The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or the Board of Governors
The authors estimate the decline in the valuation of mortgage servicing rights held by banks in a time of economic stress. https://t.co/UP883ILHlQ #FEDSNote#EconTwitter
Scale matters: China is much larger than during the first China Shock, so a given proportional shift in trade flows implies a larger global reallocation. The shock is also broader geographically and increasingly overlaps with advanced economies. (2/2) https://t.co/f4AbdsrkXX
ICYMI What is different about “China Shock 2.0”? It is not just an export surge: exports are rising much faster than imports reflecting more self-reliant strategy & pushing China’s trade surplus to unprecedented levels relative to the world economy. (1/2) https://t.co/f4AbdsrkXX
New #FEDSPaper: The Role of Inflation Perceptions in Consumer Inflation Expectations: Evidence from the Euro Area: https://t.co/sp3pSLGcNe #EconTwitter
ICYMI New #FEDSNote: Federal Reserve Discount Rate Press Releases in the 1960s and 1970s through the Lens of Monetary Policy Communications: https://t.co/9ZcmfisScQ #EconTwitter
The more worried middle-income households cut non-essentials and shift toward essentials. Low-income budgets don't have the slack to do more than trade down, and high-income households cut their spending but do so whether or not they are worried. (3/3) https://t.co/tigAbc3M2y
The authors analyze 125,000 US households' transactions to measure how 2025 tariffs affected spending. Tariffs passed through 15-20% to retail prices, raising affected-good prices 1-2%. But households cut spending by 3 to 4 times the price increase. (1/3) https://t.co/tigAbc3M2y
The burden falls hardest on low-income households facing the largest pass-through & welfare loss. Everyone cuts spending & trades down to cheaper varieties. But some pull back further & a linked sentiment survey traces that extra cut to tariff worry. (2/3) https://t.co/tigAbc3M2y
Alternative scenarios often proved more accurate than the baseline forecast. New #FEDSPaper catalogs 1,265 'what-if' exercises from 1968-2020, tracking how Fed staff prepared for demand shocks, supply disruptions, and financial crises. https://t.co/4cBAL1xzl4 #FedResearch
Scale matters: China is much larger than during the first China Shock, so a given proportional shift in trade flows implies a larger global reallocation. The shock is also broader geographically and increasingly overlaps with advanced economies. (2/2) https://t.co/f4AbdsrkXX
What is different about “China Shock 2.0”? It is not just an export surge: exports are rising much faster than imports, reflecting a more self-reliant strategy and pushing China’s trade surplus to unprecedented levels relative to the world economy. (1/2) https://t.co/f4AbdsrkXX
New #FEDSNote: Federal Reserve Discount Rate Press Releases in the 1960s and 1970s through the Lens of Monetary Policy Communications: https://t.co/9ZcmfisScQ
Call for papers: Global Research Forum on International Macroeconomics and Finance. Paper submissions due by May 31, 2026: https://t.co/XArmuVZHX8 #EconTwitter