's BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, the entire military balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean will fundamentally shift.

🔷Media reports highlight deep anxieties within Ankara’s defense circles regarding a potential multi-billion dollar strategic defense axis taking shape between India, Greece, and Cyprus.

💠Why the Turkish Defense Establishment is Alarmed
➡️As analyzed by publications like Moneycontrol and News18, Turkish military strategists view the deployment of Indian missiles near their shores as a direct threat to their "Blue Homeland" (Mavi Vatan) maritime ambitions:

▶️Defeating Air Defenses:
➡️Traveling at speeds of Mach 2.8 to 3.0, the BrahMos flies using low-altitude, sea-skimming trajectories (as low as 10 metres).
🔹Zentürk and other analysts argue this could easily blind or overwhelm Turkey’s advanced Russian-made S-400 Triumf air defense systems.

▶️Cost-Effective Naval Denial:
➡️For Greece and Cyprus, procuring ground-based BrahMos coastal batteries is vastly cheaper (estimated at $3.5 million per missile) than building massive surface fleets.
➡️A few well-placed batteries could act as a lethal anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) shield, putting Turkey's larger navy at an immediate disadvantage.

▶️Targeting Strategic Assets:
➡️The concerns are not restricted to the BrahMos.
➡️Turkey is also tracking India's development of the Long-Range Land Attack Cruise Missile (LR-LACM), which could hold Turkey's critical mainland infrastructure at risk from the Aegean islands.

▶️The Geopolitical Chessboard:
➡️Cyprus as a GatewayBecause direct procurement by Greece might trigger intense diplomatic or legal hurdles within NATO, Turkish intelligence monitors speculate that Athens may use Cyprus as an indirect channel:

▶️The India-Cyprus Roadmap:
➡️New Delhi and Nicosia recently upgraded their relationship to a Strategic Partnership and signed a 5-year defense roadmap.

▶️Funding the Shield:
➡️Turkish media outlets like Türkiye Today report that Cyprus is actively exploring a €1.2 billion defense procurement package under the EU's SAFE program, which includes interest in Indian cruise missiles and kamikaze drones.

▶️The Pakistan Factor:
➡️New Delhi's willingness to export strategic hardware to Turkey's immediate rivals is widely seen as a direct diplomatic counterweight to Ankara's vocal military and geopolitical backing of Pakistan on international forums.

💠No official sales agreement has been formally announced by New Delhi or Athens, but the psychological and tactical deterrence of the missile has already forced a recalculation of Ankara's security posture.

[Το Κρασάκι Του Τσου #Komninos_Dynasty_Association @Krasaki_Tsou]

Στο Μεγάλο Παλάτι στην Αίθουσα του Θρόνου του Κωνσταντίνου υπήρχαν πολλές εντυπωσιακές κατασκευές, όπως τα μηχανικά λιοντάρια που βρυχώνταν, με σκοπό να εντυπωσιάσουν τον εκάστοτε καλεσμένο. Ανάμεσα στις πιο εντυπωσιακές αφηγήσεις ξεχώριζε το περίφημο «Χρυσό Δέντρο» του αυτοκρατορικού παλατιού. Σύμφωνα με τις περιγραφές, ήταν ένα περίτεχνο δέντρο από χρυσό και ασήμι, γεμάτο με μηχανικά πουλιά που κινούνταν και κελαηδούσαν μέσα στις αίθουσες της βυζαντινής αυλής. Για τους ξένους επισκέπτες, το θέαμα αυτό έμοιαζε σχεδόν μαγικό και ενίσχυε ακόμη περισσότερο την εικόνα της Κωνσταντινούπολης ως πόλης πλούτου, τεχνολογίας και αυτοκρατορικής δύναμης

[Ed West @edwest]

I wrote about the troubling police response to Henry Nowak's fatal stabbing.

[Nikos Dendias @NikosDendias]

573 χρόνια από την Άλωση της Κωνσταντινούπολης, η πολιτισμική κληρονομιά της βυζαντινής περιόδου παραμένει ζωντανή μέσω της ελληνικής γλώσσας, της γραμματείας και της ορθόδοξης πίστης.

Μια κληρονομιά που διαφύλαξε ζωντανή τη φλόγα του Ελληνισμού, «φώτισε» την Αναγέννηση και έβαλε τη σφραγίδα της στον σύγχρονο ευρωπαϊκό πολιτισμό.

Η φράση «ουκ εάλω η Πόλις» παραμένει σύμβολο της άσβεστης ιστορικής μνήμης και της εθνικής συνέχειας.

[Boris Zilberman @rolltidebmz]

How Turkey became the world's most consequential terror-finance hub — and why NATO membership is part of the business model https://t.co/0QvpxFDSBb

[Moderatus @moderatus_gr]

İddia 7: “Ege’de iki ana kıtasal Devlet vardır: Türkiye ve Yunanistan”

▪ Bu, coğrafyanın siyasi olarak yeniden kurgulanmasıdır: Yunan adalarını ortadan kaldırır ve Ege’yi iki anakara kıyısı arasındaki yapay bir karşılaşmaya dönüştürür.

▪ Uluslararası içtihat bu tür coğrafi yeniden kurgulamayı defalarca reddetmiştir:

– North Sea Continental Shelf, ICJ 1969, para. 91: hakkaniyet eşitlik anlamına gelmez ve “doğanın tamamen yeniden şekillendirilmesi asla söz konusu olamaz”.
https://t.co/TcfD4jxJnO

– Tunisia/Libya, ICJ 1982, para. 133: bir Devlet kıyı şeridi bakımından doğa tarafından avantajlı veya dezavantajlı kılınmış olsa bile, bu doğal eşitsizlikler hakkaniyetin gidereceği türden eşitsizlikler değildir.
https://t.co/Vlpmhd0VCs

– Libya/Malta, ICJ 1985, paras. 57-58: orantılılık hakkaniyetin bir testidir, bağımsız bir hak kaynağı değildir ve sınırlandırma yöntemi gerçek coğrafi duruma sadık kalmalıdır.
https://t.co/8zWaakuIrm

– Cameroon/Nigeria, ICJ 2002, para. 295: coğrafi yapı verili bir unsurdur, Mahkeme tarafından değiştirilebilecek bir unsur değildir. Coğrafi özellikler yalnızca bir hattı ayarlamak için ilgili koşullar olarak dikkate alınabilir, coğrafyayı yeniden inşa etmek için değil.
https://t.co/5rciDWnPDW

▪ Ege’de yalnızca iki anakara kıyısı yoktur. Karasuları hakkı üreten binlerce ada ve ekonomik bölge hakları üreten, 1,5 milyon nüfusa sahip yüzlerce yerleşik ada da vardır.

▪ Ege’de yalnızca ilgili anakara kıyıları incelense bile, tablo Gürdeniz’in ve Türk argümantasyonunun yazılarında yanıltıcı biçimde ileri sürdüğü “daha küçük bir Yunan kıyısına karşı uzanan geniş Türk anakara kıyısı” iddiasını desteklemez. Gerçekte bunun tersi doğrudur.

▪ Yunan anakara kıyı uzunluğu, her doğruluk ve körfez kapatma yönteminde Türk anakara kıyı uzunluğundan fazladır. Aşağıdaki ölçümler, NOAA kıyı verilerine ve ilgili coğrafi modellerin ölçüm varsayımlarına dayalı olarak rakam ve karşılaştırma bakımından tartışmasızdır.

➡️ Ege’de ilgili kıyıların teknik ölçümleri, ilgili coğrafi modellerin varsayımları altında:

– körfez kapatması yapılmadan tam uzunluk:

oran Yunanistan lehine 1,18

🇬🇷 2.850 km / 🇹🇷 2.420 km

– Eğriboz dahil, ihtiyatlı körfez kapatması:

oran Yunanistan lehine 1,21

🇬🇷 2.428 km / 🇹🇷 2.000 km

– Eğriboz dahil, daha az ihtiyatlı körfez kapatması:

oran Yunanistan lehine 1,47

🇬🇷 1.645 km / 🇹🇷 1.116 km

➡️ Dolayısıyla her üç ölçüm senaryosunda da Ege’deki ilgili Yunan kıyısı Türk kıyısından daha uzundur.

▪ Ege’deki Yunan ada kıyıları da eklendiğinde, yaklaşık 8.185 km, fark çok daha büyür: ölçüm modeline bağlı olarak Yunanistan lehine 4,56 ila 8,8 kat.

▪ Türk argümantasyonu Ege’nin ilgili coğrafyasını atlamakta ve yanıltıcı biçimde ilgisiz veya belirleyici olmayan büyüklükleri öne çıkarmaktadır:

▪ Akdeniz, Karadeniz, Çanakkale Boğazı, Marmara Denizi ve İstanbul Boğazı kıyıları da dahil edilerek Türkiye kıyılarının toplam uzunluğu. Oysa bunlar Ege uyuşmazlığının coğrafyasıyla ilgili değildir ve ihtilaflı alanda Yunan kıyılarına karşı çakışan deniz projeksiyonları üretmez.

▪ İç bölgenin derinliği veya toplam kara kütlesi. Bu, deniz yetkisi veya sınırlandırma bakımından bağımsız bir ölçüt değildir. Libya/Malta, ICJ 1985, para. 49 kararında Mahkeme, kara egemenliği ile deniz hakları arasındaki hukuki bağın kara kütlesi üzerinden değil, kıyı üzerinden kurulduğunu belirtmiştir.

▪ Nüfus büyüklüğü. Bu da deniz yetkisi veya sınırlandırma bakımından bağımsız bir ölçüt değildir. Greenland/Jan Mayen, ICJ 1993, para. 80 kararında Mahkeme, Jan Mayen’in sınırlı nüfusunu veya sosyo-ekonomik faktörleri sınırlandırma koşulları olarak dikkate almak için bir sebep bulunmadığını belirtmiştir.

#MaviVatan #UNCLOS #Karasuları #KıtaSahanlığı #EgeDenizi

[Ictinus ®️ @ictinus_x]

Since we’re listing disputes:

-Imbros and Tenedos: Restoration of the special administrative organization/autonomy provisions prescribed by Lausanne

-Constantinople/ Ecumenical Patriarchate

-Restitution of Confiscated Greek Properties and Foundations in Turkey

-Anatolian territories not explicitly ceded to Turkey in Lausanne.

-Restitution of Hagia Sophia and Other Converted Greek Orthodox Churches in Turkey.

-Cyprus

-Recognition of the Greek Genocide (Pontic and Asia Minor).

If you think we are wrong, let's go to the ICJ. But you only talk. 🦃