maniac

@amb_poland

Joined February 2022

416 Following

14 Followers

470 Posts

maniac @amb_poland

2 days ago

@Eric00001989 Otworzyłeś wrota do nowego wymiaru głupoty.

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amb_poland retweeted

Patryk Słowik

@PatrykSlowik

6 days ago

Nie ma i już chyba nigdy nie będzie tak dobrego momentu na głęboką reformę publicznego systemu ochrony zdrowia. Na razie jest propozycja załatania kilku dziur, nie ma propozycji kompleksowej reformy. Szkoda byłoby stracić tę szansę.

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amb_poland retweeted

Daniel Foubert 🇵🇱🇫🇷

@d_foubert

16 days ago

Poland's reward for saving Ukraine: AMNESIA. The Ukrainians seem to have forgotten that without Polish pressure, the West — Scholz, Macron, Biden — would have let them down. Remember Scholz's 5,000 helmets, Macron's endless phone calls to Putin? Remember Biden's slow, hedged, incremental reaction, weapons systems approved only after months of Ukrainian pleading and battlefield necessity? Poland decisively changed all of this. It organized the reaction of the West when the West preferred to hesitate. The Poles were everywhere: opening their border to millions of refugees, turning Rzeszów into the logistical spine of Western military aid, pushing NATO to send tanks before Berlin would even discuss it, lobbying for fighter jets while others still calculated the risk of provoking Moscow. Poland did not calculate. It did everything it could. And in return, once the job of mobilizing the West was done, Ukraine decided that Poland was a second-rate player after all, not a partner worth attention, not a power worth sharing common interests with. It has always been only about Ukrainian interests, with Poland's own interests treated as an afterthought at best, an inconvenience at worst. German interests, French interests, American interests, however, were courted with real eagerness, real diplomatic tact, real willingness to compromise. Poland got gratitude in press releases and friction everywhere it mattered: the grain corridor dispute, where Ukrainian exports flooded Polish markets and undercut Polish farmers, met not with negotiation but with Kyiv's indignation that Warsaw would dare protect its own producers. The truckers' blockades that followed were framed by Ukrainian officials as Polish betrayal, not as the predictable consequence of a neighbor absorbing the costs of war with no reciprocal accommodation. Zelensky himself, standing at the UN, could imply that certain unnamed neighbors were playing into Moscow's hands, a remark that landed in Warsaw exactly as intended. Volhynia remains unaddressed. Seventy years of a massacre Poland has been extraordinarily patient in raising diplomatically, and still no Ukrainian government has been willing to treat it as the reckoning it deserves to be, because admitting Polish grievance has never seemed worth the political cost to Kyiv. When Poland finally asks for something in return, it is treated as an unreasonable demand from a junior partner who should simply be grateful to have been allowed to help. Ukraine was sure Poland's only interest was that Ukraine would fight Russia, and that Poland, having no interests of its own worth honoring, had nothing to be owed in exchange. Poland bled goodwill so Ukraine could bank it. That is the whole story, stripped of diplomatic phrasing. Every tank Warsaw sent before Berlin dared to. Every refugee absorbed without a single EU quota forcing the hand. Every border crossing turned into a supply artery running day and night while other capitals debated committees. Poland did not deliberate. Poland moved. And Ukraine watched, took the shipment, and kept its warmth for the countries that made it wait. Ask what Volhynia has earned in seventy years of Polish patience. Silence, mostly. Diplomatic silence dressed up as tact, because admitting a massacre costs Kyiv nothing with Berlin and everything with its own nationalist mythology. Ask what the grain corridor earned Polish farmers. Ruin, and then indignation from Kyiv that Warsaw dared object to its own ruin. Ask what four years of unconditional logistics earned Poland at the table where decisions are actually made. A folding chair, pulled up after France and Germany had already taken the good seats. There is a kind of contempt that only the rescued can show the rescuer, because gratitude implies debt, and no nation likes admitting it owes its survival to the neighbor it has spent a century looking down on. Poland was never the ally. Poland was the tool that worked, and tools do not get consulted, they get used and put back in the shed. Warsaw should remember that the next time Kyiv calls. There is a geography to Ukraine's gratitude, and it runs backward. The farther a capital sits from the Russian border, the more indulgence it receives, the more its hesitations are forgiven, the more its eventual help is treated as a gift rather than an obligation. Washington can arrive late and still be thanked first. Paris can phone Moscow throughout the war and still be received as a statesman. But Warsaw, Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn, the nations that actually share a fence line with the Russian threat, that live with the same fear pressing on their own borders, are expected to help simply because they exist next door. Their assistance is not a choice to be honored. It is a natural feature of the terrain, like weather. This is the logic Kyiv has never said aloud but has practiced consistently: if you fear Russia the way Ukraine fears Russia, if the threat sitting on your border is the same threat sitting on Ukraine's, then your help was never really a gift, it was self-interest wearing the costume of solidarity, and self-interest does not require gratitude. Only the distant, the safe, the countries who could have stayed comfortably uninvolved and chose otherwise, only they get treated as benefactors. Poland's proximity to Russia, the very thing that should have made its solidarity more credible, more urgent, more deserving of trust, became instead the reason that solidarity was assumed rather than earned. Nobody thanks the neighbor for putting out a fire that could have reached his own house next. And so the arrangement settles into something almost administrative. Poland's help gets taken, filed, consumed, and the relationship moves on without adjustment, without priority, without a single Ukrainian concession ever weighed against it. Ask for movement on Volhynia, and the answer is silence. Ask for consideration on the grain corridor, and the answer is indignation. Ask, simply, to be treated as a partner whose interests matter as much as Berlin's or Washington's, and the answer is a folding chair. Fear of Russia, it turns out, is not a currency Kyiv values in its neighbors. It is simply the price of admission, paid in advance, and never redeemed. There is a word for a relationship where proximity to power obligates assistance but confers no standing, where the neighbor's role is fixed in advance and cannot be renegotiated no matter what is given. That word is not alliance. It is empire, and empires have always organized their peripheries this way. This is, surprisingly and paradoxically, the shape of what Ukraine has constructed with Poland, whether or not Kyiv would ever use the word for it. Poland's tanks, Poland's border, Poland's logistics, Poland's political capital spent in Berlin and Brussels, none of it was received as the discretionary act of a sovereign equal choosing to stand with a friend. It was received as tribute, the expected offering of a smaller neighbor to the cause that mattered more, collected without negotiation and without the courtesy of treating the giver as someone whose own demands might now be owed a hearing in return. Tribute does not buy influence. That is precisely what distinguishes it from investment, from partnership, from any relationship between equals. What makes this arrangement particularly bitter is that Ukraine is not even the empire in the classical sense, it is itself the smaller power fighting for survival against one. And yet it has absorbed, perhaps unconsciously, the exact reflex of empire toward its own periphery: the assumption that those closest to the danger owe the most and are owed the least, that proximity is a debt rather than a claim, that the neighbor who cannot afford to look away has therefore already committed to helping regardless of how he is treated.

d_foubert's tweet photo. Poland's reward for saving Ukraine: AMNESIA.

The Ukrainians seem to have forgotten that without Polish pressure, the West — Scholz, Macron, Biden — would have let them down.

Remember Scholz's 5,000 helmets, Macron's endless phone calls to Putin? Remember Biden's slow, hedged, incremental reaction, weapons systems approved only after months of Ukrainian pleading and battlefield necessity?

Poland decisively changed all of this. It organized the reaction of the West when the West preferred to hesitate. The Poles were everywhere: opening their border to millions of refugees, turning Rzeszów into the logistical spine of Western military aid, pushing NATO to send tanks before Berlin would even discuss it, lobbying for fighter jets while others still calculated the risk of provoking Moscow. Poland did not calculate. It did everything it could.

And in return, once the job of mobilizing the West was done, Ukraine decided that Poland was a second-rate player after all, not a partner worth attention, not a power worth sharing common interests with.

It has always been only about Ukrainian interests, with Poland's own interests treated as an afterthought at best, an inconvenience at worst. German interests, French interests, American interests, however, were courted with real eagerness, real diplomatic tact, real willingness to compromise.

Poland got gratitude in press releases and friction everywhere it mattered: the grain corridor dispute, where Ukrainian exports flooded Polish markets and undercut Polish farmers, met not with negotiation but with Kyiv's indignation that Warsaw would dare protect its own producers. The truckers' blockades that followed were framed by Ukrainian officials as Polish betrayal, not as the predictable consequence of a neighbor absorbing the costs of war with no reciprocal accommodation. Zelensky himself, standing at the UN, could imply that certain unnamed neighbors were playing into Moscow's hands, a remark that landed in Warsaw exactly as intended.

Volhynia remains unaddressed. Seventy years of a massacre Poland has been extraordinarily patient in raising diplomatically, and still no Ukrainian government has been willing to treat it as the reckoning it deserves to be, because admitting Polish grievance has never seemed worth the political cost to Kyiv.

When Poland finally asks for something in return, it is treated as an unreasonable demand from a junior partner who should simply be grateful to have been allowed to help. Ukraine was sure Poland's only interest was that Ukraine would fight Russia, and that Poland, having no interests of its own worth honoring, had nothing to be owed in exchange.

Poland bled goodwill so Ukraine could bank it. That is the whole story, stripped of diplomatic phrasing. Every tank Warsaw sent before Berlin dared to. Every refugee absorbed without a single EU quota forcing the hand. Every border crossing turned into a supply artery running day and night while other capitals debated committees. Poland did not deliberate. Poland moved. And Ukraine watched, took the shipment, and kept its warmth for the countries that made it wait.

Ask what Volhynia has earned in seventy years of Polish patience. Silence, mostly. Diplomatic silence dressed up as tact, because admitting a massacre costs Kyiv nothing with Berlin and everything with its own nationalist mythology. Ask what the grain corridor earned Polish farmers. Ruin, and then indignation from Kyiv that Warsaw dared object to its own ruin. Ask what four years of unconditional logistics earned Poland at the table where decisions are actually made. A folding chair, pulled up after France and Germany had already taken the good seats.

There is a kind of contempt that only the rescued can show the rescuer, because gratitude implies debt, and no nation likes admitting it owes its survival to the neighbor it has spent a century looking down on. Poland was never the ally. Poland was the tool that worked, and tools do not get consulted, they get used and put back in the shed. Warsaw should remember that the next time Kyiv calls.

There is a geography to Ukraine's gratitude, and it runs backward. The farther a capital sits from the Russian border, the more indulgence it receives, the more its hesitations are forgiven, the more its eventual help is treated as a gift rather than an obligation. Washington can arrive late and still be thanked first. Paris can phone Moscow throughout the war and still be received as a statesman. But Warsaw, Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn, the nations that actually share a fence line with the Russian threat, that live with the same fear pressing on their own borders, are expected to help simply because they exist next door. Their assistance is not a choice to be honored. It is a natural feature of the terrain, like weather.

This is the logic Kyiv has never said aloud but has practiced consistently: if you fear Russia the way Ukraine fears Russia, if the threat sitting on your border is the same threat sitting on Ukraine's, then your help was never really a gift, it was self-interest wearing the costume of solidarity, and self-interest does not require gratitude. Only the distant, the safe, the countries who could have stayed comfortably uninvolved and chose otherwise, only they get treated as benefactors. Poland's proximity to Russia, the very thing that should have made its solidarity more credible, more urgent, more deserving of trust, became instead the reason that solidarity was assumed rather than earned. Nobody thanks the neighbor for putting out a fire that could have reached his own house next.

And so the arrangement settles into something almost administrative. Poland's help gets taken, filed, consumed, and the relationship moves on without adjustment, without priority, without a single Ukrainian concession ever weighed against it. Ask for movement on Volhynia, and the answer is silence. Ask for consideration on the grain corridor, and the answer is indignation. Ask, simply, to be treated as a partner whose interests matter as much as Berlin's or Washington's, and the answer is a folding chair. Fear of Russia, it turns out, is not a currency Kyiv values in its neighbors. It is simply the price of admission, paid in advance, and never redeemed.

There is a word for a relationship where proximity to power obligates assistance but confers no standing, where the neighbor's role is fixed in advance and cannot be renegotiated no matter what is given. That word is not alliance. It is empire, and empires have always organized their peripheries this way.

This is, surprisingly and paradoxically, the shape of what Ukraine has constructed with Poland, whether or not Kyiv would ever use the word for it. Poland's tanks, Poland's border, Poland's logistics, Poland's political capital spent in Berlin and Brussels, none of it was received as the discretionary act of a sovereign equal choosing to stand with a friend. It was received as tribute, the expected offering of a smaller neighbor to the cause that mattered more, collected without negotiation and without the courtesy of treating the giver as someone whose own demands might now be owed a hearing in return. Tribute does not buy influence. That is precisely what distinguishes it from investment, from partnership, from any relationship between equals.

What makes this arrangement particularly bitter is that Ukraine is not even the empire in the classical sense, it is itself the smaller power fighting for survival against one. And yet it has absorbed, perhaps unconsciously, the exact reflex of empire toward its own periphery: the assumption that those closest to the danger owe the most and are owed the least, that proximity is a debt rather than a claim, that the neighbor who cannot afford to look away has therefore already committed to helping regardless of how he is treated.

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maniac @amb_poland

17 days ago

@gra_gitara Stranger things

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maniac @amb_poland

17 days ago

@Eric00001989 Fejk. Nie można być tak głupim.

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maniac @amb_poland

18 days ago

@rafalhubert A jaki produkt marki Fiskars przeszedł próbę czasu? Nawet noże nie dają rady.

maniac @amb_poland

18 days ago

@WaldemarRomano2 Przecież to niczym się nie różni od wyłudzenia na żołnierza z Ameryki, którego ktoś oszukał czy innego zakochanego lekarza z Mozambiku.

maniac @amb_poland

18 days ago

@oleksieradz No nie. Osoby urodzone w 2025 nie chodzą do podstawówki, a nie było ich na świecie TEGO dnia.

maniac @amb_poland

21 days ago

@MarekLangalis Proszę spojrzeć na ich zarobki względem rynkowych. Czymś to wojsko/policja musi kusić.

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maniac @amb_poland

24 days ago

@patrycjuszwyzga @bandyci_drogowi @Stop_Cham_W_wa @Stop_Cham @Policja_KSP Szczerze? Lepiej tu niż po chodniku!

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maniac @amb_poland

28 days ago

@jakubtepper Ale załamka 😕 Jako człowiekowi związanemu z gastronomią jedynie od strony klienckiej, nie mieści mi się to w głowie.

maniac @amb_poland

28 days ago

@LeszBuk @igorsushko Nie wiem czy można napisać bardziej celny komentarz w jakimkolwiek temacie. 🔥

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amb_poland retweeted

Leszek Bukowski 💻🏛️👾

@LeszBuk

28 days ago

Igor, a country that has not been able to protect its own borders since 2014 and is addicted to foreign aid, can't be a security provider to anyone. You have to sell your battlegrounds where Ukrainians are dying to foreign companies as testbeds for miltech. Have you counted the millions of dollars pumped into your miltech by foreign VC funds (especially from the USA)? This romantic view of purely Ukrainian miltech is just your delusional vision. You have lost the last 35 years, even though we started almost from the same level. Just think, how is it even possible that such a huge country for the last 35 years hasn't been able to develop a stable economy? Maybe there is something wrong with you, not the circumstances. Even Belarus is doing better. Why do so many Ukrainians avoid the fight and look for opportunities outside Ukraine? You are a prominent example of this. Right now, it is more obvious why this is the meter when I hear your fantasy about being a security provider. Maybe the better idea is to reconsider the last 35 years - this is one of the reasons why you are right now in such a shitty situation. Poland helps you fight Russia because it benefits us. Just don't name military units by the names of nazi murderers of Polish children and women - this is a minimal condition for being considered a European country. But if you don't have other heroes, this means something. For us, Russia is an alien and hostile civilization. For you, it seems to be only a political competitor, since some of you are unable to recognize basic values.