Бывший разработчик СОРМ вывез из России документацию системы слежки. Изучив ее, @istories_media выяснили, какие данные ФСБ получает о пользователях «Телеграма» и WhatsApp и почему Signal остается для системы самым непрозрачным сервисом 🔽
https://t.co/tBiclPDvBJ
🚨 President suspected of espionage: major scandal erupts in Slovenia
Nataša Pirc Musar has come under suspicion over alleged ties to Russian intelligence, while the ruling party is already demanding that the president be denied access to classified intelligence briefings.
It all started with an ordinary car accident. It turned out that Pirc Musar was traveling with a Russian friend who is linked to a former deputy head of Slovenian intelligence who fled to Russia back in the 1990s.
Parliament’s security commission called an emergency meeting and demanded that the intelligence services provide a report on possible Russian influence within the president’s inner circle.
Attention has also turned to Pirc Musar’s own trips to Russia. Despite publicly criticizing Russia’s invasion, she regularly visited Moscow and St. Petersburg — including shortly before the start of the full-scale war.
CIA analysts turn raw secrets into something presidents can actually act on. The PDB isn’t just paperwork. It’s warning, context, and judgment before threats blow up into full-blown crises. #CIA#PDB#NationalSecurity
https://t.co/9thO5IcXti
Counterintelligence isn't just chasing spies. It's stopping foreign intelligence officers from recruiting Americans in the first place. China targets people with access, knowledge, and influence. FBI counterintelligence works to shut that door before secrets walk out. #FBI #Counterintelligence #NatSec
https://t.co/M0AdhxiHMN
This is why insider threats scare intelligence agencies so much. A theft is not just stolen property. It can expose operations, sources, shell companies, and years of work. One trusted person can do more damage than a foreign spy. #CIA#Counterintelligence#NationalSecurity
https://t.co/AX92Cvdm1t
A secret department inside one of Russia's most prestigious universities has been quietly producing hackers, saboteurs, and spies for the GRU. Now 2,000+ leaked documents reveal exactly where its graduates end up — and what they do there. https://t.co/EBC2DLb8HC
INSTEAD OF WATCHING AN HOUR OF NETFLIX TONIGHT.
This 1 hour Stanford lecture by Joel Peterson will teach you more about negotiation and getting what you want than most people learn in years.
Bookmark it and give it an hour, no matter what.
CIA recruitment inside Russia no longer needs a dark alley. Digital tradecraft lets disaffected insiders reach Langley safely. If Moscow’s own people start talking, U.S. intelligence gains a window into the Kremlin. #CIA#Russia#Intelligence
https://t.co/7Qr9rKOhbs
General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and current Ambassador to the UK:
Due to scientific and technological progress, it has become impossible, regardless of what others may claim, to carry out operational-level tasks. 1/12
Kaitsepolitseiamet panustas koostöös partnerteenistustega GRU küberüksuse APT 28 globaalsesse tõkestamisse Eestis olevate ruuterite haavatavuse paikamisega, sulges neile ligipääsu ning seeläbi tõkestas GRU küberluure tegevust.
https://t.co/CWPeI1rKrl
Hackers from the GRU-linked Fancy Bear group are infiltrating routers to steal passwords from government agencies
Attacks of this kind put victims at risk of credential theft, data manipulation, and broader system compromise, the NCSC warning states.
https://t.co/zsjD8VfjVP
.@DNIGabbard: "The most dangerous threat posed by Russia to the U.S. is the potential of an escalatory spiral in an ongoing conflict such as Ukraine…that led to direct hostilities including the potential deployment of nuclear weapons."
CRAZY FOOTAGE 🔴
Reports point to a rise in hit-and-run attacks on Basij checkpoints across Iran, adding pressure on regime forces. Some accounts also suggest growing absenteeism among militia ranks.
Gen. PETRAEUS: The future of warfare—not yet seen in the Gulf—is Ukraine producing 7 million drones per year. Last year they made 3.5 million, enabling 9–10 thousand drones per day.
These are still remotely piloted. But autonomous systems are coming, and that means drone swarms. They're already being introduced at mission end. Defending against swarms is really hard—you'll need high-powered microwaves or similar.
We're not where we should be, despite what we should have learned from Ukraine for a very long time. They're making software changes every week or two, hardware changes every 2–3 weeks.
In Russia, they're afraid of their own "state messenger". Government officials are buying separate phones for "MAX", the new required North Korean style spy app.
Russian officials, deputies, and top managers of state companies don't trust the "national" messenger Max and are trying to minimize the risks of using it.
As reported by The Moscow Times, citing sources, they're buying separate SIM cards and smartphones - so-called "Maxphones" - to install Max.
The reason is simple: in government circles, they believe that installing Max is equivalent to giving access to data to special services. Even those who register in the messenger with their own number use separate devices and don't sync contacts.
Despite the pressure, officials are in no hurry to give up on Telegram. In informal communication, they continue to use it and hope that the blocking can be circumvented.
Recall that recently in Russia, for the first time, a person was fined for a photo in the Max messenger.
On our latest podcast Trevor Barnes reveals how a Russia-linked spy network surveilled dissidents across Europe, guided remotely by Jan Marsalek, and uncovered through a US intelligence tip-off.
Links in comments below 👇 👇 👇
That’s how slick cyber espionage has gotten. They’re not just hacking systems, they’re impersonating trusted agencies to trick people directly. One convincing email can bypass firewalls and turn a human into the entry point. #CyberSecurity#Espionage#Phishing
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