@zhil_arf Setelah kulihat bbrp kejadian di lapangan, dan surat kabar. Industri semikonduktor ini akan ke arah sana. Ngelihat bbrp perusahaan adik Wowo Arsari Group yg mencari tambang, punya smelter komoditas strategi timah, REE, dan IEU-CEPA yang dipercepat. Mereka ini jadi supply chain
@koganenohikari Kenapa KRL belum ada di Gerbangkertasusila padahal Surabaya kota terbesar kedua di Indonesia sementara Osaka di Jepang yang sama dengan Surabaya lebih punya KRL?
Industrialisasi Indonesia tuh minimal: paksa konglo buat pindahin semua modalnya ke bikin pabrik ekspor.
Gapapa pabriknya tetap punya konglo terus jadi chaebol. Yang penting pabriknya jadi dan jual.
Korsel pakai cara ini. Park Chung-hee, diktator, maksa pebisnis Korsel buat bikin dan ekspor barang. HARUS bikin pabrik.
Bikin pabrik apa?
Ada jaminan hukum dan jaminan politik dari pemerintah nggak, bahwa segala regulasi yang perlu, infrastruktur jalan dan listrik, suplai tenaga kerja ahli bakal ada?
Ada suplai uang atau utang buat membiayai pembangunan pabriknya nggak? Bank-bank di luar sana memang mau minjemin uangnya?
Ini butuh perencanaan. Rezim Park Chung-hee mau dan punya political will buat merencanakan, melakukan, dan mengamankan semua itu.
Di Jepang, ini tidak dilakukan oleh satu orang diktator, tetapi oleh mesin Partai, Kementerian Industri & Perdagangan (MITI), dan Kemenkeu. Yang dua terakhir diisi oleh jenius-jenius dari Todai.
Tiga institusi Jepang itu memecut dan menggerakkan megakorporasi (Keiretsu) di Jepang untuk membangun pabrik dan mengekspor produk manufaktur ke luar negeri.
Profit dollar raksasa hasil jualan merodok masuk ke Jepang, yang diputar lagi untuk membangun semakin banyak pabrik.
Di China, perencanaan seperti ini didelegasi ke pemda. Pemda China secara sadis dan brutal berkompetisi Darwin bikin pabrik, bikin infrastruktur, bikin kerangka regulasi, bikin sekolah teknik canggih, mencari aliran uang dan investor.
Gubernur bodoh, ngaco, atau lamban dipecat.
Indonesia kebalik. Konglo bukan hanya dibiarkan malas menyedot uang di sektor sawit tambang yang tanahnya hasil mencuri, melainkan juga malah difasilitasi kekerasan bersenjata negara dalam melakukannya. Harusnya, konglo dipecut dengan sadis.
This chart is one of the clearest illustrations of China’s ongoing industrial involution problem.
The four largest Chinese solar manufacturers — JinkoSolar, LONGi, Trina Solar, and JA Solar — generated strong profits throughout 2022 and 2023. At their peak, combined quarterly profits exceeded US$1.5 billion, with industry net margins around 7% of revenue. Yet despite global solar demand continuing to grow, the industry has now posted losses every quarter since the beginning of 2024.
The key issue is not demand destruction. The problem is excessive supply. China’s solar industry became a victim of its own success. Massive capital investment, aggressive capacity expansion, local government support, and intense competition created far more manufacturing capacity than global demand could absorb. As every producer attempted to gain market share simultaneously, module prices collapsed faster than costs could fall.
The result is classic involution. Companies continue producing, revenues remain large, shipments often reach record highs, but profitability disappears because everyone is competing away the economic value. Consumers benefit from cheaper solar panels, while producers suffer collapsing margins.
What makes this particularly noteworthy is that these are not small players. These are the national champions of China’s solar industry. If even the industry leaders are collectively losing money, it suggests the imbalance between supply and demand has become severe.
More broadly, this chart reflects a pattern now visible across several Chinese industries including solar, batteries, EVs, steel, chemicals, and parts of the broader manufacturing sector. China’s industrial policy has been extraordinarily successful at increasing productive capacity, but profitability has not kept pace because capacity growth often exceeds end-market demand growth.
For investors, the lesson is important. Volume growth alone is not enough. An industry can grow shipments by 20-30% annually and still destroy shareholder value if pricing power collapses. Ultimately, equity investors are paid from profits, not production.
This is also one of the key reasons we continue to avoid Chinese equities. Many investors focus on China’s engineering capability, manufacturing scale, and market share gains, all of which are real strengths. However, shareholders do not own market share. They own future cash flows. When industries repeatedly compete away profits through relentless capacity expansion, the economic benefits accrue primarily to consumers rather than equity holders.
The bullish case is that these losses eventually force consolidation, bankruptcies, capacity closures, and rationalization, allowing survivors to regain pricing power. The bearish case is that involution persists for years, with companies continuing to prioritize market share, employment, and strategic positioning over profitability.
At the moment, this chart suggests China’s solar industry remains firmly in the latter camp. The world is getting cheaper solar panels, but the producers themselves are paying the price. That may be excellent for global consumers and the energy transition, but it is a far less attractive proposition for long-term equity investors seeking sustainable returns on capital.
TW: Grooming
Sekali lagi mau bilang kasus Daniel (@nokitron) ini bukan kejadian satu/dua kali. Ada POLA BERULANG dmn dia nargetin cewek UNDERAGE + VULNERABLE
Salah satu korbannya adalah temen gue. Predator ini mulai flirting dgn dia sejak SMA, and mind you, he's pushing 30💀