๐ฉ Hats off to @eth_nik_dev for finding a low severity bug in the Hats vault
Nik has been an appreciated contributor in our community, constantly participating in the competitions we run.
Check out our writeup ๐
https://t.co/sT6fVRqAt5
@delucinator The market is full of "auditing firms" which just run slither on the contracts and then gave the project owners a pdf to show to the investors, or worse... I had audits mentioning snippets of code not in my codebase...
@PopPunkOnChain this is great, how would you handle picking a random winner with their probability of winning directly proportional to their ticket count?
from their implementation they'd do raffle.participants[randomNumber]
@emilianobonassi I like the idea, but I see a potential Arbitrary Code Execution when calling revokeERC20 with the address of a malicious token contract, would there be a way to ensure that wouldn't happen in a trustless manner?
@arzdev@moopidoopi https://t.co/MwvY7NR7i7โฆ OZ ReentrancyGuard works like this under the hood since 2020, definitely good to highlight this as it's not very intuitive when writing code
@pcaversaccio@samczsun if a public zk-proof of an exploit is given then you raise attention on the contract, and it basically becomes like a CTF, it's likely that someone else might find a solution and behave badly
@pcaversaccio@samczsun The "zk proof-of-attack" is a concept I'd love to see evolve, but if a contact with the owners of the project is difficult, especially if the exploit is fairly simple, I think white-hacking is the best way to go