Wall Street’s AI rout is about to land in Taipei and Seoul.
EM portfolio outflows reached about $46 bn since October 1 in our daily data. At this stage, only the Iran war episode was worse. Foreign investors dumped $19 bn of Taiwanese and Korean equities in just four November sessions, double October’s pace. All of that was before the Nasdaq 100 fell 6.4% and chip stocks 12% on Thursday.
Futures point to another 6% to 8% leg down in both markets. Friday’s flow print will be ugly.
So far this is an equity story. Debt flows are still positive and the won is flat. But the Taiwan dollar is down 3%, EM sovereign CDS jumped on Thursday and China flipped to outflows. That is how spillovers start.
Agree. Guaraní bonds back that up. The 2035 guaraní global yield rose 56bp from Oct 13 to Oct 30 as the dollar climbed 4% off its Oct 14 low, consistent with holders locking in a 29% currency gain. Ueno's takeover and the resignation added 33bp and 9% on the dollar in four sessions. I expect pressure on guaraní debt to last until the deposit payouts clear and the succession settles.
Paraguay’s president resigned today over the collapse of Ueno, a bank holding 9% of the country’s deposits. Since Oct 30 Paraguay’s dollar bonds widened 22 to 30bp while regional CDS barely moved. I expect Paraguay to stop trading like a BBB credit for months.
Before Ueno, Paraguay traded at 125bp on the EMBI, level with the average BBB sovereign, for a country rated at the bottom of investment grade by Moody’s and S&P and still BB+ at Fitch. That valuation priced in strong institutions as much as strong numbers, and it is the first thing the market took back. Through midday Nov 5, 5 year CDS for Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, Colombia, Panama and Mexico moved less than 4bp either way, so this repricing is Paraguay specific.
The guaraní lost about 4.5% today alone and has now given back a third of its rally, after the dollar fell 29% between April 2025 and mid October. The correction started before Ueno, with Brazil’s election and soy seasonality, and the bank failure and the resignation sped it up. Around 88% of government debt is in foreign currency, so every 10% of depreciation adds about 3 points of GDP to a debt ratio near 38%.
The bank hole itself is manageable. Insured deposits of about $850mn fit inside a $1.6bn guarantee fund, and reserves stood at $11.2bn in mid October. The fiscal question is the roughly $830mn of public deposits, IPS pension money included, about 1.3% of GDP, on top of a central government deficit already projected at 3.2% of GDP this year and budgeted at 3.9% in 2027.
Colorado deputies shelved the impeachment case against VP Pedro Alliana 48 to 30 today, so the ruling party keeps the succession in its hands. I would turn bearish on Paraguay’s investment grade if public deposits get covered with new debt and the return to a 1.5% deficit slips past 2028. With Fitch at BB+, one downgrade from Moody’s or S&P takes Paraguay out of investment grade in indices that use the middle rating.
EM lost a net $42 bn of foreign portfolio money between October 1 and November 3 because doubts about AI returns hit Taiwan and Korea. Foreign equity outflows reached $31.8 bn in Taiwan and $14.6 bn in Korea in October, more than the $34 bn EM total for the month on daily data.
In dollar terms this already beats the full 90 days after the start of the GFC and the 2013 taper tantrum in the IIF daily database. Of the stress episodes I compared, only COVID and the March 2026 Iran war shock were bigger, at close to $100 bn each.
Korea and Taiwan went from 36% of EM ex China free float market cap at the end of 2024 to 59% in September on rallies of more than 60% this year. Foreigners sold $127 bn of Korean and $37 bn of Taiwanese stocks through September anyway. Benchmarked money held far more North Asian tech by default, and the AI earnings season gave it a reason to sell.
India went the other way, its share down from 28% to 15% with $30 bn of foreign equity outflows this year. Indonesia has lost $5.6 bn this year, $0.9 bn of it in October as its MSCI status came under review.
I expect the selling in Taiwan and Korea to run through November, and I will call it over only after four straight weeks of inflows into both. After March, the pause in foreign selling of Korean stocks lasted about a month.
No soy un detractor pero tampoco un blind supporter. Pregunta auténtica, por qué ir por la dolarización si el ciclo económico de Bolivia ni siquiera se asemeja al de USA? Por qué no un currency board que refleje mejor a nuestros large trade partners ? Ando preguntando eso a todos los proponentes de la dolarización en Bolivia y nadie logra explicármelo más allá de “control inflacionario” (que tampoco entiendo bien). Me ayudas a entender la propuesta ?
@lymanstoneky This is not completely true. The 1.56 is a projection, the survey INE itself calls the most robust source measured 2.1 for 2020 to 2023, and Bolivia in the mid 1980s was at 5.15 rather than 6.5. More here -->https://t.co/StWOvv2uFa
This is not completely true. The 1.56 is a projection, and the survey INE itself calls the most robust source measured 2.1 for 2020 to 2023. On the same UN series that supplies every other country in the comparison, Bolivia was at 5.15 in 1985, well short of the 6.5 in the post.
Bolivia's demographic and health surveys, the direct measurements INE weights most heavily, read 4.2 in 1998, 3.8 in 2003, 3.5 in 2008, 2.9 in 2016 and 2.1 in 2023, and INE lists EDSA 2023 as an input to this revision. For 2024 the World Bank and UN series says 2.52 and INE says 1.69, 0.83 apart in a year already past. The UN value predates both the survey and the 2024 census, so it is the stale one, and the survey trend puts 2024 near 1.8, much closer to INE.
INE fitted a smoothed curve through the census and survey estimates, with a lower asymptote imposed at 1.4 and a recovery capped at 1.5 from 2040, and then set the final level below that fitted curve so that the model's births match birth registrations, BCG vaccination records and school enrollment. Those counts are matched against a projected population of women that still includes anyone who left the country unrecorded, so understated emigration lowers the calibrated rate. Enrollment carries a second version of the same bias, since a child who left with the parents is missing from the rolls INE traces back to birth years, and reads as a birth that did not occur.
At the survey trend Bolivia in 2024 sits near 1.8 with Ecuador, above Colombia and the United States at 1.63 on the UN basis and above Brazil at 1.61. Chile fell from 1.84 in 2010 to 1.14 in 2024 and Argentina from 2.41 to 1.50, so a Bolivian rate in the 1s inside this decade is plausible. What 1.56 for 2026 asserts is that a country measuring 2.9 children per woman in rural areas as of 2023 drops below Brazil, Colombia and the United States within three years of that survey.
INE holds net migration flat at minus 42,042 a year from 2025 through 2032, the 2021 to 2024 average, which is 30% smaller than its own estimate for 2024, and the 2023 and 2024 emigrant counts are both 78,019 because the last observed year for each destination country is carried forward. The eight frozen years cover the dollar shortage, fuel rationing, the end of the 6.96 peg in June and an official rate at 9.83 on 17 September. Every population and birth count from 2025 onward inherits that assumption in full.
The level is defensible on the surveys' own trend, since extrapolating EDSA 2023 forward at the 0.11 children a year measured between 2016 and 2023 gives 1.59 for 2026 against INE's 1.56, and INE is right that its 2020 revision missed the decline. It is still a fitted curve with a floor, published as a projection, and the post presents it as observed data.
On the UN and World Bank series Bolivia was at 5.15 in 1985 and 5.12 in 1986, and it was last above 6.5 in 1959, at 6.73. The 3 in 2010 is right, at 3.21. From 5.15 in 1985 to 2.1 measured across 2020 to 2023, a reading near 1.6 in 2026 continues the trend. The astonishment rests on a 1985 number that is off by 1.35 children and about 25 years.
The United States side is a registered count in the numerator and a Census Bureau population estimate in the denominator. The NCHS final total fertility rate for 2024 is 1,599.5 per 1,000 women, a record low, revised down from a provisional 1,626.5 with births almost unchanged, so the revision sits in the population denominator, and the 2025 provisional general fertility rate fell a further 1.3% to 53.1. The 1.57 for 2026 is a fair extrapolation of that, and it is an extrapolation rather than a release.
I expect the population path to be the first number INE revises, because eight years of net migration frozen at minus 42,042 will not survive a single measured year of outflows at the 60,000 pace INE itself estimated for 2023 and 2024. On fertility the next EDSA is the test, and I expect it to print above the 1.5 to 1.6 INE has on the path for its reference years. A SNIS live birth count for 2025 below the 157,481 INE projects would move me the other way.
@cornu__copia This is not completely true. The 1.56 is a projection, the survey INE itself calls the most robust source measured 2.1 for 2020 to 2023, and Bolivia in the mid 1980s was at 5.15 rather than 6.5. More here -->https://t.co/StWOvv2uFa
This is not completely true. The 1.56 is a projection, and the survey INE itself calls the most robust source measured 2.1 for 2020 to 2023. On the same UN series that supplies every other country in the comparison, Bolivia was at 5.15 in 1985, well short of the 6.5 in the post.
Bolivia's demographic and health surveys, the direct measurements INE weights most heavily, read 4.2 in 1998, 3.8 in 2003, 3.5 in 2008, 2.9 in 2016 and 2.1 in 2023, and INE lists EDSA 2023 as an input to this revision. For 2024 the World Bank and UN series says 2.52 and INE says 1.69, 0.83 apart in a year already past. The UN value predates both the survey and the 2024 census, so it is the stale one, and the survey trend puts 2024 near 1.8, much closer to INE.
INE fitted a smoothed curve through the census and survey estimates, with a lower asymptote imposed at 1.4 and a recovery capped at 1.5 from 2040, and then set the final level below that fitted curve so that the model's births match birth registrations, BCG vaccination records and school enrollment. Those counts are matched against a projected population of women that still includes anyone who left the country unrecorded, so understated emigration lowers the calibrated rate. Enrollment carries a second version of the same bias, since a child who left with the parents is missing from the rolls INE traces back to birth years, and reads as a birth that did not occur.
At the survey trend Bolivia in 2024 sits near 1.8 with Ecuador, above Colombia and the United States at 1.63 on the UN basis and above Brazil at 1.61. Chile fell from 1.84 in 2010 to 1.14 in 2024 and Argentina from 2.41 to 1.50, so a Bolivian rate in the 1s inside this decade is plausible. What 1.56 for 2026 asserts is that a country measuring 2.9 children per woman in rural areas as of 2023 drops below Brazil, Colombia and the United States within three years of that survey.
INE holds net migration flat at minus 42,042 a year from 2025 through 2032, the 2021 to 2024 average, which is 30% smaller than its own estimate for 2024, and the 2023 and 2024 emigrant counts are both 78,019 because the last observed year for each destination country is carried forward. The eight frozen years cover the dollar shortage, fuel rationing, the end of the 6.96 peg in June and an official rate at 9.83 on 17 September. Every population and birth count from 2025 onward inherits that assumption in full.
The level is defensible on the surveys' own trend, since extrapolating EDSA 2023 forward at the 0.11 children a year measured between 2016 and 2023 gives 1.59 for 2026 against INE's 1.56, and INE is right that its 2020 revision missed the decline. It is still a fitted curve with a floor, published as a projection, and the post presents it as observed data.
On the UN and World Bank series Bolivia was at 5.15 in 1985 and 5.12 in 1986, and it was last above 6.5 in 1959, at 6.73. The 3 in 2010 is right, at 3.21. From 5.15 in 1985 to 2.1 measured across 2020 to 2023, a reading near 1.6 in 2026 continues the trend. The astonishment rests on a 1985 number that is off by 1.35 children and about 25 years.
The United States side is a registered count in the numerator and a Census Bureau population estimate in the denominator. The NCHS final total fertility rate for 2024 is 1,599.5 per 1,000 women, a record low, revised down from a provisional 1,626.5 with births almost unchanged, so the revision sits in the population denominator, and the 2025 provisional general fertility rate fell a further 1.3% to 53.1. The 1.57 for 2026 is a fair extrapolation of that, and it is an extrapolation rather than a release.
I expect the population path to be the first number INE revises, because eight years of net migration frozen at minus 42,042 will not survive a single measured year of outflows at the 60,000 pace INE itself estimated for 2023 and 2024. On fertility the next EDSA is the test, and I expect it to print above the 1.5 to 1.6 INE has on the path for its reference years. A SNIS live birth count for 2025 below the 157,481 INE projects would move me the other way.
@riosmauricio Esto no es del todo cierto. El 1,56 es una proyección, la encuesta que el propio INE considera la fuente más robusta midió 2,1 para 2020 a 2023, y Bolivia a mediados de los ochenta estaba en 5,15 en lugar de 6,5. Más detalle aquí -->https://t.co/StWOvv2uFa
This is not completely true. The 1.56 is a projection, and the survey INE itself calls the most robust source measured 2.1 for 2020 to 2023. On the same UN series that supplies every other country in the comparison, Bolivia was at 5.15 in 1985, well short of the 6.5 in the post.
Bolivia's demographic and health surveys, the direct measurements INE weights most heavily, read 4.2 in 1998, 3.8 in 2003, 3.5 in 2008, 2.9 in 2016 and 2.1 in 2023, and INE lists EDSA 2023 as an input to this revision. For 2024 the World Bank and UN series says 2.52 and INE says 1.69, 0.83 apart in a year already past. The UN value predates both the survey and the 2024 census, so it is the stale one, and the survey trend puts 2024 near 1.8, much closer to INE.
INE fitted a smoothed curve through the census and survey estimates, with a lower asymptote imposed at 1.4 and a recovery capped at 1.5 from 2040, and then set the final level below that fitted curve so that the model's births match birth registrations, BCG vaccination records and school enrollment. Those counts are matched against a projected population of women that still includes anyone who left the country unrecorded, so understated emigration lowers the calibrated rate. Enrollment carries a second version of the same bias, since a child who left with the parents is missing from the rolls INE traces back to birth years, and reads as a birth that did not occur.
At the survey trend Bolivia in 2024 sits near 1.8 with Ecuador, above Colombia and the United States at 1.63 on the UN basis and above Brazil at 1.61. Chile fell from 1.84 in 2010 to 1.14 in 2024 and Argentina from 2.41 to 1.50, so a Bolivian rate in the 1s inside this decade is plausible. What 1.56 for 2026 asserts is that a country measuring 2.9 children per woman in rural areas as of 2023 drops below Brazil, Colombia and the United States within three years of that survey.
INE holds net migration flat at minus 42,042 a year from 2025 through 2032, the 2021 to 2024 average, which is 30% smaller than its own estimate for 2024, and the 2023 and 2024 emigrant counts are both 78,019 because the last observed year for each destination country is carried forward. The eight frozen years cover the dollar shortage, fuel rationing, the end of the 6.96 peg in June and an official rate at 9.83 on 17 September. Every population and birth count from 2025 onward inherits that assumption in full.
The level is defensible on the surveys' own trend, since extrapolating EDSA 2023 forward at the 0.11 children a year measured between 2016 and 2023 gives 1.59 for 2026 against INE's 1.56, and INE is right that its 2020 revision missed the decline. It is still a fitted curve with a floor, published as a projection, and the post presents it as observed data.
On the UN and World Bank series Bolivia was at 5.15 in 1985 and 5.12 in 1986, and it was last above 6.5 in 1959, at 6.73. The 3 in 2010 is right, at 3.21. From 5.15 in 1985 to 2.1 measured across 2020 to 2023, a reading near 1.6 in 2026 continues the trend. The astonishment rests on a 1985 number that is off by 1.35 children and about 25 years.
The United States side is a registered count in the numerator and a Census Bureau population estimate in the denominator. The NCHS final total fertility rate for 2024 is 1,599.5 per 1,000 women, a record low, revised down from a provisional 1,626.5 with births almost unchanged, so the revision sits in the population denominator, and the 2025 provisional general fertility rate fell a further 1.3% to 53.1. The 1.57 for 2026 is a fair extrapolation of that, and it is an extrapolation rather than a release.
I expect the population path to be the first number INE revises, because eight years of net migration frozen at minus 42,042 will not survive a single measured year of outflows at the 60,000 pace INE itself estimated for 2023 and 2024. On fertility the next EDSA is the test, and I expect it to print above the 1.5 to 1.6 INE has on the path for its reference years. A SNIS live birth count for 2025 below the 157,481 INE projects would move me the other way.
@Jam1377 This is not completely true. The 1.56 is a projection, the survey INE itself calls the most robust source measured 2.1 for 2020 to 2023, and Bolivia in the mid 1980s was at 5.15 rather than 6.5. More here -->https://t.co/StWOvv2uFa
This is not completely true. The 1.56 is a projection, and the survey INE itself calls the most robust source measured 2.1 for 2020 to 2023. On the same UN series that supplies every other country in the comparison, Bolivia was at 5.15 in 1985, well short of the 6.5 in the post.
Bolivia's demographic and health surveys, the direct measurements INE weights most heavily, read 4.2 in 1998, 3.8 in 2003, 3.5 in 2008, 2.9 in 2016 and 2.1 in 2023, and INE lists EDSA 2023 as an input to this revision. For 2024 the World Bank and UN series says 2.52 and INE says 1.69, 0.83 apart in a year already past. The UN value predates both the survey and the 2024 census, so it is the stale one, and the survey trend puts 2024 near 1.8, much closer to INE.
INE fitted a smoothed curve through the census and survey estimates, with a lower asymptote imposed at 1.4 and a recovery capped at 1.5 from 2040, and then set the final level below that fitted curve so that the model's births match birth registrations, BCG vaccination records and school enrollment. Those counts are matched against a projected population of women that still includes anyone who left the country unrecorded, so understated emigration lowers the calibrated rate. Enrollment carries a second version of the same bias, since a child who left with the parents is missing from the rolls INE traces back to birth years, and reads as a birth that did not occur.
At the survey trend Bolivia in 2024 sits near 1.8 with Ecuador, above Colombia and the United States at 1.63 on the UN basis and above Brazil at 1.61. Chile fell from 1.84 in 2010 to 1.14 in 2024 and Argentina from 2.41 to 1.50, so a Bolivian rate in the 1s inside this decade is plausible. What 1.56 for 2026 asserts is that a country measuring 2.9 children per woman in rural areas as of 2023 drops below Brazil, Colombia and the United States within three years of that survey.
INE holds net migration flat at minus 42,042 a year from 2025 through 2032, the 2021 to 2024 average, which is 30% smaller than its own estimate for 2024, and the 2023 and 2024 emigrant counts are both 78,019 because the last observed year for each destination country is carried forward. The eight frozen years cover the dollar shortage, fuel rationing, the end of the 6.96 peg in June and an official rate at 9.83 on 17 September. Every population and birth count from 2025 onward inherits that assumption in full.
The level is defensible on the surveys' own trend, since extrapolating EDSA 2023 forward at the 0.11 children a year measured between 2016 and 2023 gives 1.59 for 2026 against INE's 1.56, and INE is right that its 2020 revision missed the decline. It is still a fitted curve with a floor, published as a projection, and the post presents it as observed data.
On the UN and World Bank series Bolivia was at 5.15 in 1985 and 5.12 in 1986, and it was last above 6.5 in 1959, at 6.73. The 3 in 2010 is right, at 3.21. From 5.15 in 1985 to 2.1 measured across 2020 to 2023, a reading near 1.6 in 2026 continues the trend. The astonishment rests on a 1985 number that is off by 1.35 children and about 25 years.
The United States side is a registered count in the numerator and a Census Bureau population estimate in the denominator. The NCHS final total fertility rate for 2024 is 1,599.5 per 1,000 women, a record low, revised down from a provisional 1,626.5 with births almost unchanged, so the revision sits in the population denominator, and the 2025 provisional general fertility rate fell a further 1.3% to 53.1. The 1.57 for 2026 is a fair extrapolation of that, and it is an extrapolation rather than a release.
I expect the population path to be the first number INE revises, because eight years of net migration frozen at minus 42,042 will not survive a single measured year of outflows at the 60,000 pace INE itself estimated for 2023 and 2024. On fertility the next EDSA is the test, and I expect it to print above the 1.5 to 1.6 INE has on the path for its reference years. A SNIS live birth count for 2025 below the 157,481 INE projects would move me the other way.
@JesusFerna7026 This is not completely true. The 1.56 is a projection, the survey INE itself calls the most robust source measured 2.1 for 2020 to 2023, and Bolivia in the mid 1980s was at 5.15 rather than 6.5. More here --> https://t.co/StWOvv2uFa
This is not completely true. The 1.56 is a projection, and the survey INE itself calls the most robust source measured 2.1 for 2020 to 2023. On the same UN series that supplies every other country in the comparison, Bolivia was at 5.15 in 1985, well short of the 6.5 in the post.
Bolivia's demographic and health surveys, the direct measurements INE weights most heavily, read 4.2 in 1998, 3.8 in 2003, 3.5 in 2008, 2.9 in 2016 and 2.1 in 2023, and INE lists EDSA 2023 as an input to this revision. For 2024 the World Bank and UN series says 2.52 and INE says 1.69, 0.83 apart in a year already past. The UN value predates both the survey and the 2024 census, so it is the stale one, and the survey trend puts 2024 near 1.8, much closer to INE.
INE fitted a smoothed curve through the census and survey estimates, with a lower asymptote imposed at 1.4 and a recovery capped at 1.5 from 2040, and then set the final level below that fitted curve so that the model's births match birth registrations, BCG vaccination records and school enrollment. Those counts are matched against a projected population of women that still includes anyone who left the country unrecorded, so understated emigration lowers the calibrated rate. Enrollment carries a second version of the same bias, since a child who left with the parents is missing from the rolls INE traces back to birth years, and reads as a birth that did not occur.
At the survey trend Bolivia in 2024 sits near 1.8 with Ecuador, above Colombia and the United States at 1.63 on the UN basis and above Brazil at 1.61. Chile fell from 1.84 in 2010 to 1.14 in 2024 and Argentina from 2.41 to 1.50, so a Bolivian rate in the 1s inside this decade is plausible. What 1.56 for 2026 asserts is that a country measuring 2.9 children per woman in rural areas as of 2023 drops below Brazil, Colombia and the United States within three years of that survey.
INE holds net migration flat at minus 42,042 a year from 2025 through 2032, the 2021 to 2024 average, which is 30% smaller than its own estimate for 2024, and the 2023 and 2024 emigrant counts are both 78,019 because the last observed year for each destination country is carried forward. The eight frozen years cover the dollar shortage, fuel rationing, the end of the 6.96 peg in June and an official rate at 9.83 on 17 September. Every population and birth count from 2025 onward inherits that assumption in full.
The level is defensible on the surveys' own trend, since extrapolating EDSA 2023 forward at the 0.11 children a year measured between 2016 and 2023 gives 1.59 for 2026 against INE's 1.56, and INE is right that its 2020 revision missed the decline. It is still a fitted curve with a floor, published as a projection, and the post presents it as observed data.
On the UN and World Bank series Bolivia was at 5.15 in 1985 and 5.12 in 1986, and it was last above 6.5 in 1959, at 6.73. The 3 in 2010 is right, at 3.21. From 5.15 in 1985 to 2.1 measured across 2020 to 2023, a reading near 1.6 in 2026 continues the trend. The astonishment rests on a 1985 number that is off by 1.35 children and about 25 years.
The United States side is a registered count in the numerator and a Census Bureau population estimate in the denominator. The NCHS final total fertility rate for 2024 is 1,599.5 per 1,000 women, a record low, revised down from a provisional 1,626.5 with births almost unchanged, so the revision sits in the population denominator, and the 2025 provisional general fertility rate fell a further 1.3% to 53.1. The 1.57 for 2026 is a fair extrapolation of that, and it is an extrapolation rather than a release.
I expect the population path to be the first number INE revises, because eight years of net migration frozen at minus 42,042 will not survive a single measured year of outflows at the 60,000 pace INE itself estimated for 2023 and 2024. On fertility the next EDSA is the test, and I expect it to print above the 1.5 to 1.6 INE has on the path for its reference years. A SNIS live birth count for 2025 below the 157,481 INE projects would move me the other way.
This is not completely true. The 1.56 is a projection, and the survey INE itself calls the most robust source measured 2.1 for 2020 to 2023. On the same UN series that supplies every other country in the comparison, Bolivia was at 5.15 in 1985, well short of the 6.5 in the post.
Bolivia's demographic and health surveys, the direct measurements INE weights most heavily, read 4.2 in 1998, 3.8 in 2003, 3.5 in 2008, 2.9 in 2016 and 2.1 in 2023, and INE lists EDSA 2023 as an input to this revision. For 2024 the World Bank and UN series says 2.52 and INE says 1.69, 0.83 apart in a year already past. The UN value predates both the survey and the 2024 census, so it is the stale one, and the survey trend puts 2024 near 1.8, much closer to INE.
INE fitted a smoothed curve through the census and survey estimates, with a lower asymptote imposed at 1.4 and a recovery capped at 1.5 from 2040, and then set the final level below that fitted curve so that the model's births match birth registrations, BCG vaccination records and school enrollment. Those counts are matched against a projected population of women that still includes anyone who left the country unrecorded, so understated emigration lowers the calibrated rate. Enrollment carries a second version of the same bias, since a child who left with the parents is missing from the rolls INE traces back to birth years, and reads as a birth that did not occur.
At the survey trend Bolivia in 2024 sits near 1.8 with Ecuador, above Colombia and the United States at 1.63 on the UN basis and above Brazil at 1.61. Chile fell from 1.84 in 2010 to 1.14 in 2024 and Argentina from 2.41 to 1.50, so a Bolivian rate in the 1s inside this decade is plausible. What 1.56 for 2026 asserts is that a country measuring 2.9 children per woman in rural areas as of 2023 drops below Brazil, Colombia and the United States within three years of that survey.
INE holds net migration flat at minus 42,042 a year from 2025 through 2032, the 2021 to 2024 average, which is 30% smaller than its own estimate for 2024, and the 2023 and 2024 emigrant counts are both 78,019 because the last observed year for each destination country is carried forward. The eight frozen years cover the dollar shortage, fuel rationing, the end of the 6.96 peg in June and an official rate at 9.83 on 17 September. Every population and birth count from 2025 onward inherits that assumption in full.
The level is defensible on the surveys' own trend, since extrapolating EDSA 2023 forward at the 0.11 children a year measured between 2016 and 2023 gives 1.59 for 2026 against INE's 1.56, and INE is right that its 2020 revision missed the decline. It is still a fitted curve with a floor, published as a projection, and the post presents it as observed data.
On the UN and World Bank series Bolivia was at 5.15 in 1985 and 5.12 in 1986, and it was last above 6.5 in 1959, at 6.73. The 3 in 2010 is right, at 3.21. From 5.15 in 1985 to 2.1 measured across 2020 to 2023, a reading near 1.6 in 2026 continues the trend. The astonishment rests on a 1985 number that is off by 1.35 children and about 25 years.
The United States side is a registered count in the numerator and a Census Bureau population estimate in the denominator. The NCHS final total fertility rate for 2024 is 1,599.5 per 1,000 women, a record low, revised down from a provisional 1,626.5 with births almost unchanged, so the revision sits in the population denominator, and the 2025 provisional general fertility rate fell a further 1.3% to 53.1. The 1.57 for 2026 is a fair extrapolation of that, and it is an extrapolation rather than a release.
I expect the population path to be the first number INE revises, because eight years of net migration frozen at minus 42,042 will not survive a single measured year of outflows at the 60,000 pace INE itself estimated for 2023 and 2024. On fertility the next EDSA is the test, and I expect it to print above the 1.5 to 1.6 INE has on the path for its reference years. A SNIS live birth count for 2025 below the 157,481 INE projects would move me the other way.
Is Bolivia’s total fertility rate below the U.S. rate?
In a new data release, the National Institute of Statistics of Bolivia reports the country’s total fertility rate at 1.56 in 2026. The U.S. will be around 1.57.
This is NOT my estimate. I am just copying and pasting a table from https://t.co/9mfk2R2Eec (Appendix 1, page 68). Can I say it again? This is the official data.
If I had been told 10 years ago that, by 2026, Bolivia’s total fertility rate would be below the U.S. rate, I would not have believed it. I would have happily bet $1 against $1 million that it would not happen. In fact, I look at the table, and I still need to pinch myself. Bolivia was around 6.5 in the mid-1980s and around 3 in 2010 or so.
I don’t know. Sometimes I wish I were a better writer, so I could express what I am feeling right now. More than anything, the sense that ten years ago I missed a fundamental change in humanity. What else can I be missing now?
Thanks to @LibCarlos for the link and the information..
💲 Economía | La menor participación de inversionistas extranjeros en la deuda mexicana y el mayor peso de los tenedores locales han reducido la vulnerabilidad del peso frente a episodios de aversión global al riesgo, explicó Jonathan Fortun, economista senior del Instituto de Finanzas Internacionales (IIF). https://t.co/KvCyD8mJUg
Veo al presidente del BCB en la imagen. El Banco Central es (o mejor dicho debería ser) un ente independiente (y no de “dependencia y tuición del MEFP”
Art 1 Ley No 1670: “El El BCB es una institución del Estado, de derecho público, de carácter autárquico, de duración indefinida, con personalidad jurídica y patrimonio propios