Earlier this week, our friends at @nextronresearch documented an RRCfg delivery chain. We hunted for implants with similar code in our platform and uncovered additional samples and delivery chains dating back to September 2026, using different hosts, sideloaded DLLs and C2 infrastructure.
🔹 21 September 2026 — arphaCrashReport.exe / arphaDump64.dll.
Alibaba’s arphaCrashReport.exe, renamed 20260921163500-CC1DB4D9D1744A.exe, sideloads malicious arphaDump64.dll. Its bootstrap downloads Donut from hxxps://xiaxiazai.hkg.bcebos[.]com/kekehua/27.124.41.111.bin on Baidu Cloud BOS and executes it, loading RRCfg configured for 27.124.41[.]111:8083.
Report: https://t.co/jzQT50fr0x
🔹23 September 2026 — ClosePre.exe / kcommon64.dll.
ClosePre.exe, renamed 2026095SDDE20.exe, sideloads malicious kcommon64.dll. Its bootstrap requests hxxps://gdnkdl[.]eu[.]cc/files/ahfayui.eu.cc.bin. No next-stage payload was received.
🔹22 October 2026 — BioEnrollmentHost.exe / wincorlib.dll.
Microsoft BioEnrollmentHost.exe, renamed 20261022128205.BC6FBTAC08T.exe, sideloads malicious wincorlib.dll. The DLL decrypts a bootstrap embedded in the host’s certificate table. It downloads Donut from hxxps://aawwf.hkg.bcebos[.]com/shiade/A03.bin, also on Baidu Cloud BOS, which loads RRCfg configured for 192.252.178[.]174:8083. The loader shares Nextron’s CAFEBABECAFEBABE marker, RC4 key AtkExEmbedKey2026, and SCURLTPL URL configuration.
Report: https://t.co/Ys5x5z0shn
🔹25 October 2026 — https://t.co/RbFIfTC0X8 C2 variant.
An RRCfg implant uses ahfayui[.]eu[.]cc, which resolved to 61.18.208[.]171. The same hostname appears in the payload filenames requested by the ClosePre and Edge loaders.
Report: https://t.co/Oh0cOZU4YT
🔹3 November 2026 — Edge notification_helper.exe / dbghelp.dll.
Microsoft Edge notification_helper.exe, renamed INV-No.20261102023748.exe, sideloads malicious dbghelp.dll. This loader also decrypts a certificate-embedded bootstrap, then requests hxxps://bmafhahl[.]eu[.]cc/files/ahfayui.eu.cc.bin. No next-stage payload was received.
🧬 Sample hashes, #IOCs and analysis reports: https://t.co/54m3ZGCY2S
We identified a DLL sideloading chain that hides its first stage in the certificate table of a genuine, Microsoft-signed sllauncher.exe (Silverlight launcher). The signature appears intact, and a fake oledlg.dll pulls the payload out of the signed EXE.
The chain ends in a modular implant. On its own it only profiles the host, reports installed AV and operator-chosen running processes, and loads PE plugins on demand. Everything else is left to plugins the operator sends, likely to keep the implant small.
The lures are generic invoice and payment-themed documents aimed at Western businesses.
Full analysis + IOCs: https://t.co/IjVmch4tYT
There’s misinformation circulating about the Claude Code incident.
The confirmed incident involved a tampered copy distributed through Cursor’s own marketplace. A compromise of Anthropic’s official distribution, Microsoft’s VS Code Marketplace or Open VSX has not been established.
https://t.co/dk9he5dYbG
@rad9800@objective_see Just for context the official VSCode extension by Anthropic was not compromised. The initial reporting was incorrect. The compromise only affects the non officially developed version in Cursors store.
https://t.co/QRPX4joQSs
@0xvanpt@cyb3rops@grok Anthropic does not develop the extension in Cursors marketplace, which is also clarified in the statement by Cursor. https://t.co/QRPX4joQSs
We’ve been checking our PHP2SHELL detection coverage at Nextron and extending the rule set based on the published PoCs
After successful exploitation, we expect familiar activity: webshell drops, reverse shells, suspicious child processes, new user accounts… Our generic detection rules have covered many of these patterns for years, so useful coverage was already in place before disclosure.
The blog documents that existing coverage and the additions, explains what the findings can actually tell you, and includes PHP hardening recommendations.
https://t.co/DYfcrj4lh6
PolinRider has resurfaced in [email protected]. This version switches the disguised payload to fa-solid-300.llf and adds a second loader, api.js, to npm run build, extending execution beyond VS Code's folderOpen task to developer and CI builds. https://t.co/3O4V79GpXy
We examined artifacts left behind by attackers during the recent Citrix #NetScaler compromises. Many were already covered by existing generic THOR rules, including rules we've shipped for years.
One script matched SUSP_Linux_Downloader_Jul20_1. That rule dates back to 2020, more than six years ago(!). The script also matched SUSP_Bash_Jul26.
The recovered webshells matched these existing generic rules:
- SUSP_WEBSHELL_PHP_Encoded_Jun21_1
- SUSP_Eval_Base64_Indicators_Feb22_1
- EXT_WEBSHELL_PHP_Generic_Eval
- EXT_WEBSHELL_PHP_OBFUSC_3
- EXT_WEBSHELL_PHP_Generic
- EXT_WEBSHELL_PHP_Gzinflated
- EXT_WEBSHELL_PHP_Dynamic_Big
Some of those webshell rules are in THOR Lite, too (EXT_*)
This is POST-EXPLOITATION DETECTION. We didn't need to know which zero-day got the attacker in to recognize what they left behind.
A scan could have flagged these artifacts from day one, before the exploited vulnerabilities were public. The rules were already there.
Scan your edge devices regularly. Daily, where practical. Use THOR via SSHFS or scheduled file collection for THOR Thunderstorm.
Don't wait for the next advisory to start looking
Why THOR detects what others miss
https://t.co/EbtVt3al8E
Our THOR Thunderstorm-based artifact scanning pipeline detected a malicious, newly published npm package: dotenv-async v1.0.0.
Presented as an environment-configuration toolkit, it contains a Windows downloader that executes at import time and is concealed in JPEG metadata.
Because environment-configuration packages are typically loaded during application startup, simply importing the package is enough to trigger the malicious chain.
The downloaded winhost.exe is an unsigned NSIS installer that deploys an obfuscated Electron infostealer. It targets browser passwords, cookies, and payment data, Discord and Telegram sessions, documents, and cryptocurrency wallets and seed phrases.
The malware establishes persistence as:
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\0\svchost.exe
It also connects to a WebSocket gateway that provides an interactive CMD/PowerShell backdoor. Additional payloads are retrieved on demand:
/browser: encrypted shellcode injected into dllhost.exe to extract browser credentials and cookies (browser.h)
/update: a PowerShell loader that retrieves /jack, a native clipboard hijacker exporting StartClipjack, RunClipjackLoop, and StopClipjack.
Collected data is staged in %TEMP%, compressed, uploaded to a separate TryCloudflare endpoint, and then deleted.
We confirmed this multistage behavior in the analyzed artifacts. We are not attributing this activity to a specific actor, nor are we claiming that a legitimate maintainer was compromised.
Domains:
hardwood-studio-obviously-briefing[.]trycloudflare[.]com
manufacturers-arrested-acre-foods[.]trycloudflare[.]com
campus-petite-timothy-gulf[.]trycloudflare[.]com
SHA-256:
2a001e4ef9933701b3d93e1a7e1e7ef67d481fac5febc96f951beabe68022322 (winhost.exe)
196f6b820aaf094b8728a11699e4e91cea464623ab0c3acebdde3d1adab59fb6 (embedded Electron executable)
79121c5d9ddfafd532c30b9c20644b9a45fadadee9163eb2e5678e4efceb4312 (browser.h shellcode)
4a439412a37048f7c4e18c5a6b6763258e6358aa77693802dccc9d9d506ebc44 (ret.ps1 Clipjack PowerShell loader)
We found a Ukraine-targeted campaign using two very different lures: an “air raid alert” document aimed broadly at Ukrainian users, and a military-specific unit property inventory.
Both lead to a Telegram-controlled VBScript RAT capable of credential theft, screenshots, command execution and targeted file collection.
The second lure pushes the campaign back to at least 26 August 2026. What stands out is the collection focus: CAD, BIM, GIS, LiDAR and weather-model data, combined with per-host tasking and date-based file harvesting.
Full technical analysis + IOCs:
https://t.co/YVqFy7PXTX
We found a heavily obfuscated, WHQL-signed malicious kernel driver with very low detections on VirusTotal.
PlugPlayService.sys - MD5: a26abe238cc339da81f4853ab16e1a6a
The driver provides arbitrary memory access and directly accesses RAID devices. It also makes heavy use of control-flow obfuscation, with similarities to techniques recently documented in our blog post on RegPhantom.
Samples similar to PlugPlayService.sys have also been observed dropped by xigmapper. While investigating, We identified 9 additional xigmapper UEFI samples, all with no AV detection. xigmapper executes before the OS, disables SMEP/WP and patches ntoskrnl.exe in memory via egg hunting.
Of particular interest: zenither.efi - MD5: 924c410a520e6dc9aa1118474d9eb354
This specific xigmapper sample has been observed deploying kernel drivers similar to PlugPlayService.sys.
Full xigmapper UEFI sample set + IOCs:
https://t.co/i4GaUF9alE
Blog post on RegPhantom
https://t.co/cMWxkoaI0p
🚨 Our THOR Thunderstorm-based artifact scanning pipeline identified the open-source research project BindsNET as compromised in activity linked to the DPRK-associated NullReceiver campaign.
BindsNET is an established Python/PyTorch library for simulating spiking neural networks, with 1.7k GitHub stars.
Three days ago, threat actors used a force-push with backdated commit timestamps to add a malicious VS Code task and an obfuscated Node.js loader disguised as a Font Awesome file. The tradecraft is consistent with known PolinRider activity.
Affected commit:
https://t.co/f19V8JVZ3F
IOCs:
780abb9d268a2b1890bf4873d0d89d21fc86be44da685b932a54a738d2699810 (public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2)
ETH: 0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a
Security warning:
https://t.co/bZQ72AK5CP
The REDSHELL payload is now disguised as "math.mjs", replacing the previously used .dat and .bin extensions. Our artifact scanner detected it in the npm package "hydration-vli-ui" (v1.0.0), triggering two additional YARA rules designed to flag executables masquerading as script files.
🚨 We identified 57+ malicious npm packages looking similar to previous Shai-Hulud Miasma supply-chain attacks. They have preinstall hooks which download Bun and run an obfuscated stealer targeting npm/GitHub tokens, AWS, Kubernetes and Vault secrets.
https://t.co/1Ph0FjMSQc
We identified further activity linked to Iranian APT Nimbus Manticore (UNC1549), including two fake LinkedIn recruiter accounts:
https://t.co/TCUfHk2V7h
https://t.co/av0sjMF3CM
The profiles claimed to work for SmartSight HR and STC, used professional-looking AI-generated profile images, and obtained LinkedIn’s work-email verification. Both accounts have since been flagged and removed, they were active since late 2025.
Their claimed employment histories also overlap with companies impersonated in earlier phishing campaigns reported by us and Check Point Research.
During our analysis, we identified infrastructure likely being prepared for further phishing activity. The first domain currently hosts a fake web design agency landing page, while the second has no visible content yet.
IOCs:
smart-sight-hr[.]com
30min-smartsight-hr[.]com
We spotted three new malicious npm packages impersonating legitimate blockchain libraries:
- [email protected]
- [email protected]
- [email protected]
The credential stealer targets MetaMask, Phantom, Ledger and Trezor wallets.
Full list of IOCs: https://t.co/QzcK0sEona