I wanted to wait a decent time and put out enough content before I set up an official donation page.
I started a KUNO because I feel like there’s a gap in the media space around privacy.
Most of the popular options today are focused almost entirely on speculation and price talk.
One example: @MarketBubble
I'm glad the current options opened the door. Between @MoneroTalk and @xenumonero’s AntiMoonboy podcast, I believe there’s room for more Monero $XMR and privacy focused podcasts. I want to help spread the Monero message.
Monero IS my message as you see from the page.
Topics like this(quoted post) are exactly why these conversations matter.
But beyond that, I also want to help expand Monero’s podcast-style media presence. My goal is to bring more discussions about Monero and privacy to X through Spaces and other formats.
This would be short form content. 10 minute straight to the point spaces, to start.
The KUNO is meant to help get everything in place, keep a budget and, more importantly, help create a circular economy around Monero media. That means guests would be paid for their time *in Monero*, using donations *from the Monero community*.
I’m also looking for sponsors as well.
If you'd like to expand Privacy and Monero media, feel free to reach out in the DMs.
Thanks for reading and thanks your time😀
👀This @GrapheneOS X @Moto collab is bigger than I thought!
If we didnt get this NOW, who knows what direction privacy on mobile would be headed!
Did you know: @Google Pixel 10 delays and tighter controls threw off GrapheneOS support timelines, making it harder to keep up with fast Pixel releases.
Its almost like they were TRYING to brick @GrapheneOS
Perfect timing for the @Moto partnership: 2027 flagships will let you unlock the startup security, install GrapheneOS, then lock it back so the phone checks everything’s safe.
Samsung stays locked.
Apple gives you no choice.
Real secure Android options are finally coming.
👀
This is the start of something great!
Not about Monero it isn't.
you can verify Monero isnt inflating.
You can NEVER verify this for Zcash.
The simplest response per grok:
https://t.co/hNaB4nG0t1 independently verifies that Monero's actual circulating supply exactly matches its predictable emission schedule (18.132M main emission + 0.6 XMR/block tail emission), with no extra coins created. It does this by cryptographically checking every transaction's ring signatures, key images, and confidential amounts to confirm inputs equal outputs + fees, preventing hidden inflation or bugs—proving over 12 years of sound supply with no deviations
@followjason@CryptoTaxGuyETH@BostonZcash You consider an infinite minting of coins and an exploit of the shielded pool impressive?
And I have zero technical knowledge?
Oh buddy, lmao.
@moneyhippie@_tm3k No.
In fact zcash is WAYYYYY more susceptible to this regardless of what you're scamfluencers are trolling you.
TLDR: its not quantum resistant AT ALL 😂lmao
@_tm3k Do you relly believe this?
Lmao.
Maybe if I type on twitter the world is full of sunshine and rainbows and my bills will pay themselves, it will make it true, eh?
@_tm3k Do you relly believe this?
Lmao.
Maybe if I type on twitter the world is full of sunshine and rainbows and my bills will pay themselves, it will make it true, eh?
I genuinely do not get the psyop around Zcash.
This guy tries to reference "moneros inflation bug" which hasnt happened in almost a decade.
Here's a list of recent $ZEC exploits and bugs:
March 1, 2018: BCTV14 zk-SNARK counterfeiting vulnerability (CVE-2019-7167) discovered (infinite counterfeit ZEC possible in Sprout pool).
October 28, 2018: Sapling upgrade fixes the 2018 counterfeiting vulnerability.
September 13, 2019: Security issue reported .
November 8, 2019: CVE-2017-18350 response and "related fixes. "
February 6, 2020: Sprout z-address wallet balance display bug.
February 6, 2020: Consensus fork vulnerability.
July 28, 2020: Sprout verification vulnerability introduced (bypass of proof checks).
March 23, 2026: Sprout verification vulnerability disclosed (~25k ZEC counterfeiting risk; March 31, 2026).
April 4, 2026: Multiple zcashd/Zebra issues reported (Orchard crashes, consensus gaps, turnstile bypass, integer issues).
April 17, 2026: zcashd v6.12.1 and Zebra v4.3.1 fixes for the April bundle (including CVE-2026-34377 and others).
May 2, 2026: Zebra v4.4.0 critical fixes (consensus, DoS, sigops undercount).
May 29, 2026: Orchard shielded pool double-spending risk discovered.
June 2–3, 2026: Emergency soft/hard fork for Orchard fix.
This focuses on publicly notable/security-relevant issues; many minor bugs exist in routine updates but lack specific dated disclosures.
Thoughts from a nontechnical observer:
- The efficiency with which Zcash devs & miners acted here is impressive.
- It’s hard to build privacy, even on “dumb” chains. That’s bearish for projects seeking to tack privacy features onto otherwise transparent smart contract chains.
- XMR and BTC also have patched vulnerabilities. Their communities’ efforts to spread fake news about this patch suggests they feel threatened.
I genuinely do not get the psyop around Zcash.
This guy tries to reference "moneros inflation bug" which hasnt happened in almost a decade.
Here's a list of recent $ZEC exploits and bugs:
March 1, 2018: BCTV14 zk-SNARK counterfeiting vulnerability (CVE-2019-7167) discovered (infinite counterfeit ZEC possible in Sprout pool).
October 28, 2018: Sapling upgrade fixes the 2018 counterfeiting vulnerability.
September 13, 2019: Security issue reported .
November 8, 2019: CVE-2017-18350 response and "related fixes. "
February 6, 2020: Sprout z-address wallet balance display bug.
February 6, 2020: Consensus fork vulnerability.
July 28, 2020: Sprout verification vulnerability introduced (bypass of proof checks).
March 23, 2026: Sprout verification vulnerability disclosed (~25k ZEC counterfeiting risk; March 31, 2026).
April 4, 2026: Multiple zcashd/Zebra issues reported (Orchard crashes, consensus gaps, turnstile bypass, integer issues).
April 17, 2026: zcashd v6.12.1 and Zebra v4.3.1 fixes for the April bundle (including CVE-2026-34377 and others).
May 2, 2026: Zebra v4.4.0 critical fixes (consensus, DoS, sigops undercount).
May 29, 2026: Orchard shielded pool double-spending risk discovered.
June 2–3, 2026: Emergency soft/hard fork for Orchard fix.
This focuses on publicly notable/security-relevant issues; many minor bugs exist in routine updates but lack specific dated disclosures.
Remember if a bug ever lets someone mint fake extra zcash zcash:native inside a shielded pool, here's what happens:
The "turnstile" system caps how much total money can ever leave the pool, only the real deposits that came in are allowed out.
But all the coins inside are completely mixed and identical. No one can tell fake from real.
So if the hacker rushes out first and cashes out, they walk away with real money.
The regular users who try to leave last? They get stuck - they literally can't take all their money out.
The turnstile stops the whole network from being flooded with fake coins… but the last people to leave end up holding the bag. (their own docs confirm this)
Since you can't prove this bug hasn't been exploited, it's advised to move your coins from the shielded pool ASAP.
Stay safe.
@Senpai_Gideon They did not prevent an exploit and there is no plausible way for them to know if infinite coins were minted.
Keep your wall of text. Lmao
@zkDragon@boogianhen@januszg_@Arnaudschenk This has been repeatedly happening.
There is a clear attack on shielded pools and the attacker KNOWS not to pull them all out at once. I know they know this by the number of times a shielded pool has been exploited.