HU Politics

Heidelberg University Department of Political Science

[HU Politics @BergPOL]

"beware the US-centric habit in your usage of 'we' & 'our' in your papers, when really you mean to say 'the united states'."
-- dr. o'reilly

[HU Politics @BergPOL]

The Iran War and the End of the “Middle East” - The New Yorker https://t.co/RVVVRssgCm

[HU Politics @BergPOL]

https://t.co/jiDABplfnR

[HU Politics @BergPOL]

Rory McIlroy tee shot at #5 @ Muirfield Village. Pro-Am Day @ The Memorial. Playing with Masters Chairman Fred Ridley. @MemorialGolf

[HU Politics @BergPOL]

Rory #5 Memorial Pro-Am @rory_fans

[HU Politics @BergPOL]

Rory McIlroy tee shot at #5. Memorial Pro-Am. Playing with Masters Chairman Fred Ridley.

[Robin Wright @wrightr]

My @NewYorker analysis "The Epic Disaster of Epic Fury. https://t.co/o631cnCo6U

[HU Politics @BergPOL]

Evolving Warfare Connects the Conflicts in Ukraine and Iran https://t.co/DQdAKfJ3zO via @NYTimes

[The Atlantic @TheAtlantic]

The U.S. is effectively checkmated in Iran—and this defeat will carry lasting consequences unlike any America has endured before, Robert Kagan argues. https://t.co/6fUPwsZfRg

[HU Politics @BergPOL]

America Is Officially an Empire in Decline https://t.co/WEnpU3IL5T via @NYTOpinion

[HU Politics @BergPOL]

https://t.co/4WiMC8oH8M

[HU Politics @BergPOL]

@rory_fans Incredible tee shot. Has to be one of the longest ever on that hole. #Smoke

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

The article @nytimes highlights a series of structural weaknesses in how the campaign against Iran was conceptualized and executed (no surprise here but still very intresting to see what happened behind the scenes)
Some important points:

1. The article suggests that the U.S. and Israeli approach was based on a questionable strategic assumptionthat the Iranian regime is inherently fragile and could be destabilized through a relatively rapid sequence of military actions.

2. This assessment appears to have been reinforced by flawed analogies. Viewing Iran through the prism of other cases, such as Venezuela, reflects a potential misreading of the nature of the Iranian system and its resilience.

3. The planning process itself raises questions. The underlying assumptions do not seem to reflect a deep familiarity with the Islamic Republic’s political structure, internal dynamics, or historical patterns of behavior. The expectation that Iran might collapse, even under extreme pressure or leadership decapitation, was not supported by prior evidence.

4. In addition, the campaign appears to have been guided, implicitly or explicitly, by an objective of regime change. However, once that outcome proved unattainable, there was no clearly defined alternative strategy or end-state, creating a gap between initial objectives and operational reality.

5. The discussion around potential alternative leadership, including figures such as Reza Pahlavi, further underscores the assessment challenges. His limited domestic legitimacy and influence raise doubts about the viability of such scenarios in practice.

6. Several of the stated or implied objectives such as dismantling Iran’s missile capabilities, fully preventing its ability to disrupt maritime routes, or eliminating its capacity to target regional actors, appear highly ambitious relative to the tools employed.

7. It would have been to more rigorously scrutinize these assessments particularly from those who framed the campaign from the outset as a pathway toward regime change in Iran.

8. A more critical review of these assumptions might have exposed the gap between expectations and the likely resilience of the Iranian system, and could have informed a more calibrated strategy before entering the campaign.

Overall, the article points to a broader issue: a persistent gap between assumptions about Iran and the reality of its strategic behavior. This gap has continued throughout the conflict and remains relevant to ongoing policy considerations.

A textbook how to (not) plan a war.

@jonathanvswan
@maggieNYT

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

The Strait of Hormuz Crisis Exposes a Strategic Blind Spot

More than anything, the growing contradictions in U.S. policy toward the Strait of Hormuz reveal a deeper problem: strategic confusion in the face of bad options.

There is no easy way to reopen the strait. A direct military effort would be fraught with risk. The geography alone, narrow waterways, proximity to Iran’s coastline, and dense maritime traffic favors Tehran.

More importantly, Iran does not need to physically control every inch of the strait to disrupt it. Even if U.S. forces or their partners were to seize key points nearby islands, Iran could still strike tankers using drones, missiles, or naval proxies operating from a distance. In practical terms, “reopening” the strait militarily may prove illusory.

The diplomatic alternative is hardly more appealing. Any negotiated reopening would likely require meaningful concessions to Iran, including, explicitly or implicitly, acknowledging its claims to authority over the waterway. That could carry far-reaching implications for international maritime norms.

What makes the situation more troubling is that it was avoidable. The Strait of Hormuz was open at the outset of the conflict. Its closure is not an inevitable feature of the regional landscape, but rather the direct outcome of a war that escalated without a clear plan for safeguarding one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints.

In that sense, the current crisis is not just about Iran’s actions, it is about a failure of strategic foresight. Tehran has taken a step that, from its perspective, is difficult to reverse without extracting a price. And there is little evidence that threats alone, whether rhetorical or military will compel it to back down.

Even more forceful measures, such as seizing Iranian-linked islands in the Gulf, are unlikely to solve the core problem. They may shift the tactical picture, but they do not eliminate Iran’s ability to impose costs from afar. Worse, such moves risk further escalation without guaranteeing a restoration of maritime security.

The uncomfortable reality is that Every available option, military or diplomatic—carries significant downsides. And none offers a clear, decisive path to restoring stability in the Strait of Hormuz.

#IranWar‌

[HU Politics @BergPOL]

Is It 1914 in America? https://t.co/GUsFlZfoHG via @NYTOpinion

[Edward Wong @ewong]

.@nytimes reports: Many of the 13 military bases in the region used by American troops are all but uninhabitable, with the ones in Kuwait, which is next door to Iran, suffering perhaps the most damage. Gift link to story by @helenecooper @EricSchmittNYT: https://t.co/ircI51dD07

[Fareed Zakaria @FareedZakaria]

In Iran, the future of war has definitively come into view.

Advanced military technology had already made war precise. Now with high-volume drone warfare in Iran, that precision is mass-produced.

My take:

[HU Politics @BergPOL]

Iran Is Using America’s Playbook Against Us https://t.co/rAkTw3aqH2 via @NYTOpinion

[HU Politics @BergPOL]

Why It’s So Hard to Reopen the Strait of Hormuz https://t.co/kz5uI5DlbA via @NYTimes

[HU Politics @BergPOL]

https://t.co/dMKbsBuIo7

[HU Politics @BergPOL]

In Iran, the future of war is coming into view https://t.co/OhRUc3F0ri