Atlas

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

@JeanPhilMadame Once we see green green candles everyone forgets the arguments

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

@Brattyenori13 Lovely lady. This shows you have made peace with the inevitability. Something most humans don't dare want to talk about. life has to end some day. Have fun dear.

[Ray @ray_world0]

buying a coin at 3kmc and still hitting -90%

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

Now that market is pumping, few things to pay attention to:

1. Be careful where you connect your main wallet to.

2. Before signing any trade, triple check the transaction.

3. Do not rush to sell your hard-core holdings to chase new shining memes. Stay safe and enjoy the bull.

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

@SunusiMinjibir The sunusi team should keep buying with the creator fee until the so called seller exhaust its holding. Pause the buy and burn and switch to buy and hold. Each time the wallets sells buy back the chat @sunu

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

@SunusiMinjibir @SunusiMinjibir is there a way You can check the wallet sunusi balance and track if actually no buy order are being made coz some1 posted sometimes ago that the wallet actually buys. Again the sell orders screenshot above, wallet is ending BW and QP

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

@S_M_Danpullo @Uthmankhan_ @kabiru_hussain @Mehusadeeq The team never told you not to buy yesterday but a random circulating posts by those spreading fud. The team did said you should sell on the day of the incident I believe that statement was made in good faith. I also encourage whoever is handling the X page to think b4 posting

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

For those asking y the team told d community to sell their $sunusi holdings. I beliv it was said in gud faith knowing a huge amount of d token was drained and was been offloaded. But be that as it may, the team should learn from this on matters of communication.@theafricanbulll

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

@Msageer_ You are the Lunatic spreading unverified information yesterday about hacker still holding chuck of sunusi. How does that work out well for You and your gullible followers now. Am sure slot of people have lost out and sold coz of that foolish post You made

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

@SunusiMinjibir A good % of the community still hold the Sanusi token.

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

@SunusiMinjibir There is absolutely no reason to create a new token. Sunusi is not the first to have it fund drained. Are you gonna launch new token after another glitch. Don't expect the same momentum if another token is launched. The community is ready to send the price just give the G light

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

@McuratorX You will buy at 10m mcp soon.

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

@Yyusufalifta @Msageer_ That's not true...on chain activities and transaction hash indicated all SANUSI were sold by the hacker.

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

@lordjustice38 @Msageer_ No mind the guy. Posting nonsense without proof

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

@Msageer_ Stop passing wrong information..do you have the hacker wallet to trace..because people sold doesnt mean the hacker is the one that sold. Check before you spill what you don't know

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

@creptosolutions @SunusiMinjibir @SunusiMinjibir raise fund, buy back a good portion of the sold tokens and this time burn it cleanly ensuring no mistakes. Now the drain tokens have all been sold. Alternatively, initiate regular buys on multiple wallets and hold for longer period until price stabilize

[Joeboy @vigho4u]

What the Blockchain Shows About the $SUNUSI Drain
Why we carried out this investigation

On 13 July 2026 the developer of the $SUNUSI token, a Solana memecoin, said publicly that his wallet had been drained while he was trying to burn part of his own supply using a website called https://t.co/lUIcalpXew. Public discussion quickly split into two camps. One held that the developer had staged a rug pull and blamed a tool to cover it. The other held that he was a genuine victim. Several early write ups also described the mechanism incorrectly, for example claiming a permanent delegate had been granted.

We set out to establish, from the public blockchain alone, what actually happened: how the assets left the wallet, how the tool worked, when its pieces were put in place, whether the same tool was used on anyone else, and whether the on chain record links the developer to the operation. Throughout, the links to the exact wallets and transactions are placed with the claims, so every statement can be opened and checked.

What we can establish from the chain: the token's own settings, the exact contents of the transactions that moved the assets, the amounts, where the assets went and what they sold for, when the tool's contracts were deployed, and whether specific wallets are connected to each other.

What we cannot establish from the chain: who recommended the tool to the developer, who operates the tool, what the developer knew or intended, and the private logic on the website that decides which users get a clean burn and which get drained. These live off chain, and we say so plainly where they arise.

1. The website and the contracts were both recent
The website, https://t.co/lUIcalpXew, was registered on 22 May 2026, roughly seven weeks before the drain, through the registrar NameCheap, and it was hosted on Vercel (name servers https://t.co/Plnc5kb5vf and https://t.co/FOn3qQxkM5). A burn service that a person should trust with a large holding did not exist two months earlier.

The on chain tool behind it is just as recent. The drainer program used on the developer was deployed on 9 July 2026, four days before the drain, by a throwaway wallet
https://t.co/UlJgZEg4bT
whose funding came through the Privacy Cash mixer (funding transaction
https://t.co/qvxOHL8os6).
An earlier copy of the same code
https://t.co/cU8zVwgGLV
had already been deployed around 1 July 2026. The code was rebuilt again and again by a series of throwaway wallets over about two weeks, all funded the same anonymous way. So the tool was a fresh, disposable, and deliberately hidden piece of infrastructure, not an established product.

2. The token itself was clean
The $SUNUSI token https://t.co/umUXjLBRCl has no hidden trap. It has no permanent delegate, no freeze authority, and no mint authority. The token could not, on its own, move anyone's holdings. Whatever happened did not come from the token, which rules out the "the contract was malicious" and "a permanent delegate was granted" explanations at the source.

3. What made the developer trust the tool
Two things. First, by his own account he was advised to burn part of his supply to reduce it and to build confidence, and he chose this tool for the job. That part is his statement and is not something the chain can confirm.

Second, and this the chain does confirm, he tested the tool the day before, on 12 July 2026, and the test worked. The test wallet
https://t.co/MpzxGPSJk0 burned about 9,511 tokens cleanly and lost nothing else (test transaction https://t.co/9Mqumf0CjU). That test wallet is his own, traced through his own funding chain: his main wallet https://t.co/XX5HWrA9mM funded an intermediary wallet https://t.co/CmyAFqAAPq which funded the test wallet. So the successful test he relied on was real. This is exactly how the trap works. The tool performs a genuine, honest burn on a small amount so that a test succeeds and earns trust, and it collects a small fee for that service, which is what keeps hundreds of ordinary users burning through it without complaint.

4. The first drain, and the anomaly he noticed
On 13 July 2026 the developer connected his main wallet and approved what the site presented as a burn of a large part of his holdings. The transaction he signed https://t.co/vXF8CrTMNm did not do that. It burned only about 242,258 tokens, roughly one tenth of one percent of the amount involved, and in the same transaction it transferred about 242 million tokens to a wallet controlled by the operator https://t.co/qHY4zDxBcE. He noticed the anomaly, that the burn had not reduced the supply as expected and that most of the tokens had moved to an unknown wallet, which then began selling.

5. Why he used the tool again, and the second drain
This is the part that looks strange at first, so it is worth setting out. By his account, in the confusion after the first transaction some people suggested burning more of the remaining supply to steady the market, and before doing another large burn he decided to test again with a small amount, the same way his test the day before had worked safely. The blockchain records what that second attempt did. He signed a small 10,000 token burn
https://t.co/DCx9bgn5Fe and the same transaction ran a hidden program that swept everything that was left, the rest of the $SUNUSI, all of his ANSEM tokens, and his SOL, to the same operator wallet.

So the reason he went back is consistent with the way the tool is built to be trusted. His first, genuine test had been clean, and he tried to repeat that safe pattern with another small test after the anomaly. The tool used that second approval to finish the job. The motive here is his account and cannot be read from the chain. What the chain shows is that the second transaction burned only 10,000 tokens and moved the rest to the operator.

6. Where the assets went and what they were worth
Across the two transactions, about 484 million $SUNUSI, roughly 48 percent of the supply, plus 205 ANSEM tokens https://t.co/LXMtunmfax and 2.44 SOL left his wallet and arrived at the operator wallet https://t.co/qHY4zDxBcE. That wallet then sold the $SUNUSI in 37 rapid trades over about 80 minutes, which crashed the price by roughly 95 percent. At the moment of the drain the project was worth somewhere between about $400,000 and $725,000. On paper the stolen tokens were worth a few hundred thousand dollars, but selling that much collapses the price as you go, so the amount actually realized was about $94,000. The 37 sell trades are visible under that wallet's Defi activity.

7. The developer's own test wallet was not drained, and we cannot fully explain why
The test wallet in section 3 is worth returning to, because it raises a fair question. It held thousands of dollars at the time, yet the tool left it alone and gave it a clean burn, while the same operation fully drained other wallets, in one case a wallet worth only a few dollars. So the tool did not simply take from the richest wallets. Why the developer's own high value wallet received a clean burn while much smaller wallets were emptied is not something the blockchain can explain, because the logic that decides who is robbed sits in the website's private backend. The most likely reading is that a tool that robbed everyone would be flagged within hours, so it robs only a portion and lets the rest, including small tests, burn cleanly. That is a reasonable inference, not a proven fact, and it is listed among the open questions.

8. The same code on other wallets, and one "victim" that was a self-test
The program that drained the developer is one of many copies. To see whether other people were also robbed, we traced two wallets the same code had drained, and they turned out to be two very different things.

One is a genuine independent victim https://t.co/HMaCixiZio.

That wallet was funded by Coinbase about eight months ago and has a long, active trading history of its own, with no link to the operator or to the developer. It was drained the same way, a tiny burn and a sweep of the rest, in its own transaction
https://t.co/GlWQSX9uQL.

This is a real, unrelated person who lost their tokens.
The other is not a victim at all, it is the operator testing its own contract https://t.co/cphWU3S7mf.

That wallet was funded by the operator's own collection wallet https://t.co/Yxb8Cb6AhI
which first sent it the tokens, and then those exact tokens were drained straight back to that same collection wallet (transaction
https://t.co/lbXvL1PDiR). Tokens out from the operator, tokens back to the operator, is a round trip test, not a robbery.

So this operation does two separate things at once. It robs genuine independent people, the developer and at least one confirmed other victim, and separately it runs its own test drains with worthless tokens. The practical lesson for anyone reviewing these events is that a small "victim" is only a victim if the tokens did not come from, and return to, the same operator wallet. That single check is what separated the real victim from the self-test above.

9. What links to the developer, and what does not
On the money trail, the developer's main wallet was funded from one exchange, MEXC https://t.co/XX5HWrA9mM. The wallets that built and funded the drainer trace back through the Privacy Cash mixer to another exchange, Binance (through https://t.co/h1qLi3Vbaz). We found no direct on chain link between the developer's wallets and the operator's wallets.

Two limits matter. First, the developer operates through intermediary wallets, at least one of which we found and used above, and we did not trace every hop of every related wallet, so a full money flow audit was not done. "No direct link found" is accurate, but it is not the same as "proven unrelated." Second, the blockchain cannot show intent. It records which wallet signed which transaction, not what the signer knew or meant.

10. Questions we cannot answer from the chain
Why was the developer's own test wallet, holding thousands of dollars, not drained, while a much smaller wallet was? The selection logic is on the website's private backend and is off chain.
How many genuine victims are there in total? We confirmed two independent victims, the developer and one Coinbase funded trader, and one operator self test that first looked like a victim. The other deployed copies of the drainer were not all checked, so the full number is unknown.

Are the operator's receiving wallets truly independent of the developer's wallet cluster? No direct link was found, but a complete money flow audit was not performed.

Who recommended the tool to the developer? That is a private conversation, not a transaction, and it is not on chain.

Who operates the tool? The funding runs through a mixer built to hide exactly that. Only the mixer operator, the exchanges, or law enforcement could reach it.

Did the developer know or intend anything about how the transactions would behave? The chain records signatures, not intent, so this cannot be settled here.

11. Lessons for everyone
Never use a burn tool or any dApp you have not independently verified, especially for large amounts, and be wary of any site or contract that is only weeks old. Type the address of a well known tool yourself instead of following a link someone sends you.

A successful small test proves nothing. These tools let a test succeed on purpose to earn your trust, then behave differently on the real amount.
Read every transaction before signing. If it shows transfers to unknown wallets when you expected a burn, reject it.

If something looks wrong after one approval, stop. Do not try again on the same tool. The second attempt is often what finishes the job.
For large holdings, assume every unfamiliar site is hostile. One approval can drain everything.

cc:
@SunusiMinjibir
@B_Versee
@connectwithtola
@richie_bitcoin
@Szymansk_ii
@Vindicatedchidi

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

@_Elsuraj @binadam61 @SunusiMinjibir Didn't you read the part where the dev said he test ran it with another wallet before connecting the main wallet for the burning. The test running may not have fully exposed the hidden flaws on the protocol. I think the Solanaburner need to be investigated and audited

[Atlas @AtlasGener]

@Szymansk_ii @officialEFCC Bross rest if you don't have what to say.