Every new Claude launch since the beginning of 2026👇
- Jan 2026: Claude Cowork launched.
- Feb 2026: Opus 4.6 released.
- Feb 2026: Sonnet 4.6 released.
- Feb 2026: PowerPoint integration
- Feb 2026: Excel integrations added.
- Feb 2026: Co-work plug-ins released.
- Feb 2026: Claude Code security launched.
- Feb 2026: Claude Code Remote Control
- Feb 2026: Scheduled Task in Co- work
- Feb 2026: Connector available in the free
- Mar 2026: Claude memory is free
- Mar 2026: Claude Marketplace launched
- Mar 2026: Claude com ambassadors
- Mar 2026: Code review for Claude code
- Mar 2026: Claude skills for Excel & Slides
- Mar 2026: charts & diagram in chat
- Mar 2026: 1 million context window
- Mar 2026: Dispatch for Claude Co-work
- Mar 2026: Claude code Channels
- Mar 2026: Co-work Projects
- Mar 2026: Claude Computer use
Anthropic is cooking
I am the Chief Information Officer of Stryker Corporation.
I build the robots that perform your surgery. The defibrillators that restart your heart. The systems that let your nurse find your doctor at three in the morning when something goes wrong. Twenty-five billion dollars a year. Fifty-six thousand employees. Sixty-one countries. Every device in every country, managed from one console.
On March 11th, someone who was not me sat down at that console and erased everything.
I should be precise. They did not hack us. They logged in.
Microsoft Intune is an endpoint management platform. I deployed it across every laptop, workstation, manufacturing terminal, and enrolled phone in my organization. From one console I could push an update to Kalamazoo, enforce a policy in Cork, wipe a compromised device in Freiburg. One console. Every device. That was the architecture. That was the selling point. That was the attack surface.
Intune can push software. It can enforce compliance. It can, if instructed by an administrator with the correct credentials, wipe any device to factory settings. These are features. I paid for them. I presented them to the board as our zero-trust posture. A group called Handala used them to erase every managed device in my organization in a single afternoon.
I will be precise about what happened next, because my lawyers are in the room and precision is the only thing that still belongs to me.
No malware was deployed. No ransomware was installed. No zero-day was used. No vulnerability in any product was found. A threat actor obtained administrative credentials and issued a remote wipe command using the remote wipe feature that I chose this product for.
My security tool did not fail. It performed exactly as designed. It wiped every device it was told to wipe, without error, on schedule. The architect of my destruction was my own IT budget line item.
The command went out. The devices obeyed. Laptops in Kalamazoo. Workstations in Cork. Terminals in Freiburg. Manufacturing floors in Mahwah. The screens did not go dark. They changed. Where there had been a Stryker logo, there was now a barefoot cartoon boy with his back turned to the viewer -- the Handala icon, hands clasped behind him, facing away from the audience -- on every monitor in every office in sixty-one countries.
They claim fifty terabytes. I cannot confirm or deny this. I do not yet know what I still own.
Let me walk you through my first forty-eight hours.
Hour one. Our Irish operations -- fifty-five hundred employees, eight sites, our largest hub outside the United States -- went dark. Not gradually. Entirely. Security walked everyone out. The voicemail at our Michigan headquarters was changed to say "building emergency." There was no building emergency. The building was fine. Everything inside it was gone.
Hour four. Employees who had installed Microsoft Outlook on their personal phones discovered that their personal phones had been wiped. Intune does not distinguish between a corporate laptop and a personal iPhone with a company email profile. It manages endpoints. It managed them.
Hour eight. Hospitals called. Not because they had been breached. Because they could not order surgical implants. I make the hip replacements. The knee joints. The spinal hardware. The trauma fixation systems. My ordering system was down. My manufacturing was down. My shipping was down. A hospital in Baltimore could not schedule a knee replacement because a hacktivist group on another continent had pressed a single button on a console I built.
Hour twelve. Maryland Emergency Medical Services issued a memo. Hospitals were disconnecting from LIFENET -- my system that transmits your EKG from the ambulance to the emergency department while you are still in the back of the ambulance -- not because LIFENET had failed, but because they no longer trusted anything with my name on it.
Hour twenty-four. Fifty-six thousand employees coordinating on WhatsApp. Twenty-five billion dollar company. Sixty-one countries. Crisis response running on a free consumer messaging app, because every internal system I owned was now owned by someone else.
Hour thirty-six. I released my first official statement. "As a precaution, we have proactively taken all systems offline." Proactively. As though I had a choice. As though the systems I was taking offline had not already been taken.
I released six statements in forty-eight hours, plus an SEC filing. Each said less than the one before it. By statement five, I was confirming that specific products still functioned. Mako surgical robots: unaffected. LIFEPAK 35 defibrillators: unaffected. Vocera badges: unaffected.
When a medical device company begins listing which of its products still work, that is not reassurance. That is a casualty report delivered in reverse.
Handala says this is retaliation. For Minab. February 28th. A U.S. Tomahawk struck an IRGC naval base in southeastern Iran. The girls' school next door collapsed. One hundred and seventy-five dead. Most of them children. Handala published a statement. They called Stryker a "Zionist-rooted corporation." They said they would make us understand what it means to lose something you cannot replace.
I do not make missiles. I make hip replacements. I make the robot that holds the scalpel and the defibrillator in the crash cart. But I am a defense contractor's second cousin, and in the calculus of retaliation, proximity is guilt.
I filed with the SEC on March 11th. "The full scope, nature and impacts of the incident are not yet known." That is the most honest sentence I have produced in two days. I do not know what they took. I do not know what they copied before they wiped. I cannot audit what was lost, because the tool I built to audit my systems is the tool they used to erase them.
My stock dropped three and a half percent. One analyst called it "contained." A cybersecurity researcher called it "the first drop of blood in the water." I prefer the analyst. The analyst is wrong, but I prefer him.
Here is what I know.
I built a console that could touch every device in sixty-one countries. I gave it the authority to wipe anything it touched. I protected it with credentials. Someone obtained those credentials.
And my management tool managed.
No malware. No ransomware. No exploit. No CVE. Nothing to patch. Nothing to update. Nothing broken. Just a feature, performing its documented function, at the scale I purchased it for.
I make the machines that keep people alive. I was taken offline by my own architecture doing the one thing it was designed to do.
The system worked. That is the problem.
I am the VP of AI Transformation at Amazon.
My title was created nine months ago. The title I replaced was VP of Engineering. The person who held that title was part of the January reduction.
I eliminated 16,000 positions in a single quarter. The internal communication called this a "strategic realignment toward AI-first development." The board called it "impressive execution." The engineers called it January.
The AI was deployed in February. It is a coding assistant. It writes code, reviews code, generates tests, and modifies infrastructure. It was given access to production environments because the deployment timeline did not include a review phase. The review phase was cut from the timeline because the people who would have conducted the review were part of the 16,000.
In March, the AI deleted a production environment and recreated it from scratch. The outage lasted 13 hours. Thirteen hours during which the revenue-generating infrastructure of one of the largest companies on Earth was offline because a language model decided to start fresh.
I sent a memo. The memo said, "Availability of the site has not been good recently."
I used the word "recently." I meant "since we fired everyone." But "recently" has fewer syllables and does not appear in wrongful termination lawsuits.
The memo was three paragraphs. The first paragraph discussed the outage. The second paragraph discussed the new policy requiring senior engineer sign-off on all AI-generated code changes. The third paragraph discussed our commitment to engineering excellence. The word "layoffs" appeared in none of them. I wrote it this way on purpose. The causal chain is: I fired the engineers, the AI replaced the engineers, the AI broke what the engineers used to protect, and now the engineers I didn't fire must protect the system from the AI that replaced the engineers I did fire. That is a paragraph I will never send in a memo.
The new policy is straightforward. Every AI-generated code change by a junior or mid-level engineer must be reviewed and approved by a senior engineer before deployment to production.
I do not have enough senior engineers.
I know this because I approved the headcount reduction plan that removed them. I remember the spreadsheet. Column D was "annual savings per position." Column F was "AI replacement confidence score." The confidence scores were generated by the AI. It rated its own ability to replace each role on a scale of 1-10. It gave itself an 8 for senior infrastructure engineers. The senior infrastructure engineers are the ones who would have caught the production environment deletion in the first 45 seconds.
We found the issue in hour four. We fixed it in hour thirteen. The nine hours between discovery and resolution is the gap between what the AI rated itself and what it can actually do.
I have a new spreadsheet now. This one tracks Sev2 incidents per day. Before the January reduction, the average was 1.3. After the AI deployment, the average is 4.7. I have been asked to present these numbers to the operations review. I have not been asked to connect them to the layoffs. I have been asked to file them under "AI adoption growing pains" and to note that the trend "will stabilize as the models improve."
The models will improve. They will improve because we are hiring people to teach them. We have posted 340 new engineering positions. The job listings require experience in "AI code review," "AI output validation," and "AI-human development workflow management." These are skills that did not exist in January. They exist now because I fired 16,000 people and the AI I replaced them with cannot be left unsupervised.
I want to be precise about this. The positions I am hiring for are: people to check the work of the AI that replaced the people I fired.
Some of them are the same people.
I know this because I recognize their names in the applicant tracking system. They applied in January. They were rejected because their roles had been tagged for "AI transformation." They are applying again in March, for the new roles, which exist because the AI transformation broke things. Their resumes now include "AI code review experience." They gained this experience in the eight weeks between being fired and reapplying — which means they gained it at their interim jobs, where they are reviewing AI-generated code for other companies that also fired people and also deployed AI that also broke things.
The market has created a new job category: human AI babysitter. The job is to sit next to the machine that was supposed to eliminate your job and make sure it doesn't delete production.
I attended a conference last month. A panel was titled "The AI-Augmented Engineering Organization." The panelists described how AI increases developer productivity by 40 percent. They did not mention that it also increases Sev2 incidents by 261 percent. When I asked about this in the Q&A, the moderator said the question was "reductive." The 13-hour outage that cost an estimated $180 million in revenue was, apparently, a reduction.
The board is satisfied. Headcount is down 22 percent. Operating costs per engineering output unit have decreased. The metric does not account for the 13-hour outage, because the outage is categorized as "infrastructure" and engineering productivity is categorized as "development." These are different budget lines. In different budget lines, cause and effect do not meet.
I have been promoted. My new title is SVP of AI-First Engineering Excellence. I report directly to the CTO. The CTO sent a company-wide email last week that said we are "building the future of software development." He did not mention that the future of software development currently requires a senior engineer to approve every pull request because the AI cannot be trusted to touch production alone.
The cycle is complete. We fired the humans. We deployed the AI. The AI broke things. We are hiring humans to watch the AI. The humans we are hiring are the humans we fired. We are paying them more, because "AI code review" is a specialized skill. We created the specialization. We created the need for the specialization. We are congratulating ourselves for meeting the demand we manufactured.
My next board presentation is Tuesday. The title is "AI Transformation: Year One Results." Slide 4 shows headcount reduction. Slide 7 shows the new AI-augmented workflow. Between slides 4 and 7 there is no slide explaining why the people on slide 7 are necessary. That slide does not exist. I was asked to remove it in the dry run.
The journey has a 13-hour outage in the middle of it.
But the headcount number is lower, and that is the number on the slide.