From a CM perspective, the question isn't whether there's a "further fact" beyond information, but whether information alone is sufficient.
Information exists in a spreadsheet, a hard drive and a camera sensor, but we don't usually think those systems are feeling anything.
What seems different in organisms is that information is embodied as ongoing physiological state change within a self-regulating system.
Pain isn't just information about damage, it's information about the state of the organism itself, coupled to system-wide regulation.
In that framing, experience isn't something added to information. It's what those state changes feel like from within the system.
Interesting direction.
One question I'd ask is whether qualia are actually the irreducible units, or whether they are the subjective manifestation of something deeper.
From a CM perspective, experience appears closely tied to changes in organism state during sensing, evaluation and regulation.
If that's right, the fundamental units may not be "qualia" themselves, but the state transitions occurring within the control architecture that generate them.
In that case the challenge becomes explaining how increasingly complex experiences are constructed from increasingly complex patterns of state regulation.
Interesting.
This feels closer to the CM position than some of our previous exchanges.
Starting with "why did consciousness evolve at all?" is exactly the question I think the field should be asking.
I'd also agree that conflict, arbitration and the reconciliation of competing demands become increasingly important in more complex organisms.
Where we'll probably end up at our familiar disagreement is that I'd see those processes as later evolutionary expansions of a deeper organism-environment regulatory architecture rather than the point at which consciousness first appears.
A bacterium, a tree and a human are all solving the same fundamental problem at different levels of complexity.
But it's interesting to see the conversation moving from "what is consciousness?" toward "what function does consciousness serve?"
I think this is where the discussion becomes genuinely interesting.
I agree with Michael Levin that we should be cautious about assuming consciousness must begin at the level of human-like cognition or rich subjective experience. Evolution tends to build new capabilities on top of older ones rather than creating entirely new categories from scratch.
At the same time, I think Aletheion is pointing at the key question: not whether information processing exists across scales, but what functional architecture is sufficient for an organism to sense, integrate, evaluate and regulate itself relative to its environment.
From a CM perspective, raw computation alone isn't enough. The important question is how signals are coupled to the ongoing regulation of the organism itself.
That suggests a continuum rather than a hard boundary. Simple organisms exhibit basic forms of adaptive regulation, while more complex organisms add integration, memory, prediction, simulation and abstract reasoning on top.
Prediction is incredibly important, but perhaps it is better understood as a later evolutionary expansion of a deeper organism-environment control architecture rather than the origin of consciousness itself.
The challenge is identifying which functional components are present, how they are integrated, and how those components scale from simple life to increasingly sophisticated forms of cognition.
@JohannesKleiner Are there any details on the schedule and agenda for the session next week?
Looking to organise my time but Mon to Wed 10:00 to 21:30 is a big window to accommodate. 🙂
Many thanks
Interesting idea, and I appreciate that you’re at least framing it as a testable hypothesis rather than asserting certainty.
From a CM perspective though, I’d currently argue there’s far stronger empirical evidence for consciousness emerging from organism-environment regulation within living systems themselves than from interaction with an external conscious field.
One of the reasons is evolutionary continuity. We can trace increasingly sophisticated forms of sensing, integration, adaptation and regulation across biology, from single cells to nervous systems to predictive cognition in humans.
That gives us a continuous biological pathway without needing to introduce a second external consciousness source.
That said, if such a field exists, the key question would be:
What unique phenomena does it explain that cannot already be explained through biological architecture, cognition, predictive processing, social modelling, memory, emotion and altered physiological states?
That still seems more likely to relate to how certain animal consciousness architectures are biologically implemented, rather than consciousness itself being located in the fluid.
Plants, fungi and single-celled organisms exhibit adaptive organism-environment regulation without neurons or cerebrospinal fluid at all.
From a CM perspective, cerebrospinal fluid is probably part of the support and maintenance infrastructure for highly metabolically active nervous systems, similar to how blood supplies oxygen and nutrients to the brain.
Important biologically, absolutely. But probably not the core source of consciousness itself.
Or consciousness may simply be what living systems do when they regulate themselves relative to the world.
From a CM perspective, there’s currently far stronger empirical grounding for consciousness emerging alongside life and adaptive organism-environment regulation than for consciousness existing as a fundamental pre-biological property of the universe itself.
And importantly, that doesn’t just apply to complex organisms with brains. Even the simplest living systems must sense conditions, regulate internal state and adaptively respond in order to remain viable.
I actually agree with the caution here.
I certainly wouldn’t claim to have “solved” consciousness or that CM is the only valid perspective. The field is far too complex for that level of certainty.
What I’m trying to offer is a different framing, one focused less on “what consciousness is made of” and more on what functional architecture consistently appears across living systems.
The goal isn’t to declare final answers, but to propose a biologically grounded framework that can be debated, challenged, refined and hopefully falsified where wrong.
Ultimately the value of any consciousness model should come from how well it explains observed phenomena, not from how confidently it’s asserted.
I think this is where the conversation starts moving from consciousness research into AGI ethics and existential risk, which are hugely important, but slightly outside CM’s primary focus.
What CM is trying to do first is provide a clearer, biologically grounded and falsifiable framework for what consciousness actually is functionally and architecturally.
The AI world will continue pursuing increasingly capable systems regardless. My hope is that clearer frameworks for consciousness and agency may eventually help society establish better boundaries, evaluation criteria and ethical guardrails.
So I’m very interested in those downstream questions, but the core focus of CM itself is understanding the architecture first.
These are exactly the kinds of questions we’ve been trying to explore with CM/CCM.
Our current position is roughly:
• Intelligence and consciousness are related, but not identical. • Current AI can clearly exhibit intelligence-like cognition without the deeper organism-level regulatory architecture biological consciousness emerged from. • In principle, artificial consciousness may be possible, but it likely requires far more than scaling prediction or compute alone.
The harder question is whether you can recreate the full adaptive control architecture that evolved under real viability pressures across billions of years.
And if you could, yes, alignment and coexistence become profoundly important questions.
We’ve written a number of articles exploring this in more depth because X threads can only go so far.
Yes, broadly speaking CM would argue consciousness and life are deeply linked, because all life must regulate itself relative to the environment in order to remain viable.
But CM doesn’t treat consciousness as one flat property. The architecture evolves in discrete functional layers as evolutionary pressures increase.
Simple organisms may only exhibit basic sensing and reactive regulation.
Then come mechanisms like:
persistent state retention,
temporal integration,
threshold accumulation,
adaptive response modulation,
environmental modelling,
prediction,
simulation,
and eventually abstract cognition and narrative self-modelling in humans.
So the transition from “reactive feedback” to predictive simulation isn’t viewed as a sudden magical jump. It’s a progressive expansion of control architecture driven by increasingly complex environmental and social pressures.
Prediction and simulation are therefore major evolutionary advances within consciousness, but not necessarily the point where consciousness first appears.
I think this is an important point.
We can never directly access another organism’s private subjective experience, even in other humans. We infer it from shared architecture, behaviour and functional organisation.
But that doesn’t mean all conscious systems would experience the world the same way.
A cat, octopus, bee, tree, hypothetical alien, or future machine could all have radically different forms of world-modelling and state regulation shaped by their own embodiment and evolutionary pressures.
From a CM perspective, consciousness is likely universal in structure but highly diverse in expression.
I actually think we’re largely describing different levels of the same evolutionary trajectory.
CM would agree that the pathway toward intelligence strongly favours prediction, simulation and increasingly sophisticated world models.
Where we differ is that we see those as later expansions of a deeper organism-environment regulatory architecture that already exists in simpler life.
So rather than “many different consciousnesses,” we’d probably frame it more as an evolutionary continuum of increasingly sophisticated conscious capabilities.
By the CM definition, yes, at least in a very basic form.
A Venus flytrap is a useful example because it doesn’t just react to a single stimulus reflexively. It integrates signals over time and only closes once a threshold is reached after multiple touches within a temporal window.
That means even without neurons or a brain, the organism is still:
sensing,
retaining short-term state information,
evaluating accumulated input,
and altering behaviour relative to environmental conditions.
From the CM perspective, that’s already part of the same broad consciousness-related control continuum that later evolves into far more sophisticated predictive and simulated modelling in animals and humans.
I’d say CM is trying to frame the broader architecture that prediction sits within.
Prediction is incredibly important, especially in more advanced organisms, because anticipating the environment massively improves regulation and behavioural flexibility.
But even the simplest life forms still have to sense, evaluate, respond and maintain themselves relative to the world long before sophisticated predictive modelling appears.
So from the CM perspective, prediction is one powerful evolutionary expansion of consciousness-related control, not the entirety of consciousness itself.
In that sense, consciousness is less about “surviving vs mastering” the environment, and more about the entire continuum of organism-environment interaction across all levels of life.
I think it’s reasonable to stay open-minded while also trying to define terms carefully and scientifically.
“Consciousness” clearly refers to something real in the sense that living organisms experience, regulate, respond, adapt and report internal states, even if we still debate the underlying mechanism.
Where discussion often breaks down is when people jump from “we don’t fully understand it yet” to either:
“therefore anything could be conscious”
or
“therefore consciousness means nothing.”
Neither extreme seems productive.
From a CM perspective, the useful question is less “what magical thing is consciousness?” and more:
what functional architecture consistently explains the observable patterns associated with conscious organisms?
This is actually getting close to the CM position, especially the evolutionary framing.
Where we’d differ slightly is that prediction and simulation are probably not the origin of consciousness, but later expansions of a more fundamental control architecture.
Even simple organisms with no brains still have to sense conditions, regulate internal state, respond adaptively and maintain viability. That basic organism-environment regulation already exists long before narrative simulation or “what-if” modelling appears.
Prediction, imagination and narrative seem more like advanced layers built on top of that deeper survival-oriented architecture, not consciousness itself.