1/ Today, @IsraelPolicy4m released a new report: Partnership Recalibrated: The Next Era of U.S.-Israel Security Cooperation. As the U.S. and Israel begin discussing a new memorandum of understanding (MOU), the authors @mkoplow@RCBrandenburg@elisaewers44@GabrielEpsteinX argue it's time to prep the security partnership for a new era. 🧵
The time has come to chart the next phase of the U.S.-Israel security relationship.
Our new report by @RCBrandenburg, @GabrielEpsteinX, @elisaewers44, and @mkoplow lays out a vision for the next MOU: moving from a provider-recipient framework to a greater partnership.
Israelis are focused on whether or not fighting will resume with Iran, what will transpire in Lebanon, and the coming elections. Gaza is on the back burner, but it won't be for long, as events are pushing a resumption of full-scale military operations https://t.co/pLF7RY1j3t
8/8 LImit 4: the political horizon in Point 1 is welcome but thin.
To be durable, a Gaza stabilization plan would need to be anchored in a much larger process — one that is inclusive and mindful of veto-wielding actors, likely addresses the West Bank and Jerusalem, and speaks to what Palestinian self-determination actually means in practice.
That architecture is obviously beyond Mladenov's mandate, but it's needed and it doesn't exist yet.
1/8 Hamas hasn't agreed to disarm. Israel hasn't agreed to withdraw. @nmladenov's new 15-point Roadmap is serious and worth reading — but it's built on assumptions that don't yet hold. 🧵
Following today’s #UN Security Council briefing, I am publishing the core elements of the proposed 15-point “Roadmap to Complete the Implementation of President Trump’s Gaza Comprehensive Peace Plan” in plain language.
• Points 1–5: Principles
• Points 6–11: Security
• Points 12–14: International Stabilization Force and IDF Withdrawal
• Point 15: Reconstruction
A thread (1/16) 🧵
7/8 Limit 3: the deeper problem remains unaddressed.
Why would Hamas deem disarmament desirable and permissible — nationally or religiously?
Why would Israel accept withdrawal before threats are eliminated?
These aren't technical questions. They're motivation and legitimacy questions.
No roadmap could resolve them without working through these disagreements (rather than assuming agreement).
Telegram channels reporting on Palestinian Authority salaries and prisoner & martyr (pay-to-slay) payments are reporting an agreement was reached to pay a part of the pay-to-slay stipends on May 24, following a weeklong sit-in outside the Prime Minister's office in Ramallah. 🧵
10/ The core lesson is becoming harder to avoid: Gaza is deadlocked around identity, core motivations, legitimacy, politics and power. No logistical, technical or operational maneuver is likely to break through this challenge.
The idea of moving ahead with postwar arrangements in parts of Gaza without a Hamas disarmament agreement does NOT contradict the Trump/Board of Peace plan. It is Point 17.
But the problem is that Gaza’s reality is stubbornly political, not only operational. 🧵
🚨The U.S.-led Board of Peace wants to start implementing its Gaza governance and reconstruction plan in the parts of Gaza that are not under Hamas control, as demilitarization talks with the group are deadlocked. My story on @axios
https://t.co/piHVYteZhh
9/ The coming Israeli elections may further narrow room for operational or political flexibility.
If Netanyahu concludes that escalation is electorally beneficial, he will tilt in a more hawkish direction. But even if he doesn't resume the war, he will likely be hesitant to compromise or experiment, especially with moves that require IDF withdrawal, even partial.