ar2rousss

[ar2rousss @ar2rousss]

@bakens48 Dodatkowo mamy w planach ciągle powiększanie naszego zestawu satelit różnego przeznaczenia. Jest co raz lepiej.

[ar2rousss @ar2rousss]

@v_stus @sikorskiradek

[Europe of the Jagiellonians @EJagiellonians]

1991 – Poland first to recognize Ukraine's independence.
2004 – President of Poland plays a key role in supporting Orange Revolution.
2014 – Polish Minister negotiates a halt to the Maidan massacre.
2022 – Polish Prime Minister is the first to visit besieged Kyiv, providing support.
🇵🇱🇺🇦
Ukraine – do not let the UPA, Germans, Russians deprive you of a real friend.

[Michał Żmihorski @MZmihorski]

Coś niesamowitego

[Michał Janczura @jan_czura]

‼️Afera kręgosłupowa w @wirtualnapolska

Tak wyglądał zwykły (poniżej przeciętnej) dzień z życia neurochirurga ze spółki Spine. Wpadał w sobotę rano, wychodził przed południem... zarabiając w okolicach 100 tysięcy!

Rekord: 77 zabiegów w jeden dzień czyli ponad 325 tysięcy w 12 godzin!

Zabiegi trwały kilka minut

LINK DO TEKSTU w komentarzu

[Antek @Antek01678168]

Zamiast robić standardowe, krótkie zabiegi za normalną stawkę, panowie w białych fartuchach wystawiali faktury jakby właśnie przeprowadzili operację na otwartym mózgu Elvisa Presleya. 26 tysięcy złotych na godzinę. Dniówka ponad 300 tysięcy.

Maciej Mielcarek i Mateusz Szylberg

[InfoGram @_InfoGram_]

This is HUGE 🔥

🇵🇱 Poland under PM Tusk secretly sent Patriot missiles to Ukraine, defying a US order.

Days earlier Tusk warned: "NATO’s splitting. Russia gets a pass. Europe’s energy is wrecked. Ukraine aid cut. US troops gone. Looks like Putin wrote this. Trump’s looking like Moscow’s asset." 🔥

The man was visionary and literally exposed Trump. 🔥👏

[Jakub Wiech @jakubwiech]

Większość z tego można dostać w każdym europejskim supermarkecie, tylko bez substancji, które robią z organizmu poligon chemiczny

[ar2rousss @ar2rousss]

Troll, czy Ukraińcy wierzą w te bajki?

[Sergiy @SergiyKhyzhnyak]

Питання до поляків.
Хулі ви робили на Українській Волині?
І позакривайте свої пиздаки, маючи наші етнічні терени під своїм контролем, бо сильно стаєте схожі на росіян.

[ar2rousss @ar2rousss]

@Orest_Baback @7bridgesK @MichaelAArouet Poland didn’t receive any reparations from Russia or Germany for WW2. Some infrastructure destroyed during the war, was still rebuilding in 80s. Basically the problem isn’t receiving money. but corruption, elite and oligarchs. Poland had way less corrupted government than Ukraine

[ar2rousss @ar2rousss]

@Piotrowicz17 @BartosiakJacek Pan Marek Budzisz nie komentowałby w ten sposób jeśli to samo było robione za PISu…

[Jarosław Wolski @wolski_jaros]

Patrząc po reakcji naszego mocno proukraińskiego rządu to "bankowa" strzeliła sobie w kolano i jeszcze nawet nie wie jak bardzo.

Zełeńskiemu&Co. udało się w Polsce zjednoczyć wszystkich. Rząd - na razie w bardzo stonowany sposób - zaczyna mówić i robić to co ośrodek prezydencki i część opozycji. Już ten jeden fakt wiele pokazuje. Do tego Ukraińskim politykom i internautom udało się wkurzyć absolutnie wszystkich w Polsce którzy mają dostęp do neta i czytają co piszą i mówią Ukraińcy. Nawet najbardziej proukraińscy aktywiści najwyżej siedzą cicho i nie komentują. Ludzie wyważeni, pomagający Ukrainie na wiele sposób dziś są gdzieś w spektrum między Tuskiem mówiącym żeby dogłębnie rozważyć kwestię kolejnych polskich transzy pomocy finansowej Ukrainie a opozycją które mówi że należy wstrzymać jakąkolwiek pomoc + zablokować wejście do UE do czasu zarzucenia kultu banderyzmu - tak jak kraje UE narzuciły Chorwacji zaprzestanie czczenia profaszystowskich Ustaszy którzy robili dokładnie to damo co UPA - czystki etniczne.
Swoją drogą jak ukraińskie elity polityczne myślą że polski rząd wybierze chłodną kalkulację ekonomiczną nad zablokowanie akcesji UA do UE do czasu debanderyzacji - no to się mocno zdziwią. Dzięki polityce Zełeńskiego jaką obecnie prowadzi kwestia godnej pamięci o ofiarach ukraińskiego ludobójstwa na Polakach będzie jednym z kilku "języczków u wagi" każdej kolejnej kampanii przedwyborczej w Polsce.
A autentyczna złość w społeczeństwie jest taka że faktycznie będzie mieć to wpływ na sondaże i działania polityków.

To co nie udało się Rosjanom przez cztery lata tępej propagandy (acz zatrute ziarno zasiali) udało się w dwa tygodnie wesołej ekipie z "bankowej": autentycznie przekonali polskich polityków i społeczeństwo że nie warto pomagać bezinteresownie Ukrainie a jedynym polskim interesem jest przetrwanie Ukrainy jako bytu niepodległego i niezależnego od Rosji. Polskie elity polityczne w tej kwestii wspaniale wręcz stanęły na wysokości zadania w 2022 i 2023 roku zabezpieczając ten interes szybką, wymierną i ogromną pomocą dla Ukrainy. Zagrożenie minęło a ukraińscy politycy właśnie ostatecznie pokazali że nie warto wychodzi po w/w kwestię.
Mogło być naprawdę fajnie między dwoma narodami z trudną historią a wyszło jak widać.
Szkoda.

[ar2rousss @ar2rousss]

Niedługo przeczytam że to cudzoziemcy którzy specjalnie do Polski przyjechali, stali na tych dworcach i rozdawali swoje rzeczy Ukraińskim uchodźcom…

[Daniel Foubert 🇵🇱🇫🇷 @d_foubert]

Poland's reward for saving Ukraine: AMNESIA.

The Ukrainians seem to have forgotten that without Polish pressure, the West — Scholz, Macron, Biden — would have let them down.

Remember Scholz's 5,000 helmets, Macron's endless phone calls to Putin? Remember Biden's slow, hedged, incremental reaction, weapons systems approved only after months of Ukrainian pleading and battlefield necessity?

Poland decisively changed all of this. It organized the reaction of the West when the West preferred to hesitate. The Poles were everywhere: opening their border to millions of refugees, turning Rzeszów into the logistical spine of Western military aid, pushing NATO to send tanks before Berlin would even discuss it, lobbying for fighter jets while others still calculated the risk of provoking Moscow. Poland did not calculate. It did everything it could.

And in return, once the job of mobilizing the West was done, Ukraine decided that Poland was a second-rate player after all, not a partner worth attention, not a power worth sharing common interests with.

It has always been only about Ukrainian interests, with Poland's own interests treated as an afterthought at best, an inconvenience at worst. German interests, French interests, American interests, however, were courted with real eagerness, real diplomatic tact, real willingness to compromise.

Poland got gratitude in press releases and friction everywhere it mattered: the grain corridor dispute, where Ukrainian exports flooded Polish markets and undercut Polish farmers, met not with negotiation but with Kyiv's indignation that Warsaw would dare protect its own producers. The truckers' blockades that followed were framed by Ukrainian officials as Polish betrayal, not as the predictable consequence of a neighbor absorbing the costs of war with no reciprocal accommodation. Zelensky himself, standing at the UN, could imply that certain unnamed neighbors were playing into Moscow's hands, a remark that landed in Warsaw exactly as intended.

Volhynia remains unaddressed. Seventy years of a massacre Poland has been extraordinarily patient in raising diplomatically, and still no Ukrainian government has been willing to treat it as the reckoning it deserves to be, because admitting Polish grievance has never seemed worth the political cost to Kyiv.

When Poland finally asks for something in return, it is treated as an unreasonable demand from a junior partner who should simply be grateful to have been allowed to help. Ukraine was sure Poland's only interest was that Ukraine would fight Russia, and that Poland, having no interests of its own worth honoring, had nothing to be owed in exchange.

Poland bled goodwill so Ukraine could bank it. That is the whole story, stripped of diplomatic phrasing. Every tank Warsaw sent before Berlin dared to. Every refugee absorbed without a single EU quota forcing the hand. Every border crossing turned into a supply artery running day and night while other capitals debated committees. Poland did not deliberate. Poland moved. And Ukraine watched, took the shipment, and kept its warmth for the countries that made it wait.

Ask what Volhynia has earned in seventy years of Polish patience. Silence, mostly. Diplomatic silence dressed up as tact, because admitting a massacre costs Kyiv nothing with Berlin and everything with its own nationalist mythology. Ask what the grain corridor earned Polish farmers. Ruin, and then indignation from Kyiv that Warsaw dared object to its own ruin. Ask what four years of unconditional logistics earned Poland at the table where decisions are actually made. A folding chair, pulled up after France and Germany had already taken the good seats.

There is a kind of contempt that only the rescued can show the rescuer, because gratitude implies debt, and no nation likes admitting it owes its survival to the neighbor it has spent a century looking down on. Poland was never the ally. Poland was the tool that worked, and tools do not get consulted, they get used and put back in the shed. Warsaw should remember that the next time Kyiv calls.

There is a geography to Ukraine's gratitude, and it runs backward. The farther a capital sits from the Russian border, the more indulgence it receives, the more its hesitations are forgiven, the more its eventual help is treated as a gift rather than an obligation. Washington can arrive late and still be thanked first. Paris can phone Moscow throughout the war and still be received as a statesman. But Warsaw, Vilnius, Riga, Tallinn, the nations that actually share a fence line with the Russian threat, that live with the same fear pressing on their own borders, are expected to help simply because they exist next door. Their assistance is not a choice to be honored. It is a natural feature of the terrain, like weather.

This is the logic Kyiv has never said aloud but has practiced consistently: if you fear Russia the way Ukraine fears Russia, if the threat sitting on your border is the same threat sitting on Ukraine's, then your help was never really a gift, it was self-interest wearing the costume of solidarity, and self-interest does not require gratitude. Only the distant, the safe, the countries who could have stayed comfortably uninvolved and chose otherwise, only they get treated as benefactors. Poland's proximity to Russia, the very thing that should have made its solidarity more credible, more urgent, more deserving of trust, became instead the reason that solidarity was assumed rather than earned. Nobody thanks the neighbor for putting out a fire that could have reached his own house next.

And so the arrangement settles into something almost administrative. Poland's help gets taken, filed, consumed, and the relationship moves on without adjustment, without priority, without a single Ukrainian concession ever weighed against it. Ask for movement on Volhynia, and the answer is silence. Ask for consideration on the grain corridor, and the answer is indignation. Ask, simply, to be treated as a partner whose interests matter as much as Berlin's or Washington's, and the answer is a folding chair. Fear of Russia, it turns out, is not a currency Kyiv values in its neighbors. It is simply the price of admission, paid in advance, and never redeemed.

There is a word for a relationship where proximity to power obligates assistance but confers no standing, where the neighbor's role is fixed in advance and cannot be renegotiated no matter what is given. That word is not alliance. It is empire, and empires have always organized their peripheries this way.

This is, surprisingly and paradoxically, the shape of what Ukraine has constructed with Poland, whether or not Kyiv would ever use the word for it. Poland's tanks, Poland's border, Poland's logistics, Poland's political capital spent in Berlin and Brussels, none of it was received as the discretionary act of a sovereign equal choosing to stand with a friend. It was received as tribute, the expected offering of a smaller neighbor to the cause that mattered more, collected without negotiation and without the courtesy of treating the giver as someone whose own demands might now be owed a hearing in return. Tribute does not buy influence. That is precisely what distinguishes it from investment, from partnership, from any relationship between equals.

What makes this arrangement particularly bitter is that Ukraine is not even the empire in the classical sense, it is itself the smaller power fighting for survival against one. And yet it has absorbed, perhaps unconsciously, the exact reflex of empire toward its own periphery: the assumption that those closest to the danger owe the most and are owed the least, that proximity is a debt rather than a claim, that the neighbor who cannot afford to look away has therefore already committed to helping regardless of how he is treated.

[ar2rousss @ar2rousss]

@unknidx To już się nawzywa desperacja. Nic jeszcze nie wygrali, tysiącami giną na froncie, korzystają z miliardów euro wsparcia bez których dawno nie mieliby się już czym bronić, a ten dalej w kółko. To już trzeba być zindoktrynowany jak ruscy żeby tak pisać..

[ar2rousss @ar2rousss]

No. Ukrainian resurgent nationalism is a threat, as import at as Russian threat.

[ar2rousss @ar2rousss]

@Play_Hard_Fun Bzdura, porównywanie bandytów z UPA do żołnierzy Armii Krajowej 😭 Armia Krajowa nie wbijała gwoździ w głowy niemowlaków…

[ar2rousss @ar2rousss]

@Zbirus1 @wolski_jaros A policzyłeś ile kasy zakontraktowały polskie firmy na polski sprzęt wojskowy? Gdzie widzisz tam pieniądze dla Ukraińców? Mówić o tusku że chce coś dać Ukraińcom to już kompletne odklejenie, typ jest obecnie ukrinosceptykiem większym niż ktokolwiek w PiS.

[ar2rousss @ar2rousss]

@Zbirus1 @wolski_jaros Panie, weź zrezygnuj z Republiki bo już was tam ostro maglują. Co ma SAFE do Ukrainy