Release notes describe intent. A diff of two SBOM versions shows what shipped: components added, removed or changed, and how the dependency graph moved.
One API call:
https://t.co/Vi8ukk21u6
#SBOM#DevSecOps
A scanner flags 200 vulnerabilities in your release. Most of them do not actually affect you.
VEX is how you say so, credibly and at scale, in a form your customer's tooling can read:
https://t.co/I0oIPNVh39
#AppSec#SBOM#VulnerabilityManagement
Three questions reach every security leader: are we affected, can we prove it, and are we ready for the Cyber Resilience Act?
Our page for CISOs and CTOs, with a one-pager for your next meeting:
https://t.co/44Tkd8OqA1
#AppSec#CyberResilienceAct
Myth: the CRA gives you time to figure out who to call.
Fact: Article 14 gives manufacturers 24 hours from becoming aware of an actively exploited vulnerability to send an early warning. Not from when someone finally returns your email. #CyberResilienceAct
Somebody hands you a signed SBOM. Can you check it without an account at the vendor that signed it?
Yes: verify the DSSE envelope offline against the organisation's public JWKS. No account, no call to us.
https://t.co/IKTVTW6XZ2
#SBOM#SupplyChainSecurity
DevSecOps is easy when you understand the story behind every tool.
It starts with shift left. For years, security was the last step. A team spends 3 months building, and a week before release the security review finds 40 issues.
So you shift left. Find problems when they are cheap to fix, not when they are expensive to explain.
The first problem is a developer committing an API key to Git. By the time anyone notices, it is already public.
So you add secret scanning. A Gitleaks pre-commit hook blocks the commit before it leaves the laptop.
Your code is clean, but a library three levels deep has a critical CVE. You never chose it, but you shipped it.
So you add SCA. Dependabot, Snyk or Trivy checks every dependency on every pull request.
Then your own code. Someone concatenates user input into a SQL query. It passes review and it is wide open.
So you add SAST. Semgrep or SonarQube flags it on commit, while the fix is still two lines.
Your Docker image inherits 200 known vulnerabilities from one FROM line.
So you scan images in CI and move to minimal base images. Smaller image, smaller attack surface.
Your Terraform creates an S3 bucket and someone forgets one line. The bucket is public, and no code scanner caught it.
So you add IaC scanning. Checkov or tfsec kills the misconfiguration in the pull request, not in the news.
Now the scanners find 400 issues on day one. The team ignores all of them and the pipeline becomes noise.
So you add quality gates. Block on Critical and High, warn on the rest. Security becomes a rule the pipeline enforces, not a PDF nobody reads.
Some bugs only show up when the app is running, like a broken auth flow or a missing header.
So you add DAST. OWASP ZAP attacks your staging app the way a real attacker would.
Your pipeline holds long-lived cloud keys. Steal those, and you own production.
So you use OIDC. The pipeline gets short-lived credentials that expire in minutes. Nothing permanent to steal.
Your image passes every scan, then someone pushes an unscanned one straight to the cluster.
So you add image signing and admission control. Cosign signs it, Kyverno rejects anything unsigned. Only trusted images get in.
A zero-day drops on Friday evening and your CEO asks if you are affected. Nobody knows what is inside what you shipped.
So you generate an SBOM for every build. The answer takes one search, not one weekend.
And finally, an attacker gets past everything and lands inside a running container. Every scan was clean, but the threat is live.
So you add runtime security. Falco watches system calls and alerts the moment a container does something it never should.
DevSecOps is not a tool. It is a list of "what if" moments, each one closed before an attacker finds it.
Shift left was never about slowing the team down. It was about making sure nobody wakes up at 2am to a breach.
An auditor asks: can you prove this record is complete, and that nobody edited it?
The audit archive is write-once and hash-chained, and every page you export comes with proof attached.
https://t.co/h3OoAHm9pF
#Compliance#DevSecOps
🛡️We added Broadcom VMWare ESX vulnerability CVE-2026-41709 & Linux Kernel vulnerability CVE-2026-46300 to our KEV Catalog. Visit https://t.co/myxOwap1Tf & apply mitigations to protect your org. #Cybersecurity#InfoSec
A practical, jargon-light tour of what a CycloneDX Software Bill of Materials contains (components, dependencies, metadata and signatures) and why each part matters. Do reed our blog at https://t.co/j9eHAFpAOc #sbom#cyclonedx#billofmaterials