Cybersecurity. Former CISO. now lead a Field CISO Team. Passion for Appsec, Cloud, and anything Cyber. I also own a travel agency (Chase Family Travel)
Two 9-something CVEs this week. OpenSSL's base64 bug is scored 9.8, but OpenSSL itself rates it Low with no known attacker path. NGINX's HTTP/2 bugs are real unauthenticated RCE. Same red number on the dashboard. How is your team telling them apart? https://t.co/DaEMX5SgK6
Optimizely got abused and 178 sites, CNN, BBC and Zoom among them, served malicious JS through a script they already trusted. A/B testing tools usually come in through marketing and run on every page. Does anyone in security own that list? https://t.co/04SVksnznE
FBI says attackers are using an open-source AI framework, ARTEX, to get from first look to privileged access in under three hours. Plenty of SOCs can't triage an alert that fast. AI SOC hype aside, is your response built for machine speed yet? https://t.co/Z9U3cWrWua
Fireworks AI got breached and some Notion AI chat transcripts went with it. Notion users never picked Fireworks, but their prompts lived there anyway. Your AI vendor's vendors are part of your data footprint now. Who's mapping where prompts end up? https://t.co/hHQaqciRXq
Railway's breach writeup is worth a read. A stolen build credential snowballed into a long-lived key that could decrypt customer secrets, and the attacker went straight for AI API keys. About $740K in stolen AI usage. Who actually owns your AI keys? https://t.co/rYbEXX1biV
Across says its domain was locked down. Didn't matter. Attacker social engineered the registrar and swapped the site for a wallet drainer. You're only as secure as your vendor's help desk. Who's asking registrars how they verify account changes? https://t.co/Q6h7NrBUwM
The Across domain is currently down while we secure it against an attack from earlier today.
At ~18:45 UTC, a social engineering attack on @Namecheap (our domain registrar) gave a bad actor control of the Across domain.
Within 15 minutes of this attack, we were alerted and immediately worked to shut the site down. SEAL911 marked across.(to) as a phishing site with major wallets, and Cloudflare worked with us to mark the domain as at risk, and later pulled the site’s DNS records.
At the time of this post, Across.(to) is fully down, and the phishing site is no longer available.
In the brief period before Cloudflare fully blocked the malware site, some users who visited across.(to) may have been affected. No third-party integrations or API users were affected. Users who believe they were affected should DM us with transaction details and revoke attacker permissions (see next tweet for details).
Despite our best efforts, @Namecheap has been unresponsive, and we have not been able to properly secure the domain to bring Across’s services back up. Across’s frontend and API will remain down until we can properly secure them. We will always put user safety first.
Across’s domain was fully locked down with best-in-class security practices; this unauthorized takeover should not have been possible. We will be investigating this deeply and will provide a post-mortem on how this domain takeover was possible once we have more information.
Vanderbilt's response to the BYOD attack leaned hard on people: shut down your device, don't click, call IT from a separate phone. Users aren't just the risk, they're part of the response plan. How many orgs have actually practiced that with their staff?
New job for me. Curious. What’s everyone’s thoughts on risky human behavior? Everyone is talking about AI Soc, but can we change user behavior to prevent user based security breaches?
Kevin Gravel Has Not Benn Recalled I Am Just Fixing The Lines I am Not Sure If Jonathan Marchessault Will Play Tommarow Vs The Ducks I Just Put Marchessault On A Question Mark ?