Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش

Middle East, National Security and intelligence
expert
خبير لشؤون الشرق الأوسط وإيران
Senior Fellow @inss_hebrew
Nonresident Fellow @AtlanticCouncil

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

Before Striking Iran: Defining Achievable and realistic Objectives

Before considering a military strike against Iran, it is essential to be realistic about what such a campaign can actually accomplish.
There is little doubt that Iran is not a peer competitor to the United States militarily. The U.S. retains overwhelming conventional superiority and operational dominance across domains. However, Iran should not be underestimated. As demonstrated in previous limited confrontations, particularly in missile warfare, Tehran possesses meaningful asymmetric capabilities — especially in its ballistic missile arsenal and regional proxy network.
The core question, therefore, is not whether the United States can inflict damage. It is: What strategic objective is realistically achievable?

1. Regime Change
Even senior U.S. officials have acknowledged that regime change would be extraordinarily difficult to achieve.
There is no unified, viable opposition inside Iran capable of stepping in and governing. Moreover, regime change would almost certainly require a prolonged campaign, potentially including ground forces — something the American public and policymakers have shown little appetite for after Iraq and Afghanistan.
Absent a willingness to commit to a large-scale, long-term stabilization effort, regime change is not a credible objective.

2. Destabilizing the Regime to Trigger Internal Uprising
A military campaign could weaken the regime and create internal pressure. However, Iran’s leadership — particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) — has no exit option. The regime’s survival is existential for its core leadership.
History suggests they would respond to internal unrest with overwhelming force. For destabilization to translate into meaningful political change, a sustained and prolonged campaign would likely be required. Even then, the most probable outcome may not be democratic transition, but internal chaos — potentially pushing Iran toward civil conflict.
That scenario carries significant regional and global risks.

3. Destroying Iran’s Nuclear Program
A military strike could significantly damage nuclear facilities. Precision strikes may delay progress and degrade infrastructure.
But strikes cannot eliminate scientific knowledge, human capital, or political will. Nor is it certain that all highly enriched material could be located and destroyed.
At best, military action may delay the program. It is unlikely to eliminate it permanently. Iran would almost certainly attempt reconstruction — potentially with greater determination and fewer constraints.

4. Eliminating Iran’s Missile Capabilities
A broad campaign could substantially degrade Iran’s missile inventory and production infrastructure.
However, Iran’s missile program is domestically based and central to its defense doctrine. It is viewed as a pillar of deterrence against superior conventional forces. Even after heavy losses, Tehran would likely prioritize rebuilding these capabilities.
The result may be temporary degradation rather than permanent removal.

5. Forcing Iran Back to Negotiations on Better Terms
There is an assumption that military pressure could coerce Tehran into accepting a more favorable agreement.
Yet past confrontations suggest that the Iranian leadership may choose endurance over capitulation. The regime may calculate that time increases political pressure on Washington to de-escalate, particularly if the conflict becomes prolonged or regionally destabilizing.
Rather than producing immediate concessions, military action could harden Iran’s negotiating position — or eliminate diplomatic channels entirely.

6. Targeting Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
Some might argue that removing the Supreme Leader could fundamentally alter Iran’s trajectory.
However, decapitation strikes often produce unpredictable outcomes. Iran’s political system is institutionalized, not purely personalist. Removing Khamenei could trigger retaliation from Iran and its regional proxies and potentially force the United States into a much broader conflict.
It is also unclear whether such a move would moderate Iranian policy. It could just as easily radicalize it.

The Strategic Bottom Line
There is no question about U.S. military superiority in a direct confrontation. The real issue is strategic clarity.
For the first time in decades, the possibility of direct U.S.–Iran military confrontation raises the prospect of open interstate war rather than proxy conflict. That demands disciplined thinking about ends, ways, and means.
No available objective appears easily attainable. All carry significant second- and third-order effects. Many outcomes could be unpredictable �� and not necessarily favorable to U.S. interests.

Thus, before initiating military action, policymakers must clearly define what “success” looks like — and whether the likely costs, duration, escalation risks, and regional consequences align with America’s broader strategic priorities.
Military capability is not the same as strategic advantage.

#IranRevolution2026
#Iran

[Yalda Hakim @SkyYaldaHakim]

Will Eisenkot change Israel’s policies towards Gaza - or should we expect more of the same?

@citrinowicz on the show 🔽

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

In my interview @SkyYaldaHakim @SkyNews , I discussed what Israeli foreign policy might look like if Gadi Eisenkot succeeds in forming a government.

Eisenkot would certainly bring a welcome change in tone and direction. But his priority would likely be Israel’s urgent domestic challenges, rather than launching another military campaign against Iran.

He fully understands the Iranian threat, but he also recognizes something Netanyahu has repeatedly failed to acknowledge: you cannot bring down the Iranian regime through airstrikes alone.

On the Palestinian issue, Eisenkot could bring a positive shift. But expectations should remain realistic. His would still be a right-wing government, likely operating with a narrow parliamentary majority. We should not expect dramatic diplomatic breakthroughs or far-reaching peace initiatives, but he will fight against Jewish terrorism in the west Bank and for improving Palestinian life.

The change would be positive, but it would not be a revolution in Israeli foreign policy.

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

Iran’s Missile Program: The Limits of Airpower and the Illusion of a Military Solution

Iran’s missile and drone capabilities are not simply the product of imported technology or foreign assistance. They are rooted in decades of indigenous knowledge, accumulated experience, and a national security doctrine built around asymmetric warfare.

The belief that Israel and the United States can permanently prevent Iran from producing missiles and drones through airstrikes has repeatedly collided with reality.

This does not mean that the military campaigns have failed to inflict significant damage. They have. Iranian production facilities, launchers, stockpiles, and supporting infrastructure have suffered substantial losses. But degrading a capability is not the same as eliminating it.

Iran spent decades preparing for precisely this kind of confrontation. Its missile and drone programs were designed not only to survive attacks but also to recover from them.

Factories can be destroyed, but engineering knowledge, technical expertise, operational experience, and the ability to rebuild supply chains are much harder to eliminate. Iran's recovery demonstrates that destroying production facilities does not necessarily destroy the industrial and technological foundations that allow those facilities to be rebuilt.

This leaves Washington and Jerusalem facing an uncomfortable strategic choice: either accept that Iran will retain significant conventional missile capabilities, or commit themselves to repeated military campaigns every few months or years, with enormous and potentially growing costs.

And these costs go far beyond the price of military operations. Every new campaign risks triggering Iranian retaliation against Israel, American military bases, Gulf states, and critical energy infrastructure. In other words, repeated attempts to weaken Iran's military capabilities could ultimately produce greater regional instability rather than lasting security.

There comes a point when national security strategy must rely not only on destroying an adversary's capabilities but also on deterring their use.

This does not mean abandoning military pressure or accepting every aspect of Iran's military buildup. It means recognizing that airstrikes cannot substitute for a comprehensive strategy combining credible deterrence, multilayered missile defense, intelligence operations, efforts to disrupt critical technology transfers, and diplomacy.

Military force can remain an important instrument. But it cannot become the strategy itself. And this is precisely the danger of a strategy built around repeated military campaigns. Tactical successes may create the appearance of progress while leaving the underlying strategic problem unresolved. Worse, they may lock Israel and the United States into an endless cycle of escalation, retaliation, and reconstruction.

Ultimately, the goal of a successful strategy should not be to ensure that Iran has no missiles. It should be to ensure that Iran understands the consequences of using them.

#Iran
#IranWar‌

[Bloomberg @business]

A western intelligence estimate says Iran can build about 50 ballistic missiles per month — roughly half its prewar capacity — providing a formidable means of retaliation if hostilities resume, despite months of airstrikes https://t.co/Zn1gYnv285

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

حتى لو انهار النظام في إيران غداً، فإن مستقبل إسرائيل سيُحسم في رام الله

مقال لي في صحيفة هآرتس @Haaretz

التهديد الأكبر لمستقبل إسرائيل لا يكمن في إيران، رغم خطورة التحديات التي تمثلها، بل في استمرار غياب حل للقضية الفلسطينية. فقد سمح التركيز الإسرائيلي المفرط على التهديد الإيراني للحكومات المتعاقبة بتأجيل اتخاذ قرارات سياسية صعبة بشأن مستقبل ملايين الفلسطينيين الذين يعيشون بين البحر والنهر.

القوة العسكرية، مهما بلغت فع��ليتها، لا تستطيع القضاء على جميع التهديدات، وأن استمرار السيطرة على الفلسطينيين دون منحهم حقوقاً سياسية متساوية يهدد الطابع اليهودي والديمقراطي لإسرائيل، ويعمّق عزلتها الدولية ويضعف علاقاتها الاستراتيجية، ولا سيما مع الولايات المتحدة.

إسحاق رابين أدرك العلاقة بين التقدم في عملية السلام مع الفلسطينيين وتعزيز قدرة إسرائيل على مواجهة إيران. فالتقدم نحو تسوية سياسية يمكن أن يفتح الباب أمام التطبيع مع السعودية، وتعزيز العلاقات مع الأردن والدول العربية، وتقليص قدرة طهران على استغلال القضية الفلسطينية لتعزيز نفوذها الإقليمي.

الحكومة الإسرائيلية المقبلة مطالبة بإحداث تغيير جذري في سلم الأولويات الوطنية، لا الاكتفاء بتغيير القيادة أ�� تحسين العلاقات مع واشنطن. فحتى لو انهار النظام الإيراني غداً، ستبقى القضية الفلسطينية قائمة، وسيظل مستقبل إسرائيل مرتبطاً بكيفية التعامل معها.

الرسالة الأساسية: إن ضمان مستقبل إسرائيل كدولة يهودية وديمقراطية لا يب��أ من طهران، بل من رام الله. فالتسوية مع الفلسطينيين ليست تنازلاً سياسياً فحسب، بل ضرورة استراتيجية وأمنية ووجودية لإسرائيل.

https://t.co/xqFH9gneqT

[Lila Odin @LOdinaev]

גם היום, הליצנים שרון גל וצבי יחזקאלי, עדיין לא התנצלו בפני דני סיטרינוביץ.

נמשיך להמתין

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

The Strait of Hormuz: Why the Status Quo Cannot Last

The current situation in the Strait of Hormuz can't continue indefinitely. And the longer it continues, the greater the risk of another military escalation.

From Tehran's perspective, the American maritime blockade is an act of war. The absence of major military operations does not mean the war is over. Iran has no intention of simply accepting this situation indefinitely.

The blockade is undoubtedly hurting Iran's economy. But we need to distinguish between inflicting economic pain and achieving strategic objectives. Iran is not going to surrender, nor is there much reason to believe that the Islamic Republic is on the verge of collapse. Tehran has learned to survive under economic pressure and continues to benefit from its relationships with China and Russia.

Sometimes it seems that Washington is confusing the means with the objective. The blockade is a tool, not a strategy. And so far, there is little evidence that it is bringing Iran closer to accepting American demands.

In fact, the opposite may be happening. Iran has already threatened to intensify its actions. Tehran may conclude that increasing the economic and security costs for Washington and its regional partners is the only way to force a change in American policy. The danger is obvious: Iran escalates, Washington responds, and both sides find themselves in another military confrontation that neither necessarily wanted.

Oil markets may also be underestimating this risk. The recent decline in prices appears to reflect expectations that the war is approaching its end. Renewed attacks on shipping or energy infrastructure could quickly reverse that trend, with serious consequences for global markets and American consumers.

The Gulf states have little interest in another confrontation, and their pressure on Washington to find a diplomatic solution could increase.

Then there is American domestic politics. Once the new Congress takes office in January, maintaining an expensive, open-ended blockade without a clear political endgame may become increasingly difficult.

Tehran understands this. The midterm election results may have strengthened its belief that time is working in its favor, reducing its incentive to make concessions. But this calculation is also dangerous, as Trump could still decide to escalate militarily before the political window narrows.

The fundamental problem is that both sides believe time is on their side. Washington assumes that continued pressure will eventually force Iran to compromise. Tehran believes that continued resistance will eventually force Washington to reconsider its demands.

Both cannot be right. And unless Washington and Tehran find a way to bridge the disagreement over the sequencing of concessions, no change in negotiators or diplomatic channels will resolve the crisis.

The bottom line: The blockade may be tactically effective, but it is strategically insufficient without a realistic diplomatic exit strategy.

The current status quo is not an alternative to war. It is a continuation of the war, and the longer it lasts, the greater the risk that the next escalation will be far more difficult to contain.

#Iran
#IranWar‌

[Javier Blas @JavierBlas]

"… Iran would love a deal. The problem is, the conditions they continue to place are absurd. Like they're not even serious right now. [...] Eventually, the economic reality penetrates the skull of even the most radical lunatic..."

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

Washington Should Not Mistake Rezaei’s Rise for Iranian Flexibility

Washington needs to understand one simple fact: Mohsen Rezaei is no dove, and his growing influence does not signal any fundamental change in Tehran’s position toward the United States.

Rezaei is neither willing nor able to offer concessions that cross the Islamic Republic’s established red lines. Iran’s position remains unchanged: Washington must first implement Tehran’s seven conditions before substantive negotiations on the nuclear issue can begin.

There is remarkable unity within Iran’s leadership on this issue, from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and President Pezeshkian to Rezaei and Ali Abdollahi. Despite their internal rivalries, none is advocating surrender to American pressure.

Rezaei may be influential, but he does not have the authority to redefine Iran’s strategic priorities. Those decisions ultimately rest with the Supreme Leader and the broader security establishment.

The real question is not whether Rezaei might eventually meet Vice President JD Vance. Iran has repeatedly demonstrated tactical flexibility regarding diplomatic channels, negotiating formats, and interlocutors. A meeting, even at a senior level, should not be mistaken for a strategic breakthrough.

The real question is whether Rezaei’s emergence reflects a fundamental shift in Tehran’s calculations. The answer is no.

The central obstacle remains the sequencing of steps. Tehran insists that the United States first fulfill its commitments and provide credible guarantees before substantive nuclear negotiations can begin.

This was true before the US midterm elections, and it is even more relevant afterward. Tehran may now believe that Trump’s weakened domestic political position gives Iran additional leverage and that time is working in its favor. But this calculation carries significant risks. A politically weakened president might also be tempted to launch another military strike to demonstrate strength or claim a victory.

That is precisely why Washington must avoid confusing access to a powerful Iranian official with actual Iranian flexibility. Overestimating Rezaei’s ability to deliver concessions could generate unrealistic expectations, deepen frustration, and ultimately increase the risk of another military confrontation.

The path to an agreement with Iran does not run through finding a more convenient Iranian interlocutor. It runs through recognizing that Tehran’s fundamental demands have not changed.

Changing the Iranian negotiator will not change Iran’s negotiating position. Only a meaningful shift in the substance and sequencing of American proposals could create a genuine opportunity for progress.

And unless Washington and Tehran find a way to bridge that gap, another meeting, another mediator, or another Iranian negotiator will do little to prevent the next escalation.

#Iran
#IranWar‌

[Alan Eyre @AlanEyre1]

Strong analysis from my @MiddleEastInst colleague @AlexVatanka
https://t.co/TiD1CkM4sm

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

Trump’s Message on Iran: The Gulf Wants No War, but the Status Quo Is Unsustainable

One thing stands out from Trump’s latest post: Gulf states clearly oppose another military confrontation with Iran. I suspect this was the central message conveyed during the meeting itself, as well as in conversations between senior U.S. officials and their Gulf counterparts.

There is a growing and welcome recognition across the Gulf that another war would not serve the interests of these countries. Quite the opposite. They would be among the first to pay the price, particularly if Iran retaliated against energy infrastructure, shipping routes, and other strategic assets.

But the real question is whether the meeting produced a new diplomatic proposal, and more importantly, whether Washington is showing any genuine flexibility. Because one thing should be clear: the current status quo cannot last.

Iran is unlikely to accept an indefinite blockade. Tehran could respond by targeting additional tankers and raising the economic and military costs of maintaining it. At the same time, once the new Congress takes office, the administration could face growing pressure to reconsider a blockade that has failed to produce Iranian capitulation while imposing significant costs on the global economy.

And there is a fundamental problem with Washington's approach: a blockade is a means of applying pressure, not an end in itself. If Tehran refuses to surrender, what exactly is the next step?

To conclude, Gulf states want to avoid escalation, and Trump increasingly appears inclined in the same direction. But preferences are not policy, and diplomatic statements are not a diplomatic breakthrough.

Unless Washington and Tehran find a formula that allows both sides to claim some degree of success, the situation will remain dangerously unstable.

The absence of an immediate war should not be mistaken for de-escalation. As long as the blockade remains in place without a credible diplomatic exit, the risk of another military confrontation will remain real.

#Iran
#IranWar

[Barak Ravid @BarakRavid]

Trump on Truth Social: I had an excellent conversation with Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, the Prime Minister of Qatar, wherein much was discussed with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Most importantly, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and others, would prefer the status quo, in other words, a continuation of the Greatest Naval Blockade in History, and the new Operation Iron Gate — Therefore, Land and Sea. All have agreed that Iran cannot have a Nuclear Weapon — That is non-negotiable! Should there be any change with respect to developments in the Middle East, the United States of America is “locked and loaded” and ready to go. At this point, however, that seems to be quite unlikely. Israel, and the entire Middle East, are protected from Iranian danger and threats. We are seeing positive momentum toward an end to this Conflict, and will ensure that America’s interests are at all times protected. At the conclusion of this Military Engagement, the American People, and the World, will be far safer and more secure

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

תחושה של דז'ה וו היסטורי

פריצת הדרך במגעים החשאיים בין ביל ברנס לבכירים איראנים בעומאן התרחשה כאשר ממשל אובמה הסכים להכיר באפשרות של העשרת אורניום באיראן במסגרת הסכם.

והנה, אם הדיווח הזה מדויק, ההיסטוריה חוזרת על עצמה: גם ממשל ��ראמפ מתחיל להבין את מה שממשל אובמה הבין לפני יותר מעשור — לא ניתן להגיע להסכם שיגביל את תוכנית הגרעין האיראנית בלי לקבל את המשך ההעשרה באיראן.

הדרך להסכם עדיין ארוכה. טהראן דורשת הקלות כלכליות ועמידה בהבנות קודמות כתנאי לפתיחת המשא ומתן הגרעיני.

אבל זו עשויה להיות התפתחות דרמטית, ובעיקר הכרה אמריקנית נוספת במגבלות הכוח הצבאי ובחוסר היכולת למנוע מאיראן העשרת אורניום לאורך זמן באמצעות כוח בלבד.

[roi kais • روعي كايس • רועי קייס @kaisos1987]

ערוץ אל-ערביה הסעודי מדווח ממקורותיו כי הצעה פקיסטנית-קטרית חדשה הביאה לחידוש של המו"מ הרציני בין ארה"ב לאיראן, שכוללת התייחסות לסוגיית הגרעין. לפי הדיווח, ממשל טראמפ הסכים לראשונה לכך שאיראן תעשיר אורניום בשטחה לרמה של-3.67% , דבר אליו עד כה סירבו בארה"ב, ובתמורה איראן תדלל את האורניום המועשר ל-60% לרמות נמוכות יותר, ייתכן שבאמצעות סיוע של מדינה שלישית. לפי ההצעה, תתאפשר שיבת פקחי סבא"א לאיראן, בינתיים ללא הבהרה למסגרת שבה הם יפעלו. לפי ההצעה, ארה"ב תשחרר בין 6 ל-9 מיליארד דולר מהכספים האיראניים המוקפאים ברגע בו יושג ההסכם, ובמקביל המצור הימי על איראן יוסר ומיצר הורמוז ייפתח לתנועה חופשית של ספינות. אין לדיווח באל-ערביה אישור ממקורות אחרים.

[Dan Raviv @DanRaviv]

@citrinowicz Strategic thinking, and a willingness to ask challenging questions. Your insights are very valuable, Danny @Citrinowicz. For admirers who want more including whether America's #Iran experts keep up with #Israel's, here's me with Citrinowicz 2 months ago: https://t.co/tte3fa9HES

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

לפתחה של הממשלה החדשה: האיום על עתיד ישראל אינו בטהראן, אלא ברמאללה.

איראן היא איום משמעותי, אבל גם אם המשטר בטהראן יקרוס מחר, מיליוני הפלסטינים לא ייעלמו. המשך השליטה בהם מסכן את עתידה של ישראל כמדינה יהודית ��דמוקרטית, מעמיק את בידודה ופוגע ביחסיה עם ארה"ב.

הממשלה החדשה חייבת להבין: לא כל איום ניתן להסיר בכוח צבאי. הסדרת הסוגיה הפלסטינית אינה טובה לפלסטינים, אלא אינטרס קיומי ישראלי. היא גם המפתח לחיזוק יחסינו עם מדינות ערב ולהתמודדות יעילה יותר עם איראן.

הדרך להבטחת עתידה של ישראל עוברת בראש ובראשונה ברמאללה, לא בטהראן.

מאמר שלי @haa

https://t.co/sbK12stjiy

[Aaron David Miller @aarondmiller2]

Having worked part of my career as an intel analyst, I can say without reservation that what Danny has defined -and achieved - is the gold standard for analysis - clarity; complexity; honesty; and truth to power.

[Guibert Philippe @Phil6gbrt]

De mon point de vue le meilleur compte pour suivre le conflit entre Israël-US et l’Iran (et la situation générale au MO) avec la distance, la factualité et l’objectivité indispensables.

[Amir Handjani @ahandjani]

The best in the business …

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

Sober Analysis: 100,000 Followers, a Few Principles, and One Goal

To my 100,000+ followers: Thank you for being part of this journey. I wanted to take this opportunity to share a few thoughts about my approach to analyzing the Middle East. I don't take your interest or your trust for granted. And this seems like a good opportunity to explain a few things about how I approach my work, what I believe, and what you can expect from me.

First, I try to analyze developments as they are, not as I would like them to be. My goal is to be as objective as possible, stay close to the facts, and distinguish between what we know, what we assess, and what we simply cannot predict. I don't always get things right, and when the facts change, I'm willing to reconsider my conclusions. Being willing to admit mistakes is not a weakness. It is an essential part of serious analysis.

Much of my professional career, particularly the past fifteen years, has been devoted to understanding Iran. It remains my main area of expertise. But over the years, I have also worked extensively on other Middle Eastern issues, which is why I occasionally write about them as well. I try to stay within the areas where my professional experience allows me to offer something meaningful.

Let me also address something that comes up quite often. Despite what some people claim, I am not a regime apologist. I do not represent the IRGC, and I am certainly not on the Iranian Foreign Ministry's payroll.

I spent many years of my professional life working to weaken the Iranian regime. I would welcome a genuine change in Iran's political system, particularly one that improves the lives of the Iranian people and contributes to regional stability.

But wanting to see the Iranian regime weakened or changed does not mean believing that every military operation against it is strategically wise.

I can hope for the fall of the Iranian regime while recognizing that a particular military strategy is unlikely to bring it about. Confusing what we want to happen with what is likely to happen is one of the most dangerous mistakes in strategic analysis.

I have never believed that military force alone can resolve the Iranian challenge. In fact, I argued from the beginning that the latest war was a profound strategic mistake. In my assessment, despite the considerable military damage inflicted on Iran, it ultimately strengthened the regime's determination and left Israel facing a more complicated strategic reality.

I know these arguments are not always popular. They have also brought their share of personal attacks. But I believe an analyst's responsibility is to say what the evidence suggests, even when the conclusions are uncomfortable, rather than tell people what they want to hear.

My analysis is not intended to serve any government, political party, or ideological camp. I have no interest in defending a particular leader or promoting a political agenda. My responsibility is to the facts, to sound strategic judgment, and to the conclusions that follow from them, even when those conclusions challenge my own assumptions.

I also believe that Israel's disproportionate, sometimes almost obsessive, focus on Iran has come at a considerable strategic cost. It has diverted attention from other challenges that are no less important to Israel's future, particularly the Palestinian issue.

I have said this repeatedly: there is no sustainable path toward a more stable Middle East without addressing the Palestinian question. For Israel, finding a political way forward with the Palestinians is more important to its long-term future than the identity of whoever governs Tehran.

That does not make me a pacifist. I believe military force is sometimes necessary, and I fully recognize the threats Israel faces. But force must serve a political strategy, not replace one. After three years of war, we should have learned that military achievements, however impressive, do not automatically translate into lasting security.

We need to invest far more seriously in diplomacy, use military achievements to create political opportunities, and understand that not every problem in the Middle East can be solved through another military campaign.

If you choose to follow this account, what I can promise is an effort to provide independent, evidence-based analysis of the region without sugarcoating reality.

I am Israeli, and Israel's security matters deeply to me. But precisely because I care about my country's future, I have no difficulty criticizing Israeli policies when I believe they undermine its long-term security. Supporting Israel should never mean supporting every decision made by its government.

I am also a strong believer in the US-Israel alliance. I am deeply concerned about the deterioration in that relationship. In my view, the long-term erosion of American support poses a greater strategic danger to Israel than Iran or any other individual regional threat.

Israel must do everything it can to preserve this relationship, including making fundamental changes to its approach toward the Palestinians. The alliance cannot be taken for granted, and its future will depend not only on shared security interests but also on the political choices Israel makes.

The same applies to Israel's peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. These relationships are strategic assets of enormous importance. They must be protected, strengthened, and never treated as permanent achievements that require no further investment.

More broadly, I believe Israel's integration into the Middle East is essential to its future. A secure Israel should not be a country that relies only on military superiority, but one that builds lasting relationships with its neighbors and becomes an accepted, constructive part of the region.

Ultimately, I believe most of us want the same basic things: to wake up in the morning feeling safe, to give our children a better future, and to live normal, decent lives.

I am not naive. There will be more crises, more threats, and probably more wars. But if we want to build something better, we cannot rely on military power alone.

We need strategic thinking, political courage, diplomacy, and a willingness to question assumptions that no longer serve us.

Thank you again to everyone who has joined me here. I appreciate the support, the criticism, and the conversations.

My goal is not to tell you what you want to hear. It is to help us understand the Middle East as it is, because only then can we make better decisions about what comes next.

#MiddleEast

[David S. @DavidS_Liberdad]

Another attack on Iran? First explain what we’ll achieve this time that we didn’t achieve in 39 days of war

It’s astonishing how two military campaigns against Iran have failed to lead to a better understanding of the Iranian regime, its way of thinking, and the limits of military force in dealing with it.

So it’s worth recalling a few basic facts:

A. Iran will not surrender even after another military operation from the air. The regime will not collapse, and even another severe blow to its military and strategic infrastructure will not necessarily bring about a change in its policy.

B. Another campaign will cause unprecedented damage to Iran, but also to the Gulf states and Israel. It could develop into a prolonged conflict that would be very difficult to end. And as we’ve already seen, even a significant blow to Iran’s military capabilities does not guarantee that it won’t rebuild its missile arsenal or continue advancing toward a nuclear capability.

We all know the saying about someone who does the same thing over and over and expects a different result. For some reason, when it comes to Iran, it seems that some decision-makers in Israel still believe that another round of strikes will bring a result we failed to achieve in previous rounds.

This is how we are gradually sliding into a strategy of “mowing the grass” in Iran. But unlike in other arenas, this is a vast country with significant retaliatory capabilities, capable of exacting a heavy price from Israel and the entire region. Worse still, another campaign could deepen the damage to Israel’s standing in the United States, precisely at a time when American support for the war is steadily eroding.

I fully understand the pressure to attack before the new Congress takes office in January, but the central question is not which additional targets can be attacked in Iran. The question is what exactly will we achieve this time that we have failed to achieve so far?

Israel and the United States attacked Iran for a total of 39 days. We caused enormous damage, but we did not fundamentally change the strategic reality. In some respects we even made it worse, as the new reality in the Strait of Hormuz illustrates.

Will another attack change the equation? Will it bring about Iranian surrender? The overthrow of the regime? A long-term solution to the nuclear and missile threat? And if the answer to all these questions is no, what exactly is the purpose of the move?

Before rushing into another campaign that will shut down the Israeli economy, send millions of Israelis into shelters, cause heavy economic damage, and could also drag the United States into another war without an exit strategy, those pushing for it should explain to the public not only what they intend to attack, but above all what they seek to achieve.

And there is another matter here that must not be ignored: the one seeking to lead Israel into another campaign is a prime minister heading a caretaker government, after the public has already had its say in the elections. Even if a caretaker government has the authority to make security decisions, that does not mean it has an unlimited public mandate to plunge Israel into another war—an expensive and dangerous one, with strategic consequences for generations. Precisely under these circumstances, special caution, maximum transparency, and a serious discussion are required on the question of whether this is an urgent security need or a move that can and should be left to the next government.

Not every threat can be removed by military force, and not every operational success is a strategic achievement. After 39 days of war against Iran + 12 days of Operation “Am Kelavi,” it’s time we internalized the difference.

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

Vance Wants to End the Iran War. But a Failed Meeting Could Bring the Region Closer to Another Escalation

The prospect of another diplomatic meeting involving Vice President JD Vance, this time with Rezaei, is an important development. But I would be very careful about reading too much into it.

Following the earlier contacts, the letter to Iran's leadership, and now the possibility of a direct meeting, Tehran can hardly ignore the message: Vance appears genuinely determined to bring this war to an end.

And there are good reasons for him to do so. Ending the conflict would serve American interests, ease the economic and political pressure on the administration, and offer Republicans an opportunity to move beyond a war that has become increasingly costly.

But wanting to end a war and being prepared to make the compromises necessary to end it are two very different things.

First, Washington should understand that Rezaei is not Delcy Rodríguez. Anyone who believes that identifying a senior figure within the Iranian establishment creates an opportunity to bypass the leadership or persuade Tehran to abandon its fundamental positions is making a serious mistake.

Rezaei is deeply rooted in the Islamic Republic's political and security establishment. Even if he has the authority to negotiate, that does not mean he has either the mandate or the desire to fundamentally change Iran's position. He is not an alternative to the regime, and Washington should not expect him to deliver an Iranian surrender simply because the United States is willing to engage with him.

More importantly, Iran's leadership has made its position clear. Tehran is not prepared to abandon its fundamental demands, particularly regarding the Strait of Hormuz, the maritime restrictions and the economic measures imposed on Iran. From the Iranian perspective, these issues must be addressed before meaningful nuclear negotiations can begin.

And this is where the real challenge lies. The proposed meeting would be a meaningful indication that both sides are searching for a political way out. It would also demonstrate Vance's personal commitment to ending the confrontation. That matters, especially given the deep distrust between Washington and Tehran.

But we have been here before. As the Islamabad experience demonstrated, a high-level meeting, however important, cannot substitute for an agreement on the fundamental issues dividing the two sides.

If Washington arrives with essentially the same position, demanding that Iran first reverse its measures in Hormuz while offering no meaningful movement on the restrictions and guarantees Tehran considers essential, I see little reason to expect a breakthrough.

The United States does not necessarily have to accept every Iranian demand. But it must be prepared to explore a different sequence of reciprocal steps, one that gives Tehran a credible reason to move forward without appearing to surrender.

That could involve a phased arrangement addressing freedom of navigation, maritime restrictions, economic measures and guarantees against renewed hostilities, with nuclear negotiations following on an agreed timetable.

There is also a crucial question about Washington itself: Does Vance have Trump's backing to explore such compromises, or is he being sent to test Iranian flexibility without any corresponding change in American policy?

For Tehran, that distinction is essential. The Iranian leadership will not make major concessions simply because it believes Vance wants peace. It needs to believe that any understanding can actually be delivered and sustained by the administration.

And this brings me to what I consider the most dangerous aspect of the proposed meeting.A failed meeting could be worse than no meeting at all.

If Vance and Rezaei meet and fail to bridge the gaps, Trump could conclude that diplomacy has been exhausted and that renewed military pressure is the only remaining option. Tehran, meanwhile, could interpret the failure as further evidence that Washington is not genuinely prepared to negotiate on terms Iran considers acceptable.

Such an outcome would strengthen those within the Iranian leadership who believe that only continued resistance and escalation can force American concessions.

We could then find ourselves in a particularly dangerous situation: both sides enter the meeting hoping to find a way out, only to emerge more convinced that the other side understands nothing but force.

And after everything that has happened during this war, another round of escalation would not necessarily resemble the previous ones. Iran has demonstrated its willingness to impose significant economic costs through Hormuz and attacks on regional infrastructure. Washington may believe it can conduct another limited military operation, but Tehran could conclude that a much stronger response is necessary to restore deterrence.

That is how a diplomatic failure could become the starting point for a much broader confrontation.

The bottom line is that a Vance–Rezaei meeting, if it takes place, would be a significant diplomatic step and an important indication of Vance's determination to end the war. But unless Washington is willing to reconsider its approach to Hormuz and the broader economic restrictions, the meeting is unlikely to produce a breakthrough.

I believe Vance genuinely wants to end this conflict. But his personal commitment, important as it is, cannot overcome the fundamental disagreements between Washington and Tehran without a corresponding change in American policy.

#Iran
#iran

[Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش @citrinowicz]

סוף מעשה במחשבה תחילה: כיצד שתי מלחמות מול איראן הותירו את ישראל במצב אסטרטגי גרוע יותר

אחרי שתי מערכות צבאיות מול איראן, הגיע הזמן לשאול שאלה פשוטה: האם מצבה האסטרטגי של ישראל מול איראן טוב יותר משהיה לפני המלחמות? לא כמה מטרות השמדנו, כמה מפקדים חיסלנו או כמה מתקנים תקפנו, אלא האם אנחנו בטוחים יותר והאם האיום האיראני התרחק מאיתנו.

לצערי, התשובה שלי היא לא. להערכתי, מצבה האסטרטגי של ישראל כיום גרוע יותר, וחשוב להבין מדוע.

אי�� ��פק שישראל וארצות הברית גרמו נזק עצום ליכולותיה הצבאיות של איראן. אלה הישגים מבצעיים משמעותיים שאסור לזלזל בהם. אבל האיראנים למדו משהו חשוב לא פחות: גם אחרי עשרות ימי תקיפות, חיסול בכירים ופגיעה קשה בתשתיות, המשטר שרד, איראן לא נכנעה והיעדים האסטרטגיים המרכזיים של המערכה לא הושגו. מבחינת טהראן, זו הוכחה לכך שאפשר לספוג מכות קשות ועדיין למנוע מישראל ומארצות הברית להשיג את מבוקשן.

הדבר נכון במיוחד לסוגיית הגרעין. המלחמות המחישו שאפשר לפגוע במתקנים, בצנטריפוגות ובמדענים, אבל אי אפשר להפציץ ידע או מוטיבציה. חמור מכך, המלחמה עלולה לחזק דווקא את הגורמים באיראן הסבורים שרק נשק גרעיני יוכל למנוע תקיפה נוספת. גם חיסולו של עלי חמינאי, שהסתייג במשך שנים מפיתוח נשק גרעיני, עלול להסיר מגבלה משמעותית על החלטה איראנית עתידית לחצות את הסף. כך ייתכן שמלחמה שנועדה למנוע מאיראן נשק גרעיני דווקא חיזקה את המוטיבציה להשיגו.

ויש כאן בעיה נוספת. במשך שנים נשענה ההרתעה הישראלית והאמריקנית על האיום בתקיפה. כל עוד האיום לא מומש, האיראנים נאלצו להביא בחשב��ן את האפשרות שמלחמה תוביל לתבוסתם. אלא שכעת הם מכירים הרבה יותר טוב לא רק את עוצמת הכוח הישראלי והאמריקני, אלא גם את מגבלותיו. הם יודעים מה אנחנו מסוגלים להרוס, אבל גם מה איננו מסוגלים להשיג באמצעות כוח צבאי. במובן הזה, המעבר מאיום בתקיפה למלחמה בפועל עלול להתברר כשגיאה אסטרטגית קשה.

מנגד, האיראנים גילו עד כמה משמעותי המנוף שבידיהם במצרי הורמוז. הם לא צריכים להביס את הצי האמריקני או את חיל האוויר הישראלי כדי לגבות מחיר כבד מארצות הברית. מספיק לשבש את תנועת המכליות, לאיים על תשתיות האנרגיה ולהביא לעלייה חדה במחירי הנפט. המלחמה המחישה לטהראן שהיא יכולה לפגוע בכ��כלה העולמית ובאינטרסים אמריקניים גם כאשר היא נחותה צבאית באופן מובהק.

וכאן אנחנו מגיעים אולי לשינוי המשמעותי ביותר מבחינת ישראל. המחיר הכלכלי והפוליטי של המלחמה, שבא לידי ביטוי גם בבחירות האמצע בארצות הברית, עלול לשנות באופן עמוק את הנכונות האמריקנית לצאת לעימות נוסף עם איראן. אינני טוען שארצות הברית לעולם לא תתקוף שוב, אבל כל נשיא אמריקני עתידי יחשוב היטב לפני שייכנס למערכה שעלולה לשתק את שוק האנרגיה ��עולמי ולפגוע קשות בכלכלה האמריקנית.

לישראל זו בעיה עצומה. אנחנו תלויים בארצות הברית לא רק מבחינת אספקת אמצעי לחימה, אלא גם מבחינת הגיבוי המדיני והיכולת לנהל מערכה ממושכת. ישראל יכולה כמובן לתקוף באיראן גם לבדה, אבל המחיר של מערכה כזאת, כפי שכבר למדנו, כבד מאוד. איראן מסוגלת לפגוע בעורף הישראלי, לשבש את הפעילות הכלכלית ולגרור אותנו לעימות ממושך שלא ברור כיצד מסתיים.

גם בזירה האזורית המציאות השתנתה. מדינות המפרץ למדו שהן עלולות לשלם מחיר עצום על מלחמה שההחלטות לגביה מתקבלות בוושינגטון ובירושלים. הן אינן מתעלמות מהאיום האיראני, אבל הן מבינות שאיראן לא תיעלם ��לכן מבקשות לקחת אחריות גדולה יותר על יחסיהן עם טהראן. הן ימשיכו לבנות כוח צבאי ולשתף פעולה עם ארצות הברית, אבל לא בהכרח יהיו מוכנות לתמוך בעוד מערכה ישראלית נגד איראן. גם כאן חופש הפעולה הישראלי עלול להצטמצם.

ואם כל זה לא מספיק, גם הדרך להסדר מדיני הפכה קשה יותר. לפני המלחמה אפשר היה להתמקד בתוכנית הגרעין, בפיקוח ובסנקציות. היום איראן דורשת גם הסדרים הנוגעים למצרי הורמוז, ערבויות מפני תקיפות נוספות, שחרור כספים ואפשרות למכור נפט. במילים אחרות, ארצות הברית עלולה למצוא את עצמה נדרשת לוויתורים משמעותיים רק כדי להתחיל לדון עם איראן על הגרעין. גם המסלול המדיני הפך מורכב ויקר יותר.

ועכשיו צריך לחשוב על התרחיש המדאיג ביותר: מה יקרה אם בעוד שנה או שנתיים איראן תחליט להתקדם לעבר נשק גרעיני? האם ארצות הברית תהיה מוכנה לצאת שוב למלחמה, אחרי המחיר ששילמה? האם ישראל תוכל לפעול לבדה, כאשר היא יודעת מה עלול להיות המחיר הכלכלי והביטחוני? והאם עוד תקיפה באמת תעצור את האיראנים, או רק תחזק את נחישותם?

אלה אינן שאלות תיאורטיות. אלה בדיוק השאלות שהמלחמות היו אמורות לחסוך מאיתנו.

ולכל ��ה צריך להוסיף את הנזקים העצומים שכבר נגרמו לישראל: הפגיעה במשק, השיבוש הממושך של החיים האזרחיים, המחיר ששילם העורף והפגיעה במעמדנו בארצות הברית. כל אלה מחירים ממשיים מאוד, שלא ברור איזו תמורה אסטרטגית ארוכת טווח קיבלנו עבורם.

וזה בעיניי לב העניין. יצאנו למלחמות כדי להרחיק את האיום האיראני, לשפר את ההרתעה ולהרחיב את חופש הפעולה שלנו. אבל בסיומן אנחנו עלולים למצוא את עצמנו מול איראן שמכירה טוב יותר את מגבלות הכוח שלנו, מבינה את עוצמת המנוף הכלכלי ��בידיה, משוכנעת יותר בצורך בנשק גרעיני ומאמינה שארצות הברית תתקשה מאוד לצאת נגדה למערכה נוספת.

ומנגד, ישראל עלולה להישאר עם פחות גיבוי אמריקני, פחות שיתוף פעולה אזורי, אפשרויות מדיניות מצומצמות יותר ומחיר גבוה בהרבה לכל פעולה צבאית עתידית. במילים אחרות, פגענו קשות ביכולותיה של איראן, אבל ייתכן שבמקביל חיזקנו את יכולתה להרתיע אותנו.

אפשר להתגאות בהצלחות חיל האוויר, במבצעים המודיעיניים ובפגיעה הקשה בתשתיות האיראניות. אבל בסופו של דבר, מלחמה אינה נמדדת במספר המטרות שהושמדו אלא במציאות האסטרטגית שהיא משאירה אחריה.

לכך צריך להוסיף גם את השינוי המדאיג ביחסן ��ל מדינות האזור לישראל. לא רק שמדינות המפרץ אינן מעוניינות להיגרר למלחמה נוספת מול איראן, אלא שחלקן רואות כיום גם במדיניות הישראלית גורם שמאיים על היציבות והביטחון שלהן. אפילו איחוד האמירויות, שחתמה על הסכמי אברהם ופיתחה מערכת יחסים אסטרטגית עם ישראל, אינה מעוניינת להפוך את היחסים הללו לברית צבאית נגד טהראן. להפך, היא מבקשת לשמר ואף להעמיק את הקשרים עם איראן, מתוך הבנה שעימות נוסף עלול לפגוע ישירות בביטחונה ובכלכלתה. מבחינת ישראל, המשמעות חמורה במיוחד: במקום שהמלחמות יובילו לגיבוש חזית א��ורית רחבה מול איראן, הן עלולות דווקא להעמיק את החשדנות כלפי ישראל ולחזק את רצונן של מדינות האזור להתרחק ממדיניותה. כך ישראל עלולה לגלות שלא רק שארצות הברית פחות מוכנה להילחם עבורה באיראן, אלא שגם מדינות ערב מעדיפות לנהל את יחסיהן עם טהראן, ובמקרים מסוימים רואות דווקא בישראל גורם שעלול לסכן את בטחונן.

אולי הגיע הזמן שנפסיק לשאול כמה נזק אנחנו מסוגלים לגרום לאיראן, ונתחיל לשאול כיצד אנחנו מבטיחים שבעוד כמה שנים לא נמצא את עצמנו מול איראן גרעינית, עם פחות כלים להתמודד איתה משהיו לנו לפני שיצאנו למלחמה.

סוף מעשה במחשבה תחילה.

[Shai Levy (שי לוי) @shailevy6]

בישראל ממשיכים להצהיר שצה"ל ערוך גם לאפשרות של תקיפה כולל תקיפה עצמאית באיראן, אבל מאחורי הקלעים מתחילה להתבהר תמונה מורכבת יותר.
בצה"ל מזהים התקררות משמעותית לאפשרות לחידוש המלחמה האמריקאית ומבינים שגם אם ישראל תחליט לפעול לבדה, כפי שכמה מצהירים כאן, ספק גדול שוושינגטון תאפשר לה לעשות זאת.
ההבנה הזאת מגיעה מתוך שיחות עם עמיתים אמריקאים והיא מעוררת דאגה בישראל. בגלל שכל עוד האורניום המועשר והידע ה��רעיני נשארים בידי איראן. המשמעות היא שהאיום לא הוסר ובינתיים גם האפשרות לטפל בו צבאית הולכת ומצטמצמת.
מעבר לריאיון כל הסימנים מראים שטראמפ לא מתכוון חדש את הלחימה עם איראן כי אין לזה תכלית אסטרטגית וההבנה שלא יהיה כאן ניצחון.
הנזק למדינות המפרץ יהיה גדול עוד יותר.
והנזק לכלכלה העולמית ולארה"ב יביא לתבוסה בבחירות 28.
ובסוף טראמפ זה טראמפ....