Britt 📍Network School

probably building // learning and exploring with @theminihackers // prev @harpieio

[Britt 📍Network School @brittintech]

@ASvanevik and @ns right next door :)

[Wazz @WazzCrypto]

Hundreds of wallets (many of which haven't been active in 7+ years) just got drained by the same address on ETH mainnet

Seems like a new live exploit, worth flagging

[Dawn 📍Edge Esmeralda @dawninthewild]

I’m so excited to find amazing storytellers to be apart of this journey!

Apply below and feel free to DM with any questions!

[Whale Coin Talk @WhaleCoinTalk]

Quantum threat: how long do we have?

@QuantusNetwork's @YuviLightman highlights differing perspectives on how much time we have before the world's cryptography needs to be upgraded.

Check out the full interview here:
https://t.co/g6vIvRc1fN

[Syndicate @syndicateio]

Syndicate Labs experienced a security incident. A private key compromise enabled malicious upgrades to bridge contracts on two chains, moving ~18.5M SYND and ~$50,000 of tokens from customer chains.

All impacted parties are being made whole. Details below ↓

[PeckShieldAlert @PeckShieldAlert]

#PeckShieldAlert @wasabi_protocol has been exploited for $5M+ across multiple chains, including Ethereum, Base, Berachain, & Blast.

[Stani @StaniKulechov]

Aave is my life's work and we're working nonstop to find the best possible outcome for users.

I’m personally contributing 5000 ETH to DeFi United as we continue working together with partners on formalizing more commitments. I’m working to see this resolved and market conditions normalized as soon as possible.

DeFi United.

[The Hacker News @TheHackersNews]

🛑 WARNING: Bitwarden CLI was compromised in a supply chain attack.

@bitwarden/[email protected] included malicious code after attackers hijacked GitHub Actions, stole secrets, and pushed a tampered version to npm.

🔗 Learn how the attack worked → https://t.co/xqqJ7a9REL

[Quantus @QuantusNetwork]

We build. We ship. We give back.

100+ Quconuts for our community at Network School @ns

With Quantus you’re not only quantum-secure but also hydrated.

[Quantus @QuantusNetwork]

New pod

Join @YuviLightman and @defijangle as they break down the architectural decisions needed to build a blockchain that is quantum-secure from the ground up.

00:00 - The Design Philosophy: Correct, Fast, and Beautiful
03:07 - Moving Beyond Bitcoin: Using Substrate for a ZK-Friendly Chain
07:22 - Why Proof of Work Remains the Sturdy Choice for Consensus
12:30 - Solving the UX Nightmare: Human-Readable Addresses and Reversible Transactions
20:51 - Security Legos: Implementing Guardian Accounts and Time Locks
26:26 - The Case for Opinionated Design: Why Featureless Platforms Lead to Security Risks

[Yuvi Lightman | Quantus @YuviLightman]

Post quantum TPS explained

[Britt 📍Network School @brittintech]

@defijangle how about both?

[Quantus @QuantusNetwork]

Correct. Fast. Beautiful.

In that order.

Full @yuvilightman and @defijangle pod drops tomorrow.

[Aixa @aixarizzo]

half the crypto twitter accounts posting security advice right now are using ai agents with browser access

that means: your browser caches everything. wallet sessions, copy-pasted seeds, login tokens, your vault is stored there

your agent can see all of it

don't mix your ai workflow with your vault

run sensitive ai locally, use a cold wallet, and keep your money on a different computer

[Whale Coin Talk @WhaleCoinTalk]

If you didn’t know Arbitrum could do this, then you really haven’t been paying attention.

Hot take: this is ironically a net positive for DeFi, if it means putting this entire fiasco behind us.

Also been saying for years: if you want real decentralization, stay on mainnet.

[Britt 📍Network School @brittintech]

@kalashvasaniya network school 🙃🙃

[Arbitrum @arbitrum]

The Arbitrum Security Council has taken emergency action to freeze the 30,766 ETH being held in the address on Arbitrum One that is connected to the KelpDAO exploit. The Security Council acted with input from law enforcement as to the exploiter’s identity, and, at all times, weighed its commitment to the security and integrity of the Arbitrum community without impacting any Arbitrum users or applications.

After significant technical diligence and deliberation, the Security Council identified and executed a technical approach to move funds to safety without affecting any other chain state or Arbitrum users.

As of April 20 11:26pm ET the funds have been successfully transferred to an intermediary frozen wallet. They are no longer accessible to the address that originally held the funds, and can only be moved by further action by Arbitrum governance, which will be coordinated with relevant parties.

[Easy @NotSoEasyMoney]

This is one of the clearest reasons why I am insanely bullish on Physical Infra for AI

Meta is literally paying for people to have the training to build data centers

If you as a company are willing to cover cost for education on an industry

It is entirely because of 1 of 2 things
1. Demand is outpacing by an astronomical level

2. You believe demand will outpace by an astronomical level

[Whale Coin Talk @WhaleCoinTalk]

Quantum threat is no longer theory⚠️

Our boy @YuviLightman shouts out grad student @stevetipp, already running Shor’s algorithm on cloud quantum machines to crack elliptic curve keys.💡

6-bit today… 256-bit tomorrow!?

[Charles Guillemet @P3b7_]

Two days ago, Kelp DAO suffered a $292 million exploit, the largest DeFi hack of 2026. The attack is elegant in its simplicity, terrifying in its implications, and a case study in how a single misconfiguration can cascade through the entire DeFi stack.

▶ The Setup
Kelp is a liquid restaking protocol. It creates rsETH -- a liquid token representing ETH restaked on EigenLayer. DeFi being DeFi, users want these tokens available across multiple chains. So Kelp uses LayerZero, a cross-chain messaging protocol, to bridge rsETH between networks.

The core idea behind any cross-chain bridge is straightforward:
- A user locks (or burns) tokens on Chain A
- An oracle observes and verifies that transaction
- The bridge mints an equivalent amount of tokens on Chain B
LayerZero's oracle mechanism is its Decentralized Verifier Network (DVN), a set of independent verifiers that must agree a cross-chain message is legitimate before it is executed.

The critical word here is "independent." And that's where things went wrong.

▶ The Vulnerability
For reasons that remain unclear, Kelp had configured a 1-of-1 DVN setup. One verifier. No redundancy. No independent confirmation. LayerZero had explicitly warned against this configuration. Kelp ignored the warning.

A single point of failure in a system securing hundreds of millions of dollars.

▶ The Attack
The attackers, preliminarily attributed to North Korea's Lazarus Group, didn't need to break any smart contract. They went after the infrastructure layer.

To verify blockchain state, a DVN relies on RPC nodes, the servers that synchronize and serve blockchain data. The attackers compromised two RPC nodes used by Kelp's lone DVN, then launched a DDoS attack against the remaining healthy nodes, forcing failover to the poisoned ones.

From there, it was trivial. The compromised RPC nodes presented a fabricated blockchain state to the DVN, pretending that 116,500 rsETH (~18% of total circulating supply) had been legitimately deposited on the source chain. The DVN, seeing no contradicting signal from any other verifier, approved the message. The attacker retrieved 116,500 rsETH freshly minted on the destination chain.

▶ The Liquidation
The attacker deposited the stolen rsETH as collateral on Aave V3 and Compound V3, then borrowed approximately $236 million in (W)ETH against it. By the time lending protocols reacted, freezing rsETH markets, halting new deposits, restricting withdrawals, the damage was done.

Aave now carries an estimated $177-196 million in bad debt. Its TVL plunged from ~$26.4 billion to ~$17.7 billion as panic withdrawals exceeded $5.4 billion. Whether Aave's safety module can fully absorb the loss remains an open question.

Not the decentralized and trustless ideal we went for... The Deeper Problem
Poisoning a handful of RPC nodes and DDoS'ing a few others was enough to fabricate $292 million out of thin air and erodes trust across the entire DeFi ecosystem. No smart contract exploit. No zero-day. Just a misconfigured verifier and an infrastructure-level attack on the nodes it relied on.

But the root cause runs deeper than Kelp's configuration. The fundamental problem is the trust model. Kelp's bridge, like most bridges and many Layer 2 rollups, relies on oracles reading blockchain state from RPC nodes and attesting that "this thing happened." The security of the entire system reduces to one question: can you trust the nodes feeding data to your verifier?

The Kelp hack proves the answer is no. Not the decentralized and trustless ideal we went for...

There is a fundamentally different approach: validity proofs. Instead of trusting oracles to honestly report what happened on another chain, you require a cryptographic proof, a zero-knowledge proof, that the state transition actually occurred according to the protocol's rules. The verifier on the destination chain doesn't trust any RPC node, any oracle, or any DVN. It checks the math. Either the proof is valid or it isn't.

This is exactly the model ZK rollups use to settle on Ethereum. The L1 doesn't ask an oracle "did these transactions happen?" It verifies a succinct proof that they did.

▶ The Goose That Lays the Golden Eggs
One could argue the attacker showed restraint. With a 1-of-1 DVN, they could have minted any amount, $292 BILLION, if they wanted. There are liquidity arguments (you can only extract what lending markets will let you borrow against) and detection arguments (the larger the mint, the faster the response). But there's a more cynical reading.

The Lazarus Group and similar state-sponsored actors are in a peculiar position. They could mint an amount large enough to collapse the entire DeFi ecosystem. But doing so would kill the very system they profit from. So they calibrate, enough to fund their operations, not so much that the ecosystem loses confidence and collapses. The goose must keep laying.

The DeFi ecosystem likes to talk about trustlessness and decentralization. But when a handful of poisoned RPC servers can drain nine figures and trigger a systemic crisis, we should be honest about where we actually are, and serious about the cryptographic tools that can actually get us there.

Stay safe.