The key to making money through cycle in cyclical industries is not by nailing the fundamentals of your companies’ customers but in your companies’ customers’ customers (and their customers).
Visibility in immediate to mid-term demand is not enough because the tail of the dog is the last to whip (and you will lose money before you know the dog has even blinked).
I think deep value investors underestimate the need for a catalyst to realize value. There are two primary mechanisms:
1. Mean reversion of returns on capital (in other words, earnings improvement). A business earning shit ROICs returning to normal.
2. External pressures (an activist).
In my book (https://t.co/IqjRXffvWr), I talk about a few of these. Cleveland Worsted Mills never really had the mean reversion, so returns to shareholders were poor even though Warren bought the stock below NCAV. Greif was a company that had ROICs improve as Jack Dempsey transformed the business.
Net nets don't work unless the returns on the underlying business improve or capital is re-allocated away from the dismal enterprise to better uses (such as returned to shareholders.
Graham was pretty aware of this as well, and went activist a number of times throughout his career.
Most people buying options are just paying for lottery tickets and wondering why they keep losing.
So I dropped a guide which isn’t full of jargon or emojis that I wish existed when I started.
https://t.co/zXujU7uKSb
A lot of runners peak in training, then underperform on race day. Fitness doesn’t improve forever, it follows a curve.
You only have a limited window to accumulate hard training before fatigue starts catching up.
The key is timing your peak so your best fitness shows up on race day, not three weeks before it.
🔥 "The Volatility Edge" Esta estrategia de volatilidad hizo +86,9% en 2008, el año que el S&P 500 se desplomó 36,8%. Y rinde 16,3% anual desde entonces cobrándole el miedo al mercado
Zarattini y Aziz, los mismos del paper de ayer, se juntaron con Antonio Mele, profesor del Swiss Finance Institute, para atacar el trade más temido del mercado: vender volatilidad
La idea de fondo es simple. El VIX sobreestima la volatilidad que después se materializa el 80% del tiempo, porque la gente paga de más por asegurarse
El que vende ese seguro cobra una prima. El problema es que cobrás de a poquito y cada tanto viene un 2008 o un COVID y te lleva puesto
El paper arma 4 versiones de la estrategia, de la más naive a la más fina, usando solo ETNs de VIX que opera cualquiera:
- Pasiva, siempre vendido: 6,2% anual, Sharpe 0,48, drawdown de 32%
- Con filtro de prima esperada: 6,9% anual y menos drawdown
- Sumando la pendiente de la curva del VIX, y si se invierte se pone COMPRADA de volatilidad: 10,5% anual, Sharpe 0,87
- Con tamaño dinámico según el nivel del VIX: 16,3% anual, Sharpe 1, correlación de 15% con la bolsa
Los años bravos son una bestia:
- 2008: +86,9% contra -36,8% del S&P
- 2020: +42,3%
- 2022: +1,8% contra -18,2% del S&P
Todo neto de costos de transacción. Y el detalle que más me gustó: publicaron el código Python completo para automatizarla por la API de Interactive Brokers, gratis
Para no vender humo: vender volatilidad ya fundió gente, XIV cayó 97% en UN día en 2018 y lo terminaron cerrando. La diferencia entre cobrar la prima y volar por los aires son las reglas y el tamaño de la posición
Mi conclusión: la volatilidad dejó de ser terreno exclusivo de los hedge funds, pero es un seguro que cobrás de a centavos y pagás de a millones si no tenés reglas
Link al paper en el primer comentario
Open model capabilities now exceed what is required for most enterprise tasks. Which - along with the ability to self-host for security purposes - is prompting enterprises to switch away from expensive private models toward open models like Deepseeks at a fraction of the cost.
Looking at the skew dashboard right now...
Bonds skew put biased. Gold skew put biased. Equities put skew cheap as chips. One of them is wrong.
Bond put skew is sitting around the 75-85th percentile. Gold put skew is 85th percentile. Investors are loading up on downside protection outside of stocks.
Equity put skew? Near bottom-of-range.
Three asset classes, three reads on the same macro. One of them is probably mispriced. I don't know which way it resolves, but it doesn't tend to sit like this forever.
For me, I kind of think it gets resolved by equity skew catching a bid rather than the other way around. Stocks ignoring what bonds and gold are pricing usually ends with the put skew waking up.
Doesn't mean short stocks. Could mean owning a few equity puts before the rest of the surface catches up makes sense.