@DnaBiancorosso Bucarelli
Gara 1: 26 min, 40 di val.
Gara 2: 34 min, 29 di val.
Tambone invece condizionato dai falli in gara 1. Siamo superiori, ma in gara 1 ho visto facce spente. Fondamentale l'esperienza di Buccarelli per ribaltare la serie
Possibile un pedaggio per transitare nello Stretto di Hormuz. La nuova realtà si affaccia mentre l'Europa resta prigioniera dei suoi stessi vincoli che la condannano a recessione e irrilevanza.
Grazie a @gandolag per la bella chiacchierata di oggi.
https://t.co/OnDsbh8wJj
This is part one of a paper in which I argue that the EU has historically compensated for its lack of democratic legitimacy by cycling through a series of (self-)legitimising narratives — from postwar peace to market integration to “European values” — and reflect on how these have systematically failed to resolve the core tension between technocratic governance and democratic self-rule, and indeed have actually exacerbated this tension, leading both to an intensification of the EU’s imperial project but also to a growing backlash against it.
Abstract
The European Union has never possessed a democratic foundation in any meaningful sense of the term. In the absence of a European demos, a shared public sphere or any founding act of collective self-determination, the EU has historically compensated for its structural legitimacy deficit through the continuous production and rotation of legitimising narratives. This paper traces that evolution from the postwar peace project through market integration, monetary union and rights-based constitutionalism, to the emergence of an explicitly moral and geopolitical register centred on “European values”. It argues that this succession of narratives has never represented a maturing political identity but rather a series of compensatory symbolic adjustments — each one emerging from the exhaustion of the previous, none capable of resolving the underlying contradiction between technocratic supranational governance and democratic self-rule.
The paper further argues that the EU’s values discourse, far from reflecting a genuine normative commitment, has always functioned as an instrument of depoliticisation and elite power: a means of sacralising the integration project, narrowing the space of legitimate democratic contestation and externalising blame for domestically unpopular policies onto supranational necessity. Rather than opening politics, EU value narratives have consistently closed it, reframing fundamental political choices as moral imperatives, technical requirements or existential obligations beyond legitimate challenge.
This structural hypocrisy has now been definitively exposed. The EU’s loudly proclaimed commitments to the so-called rules-based international order, human rights, democratic sovereignty and the prohibition of aggression have been revealed as entirely conditional on geopolitical alignment. The contrast between the EU’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — framed as a civilisational struggle requiring unlimited solidarity and sacrifice — and its silence or active complicity in the face of the ongoing genocide in Gaza, the strangling of Venezuelan sovereignty and US-Israeli military aggression against Iran lays bare what the values discourse has always concealed: that “European values” are not universal principles but instruments of Western geopolitical interest, deployed selectively and abandoned without embarrassment the moment they become inconvenient.
What emerges from this analysis is a portrait of the EU not as a community of shared values, but as a technocratic, anti-democratic juggernaut whose moral language has always served a dual imperial purpose: justifying the subordination of member-state democracies to supranational elite governance — a form of internal or “auto-colonisation” — while simultaneously providing ideological cover for the projection of Western power abroad. The paper concludes that the EU’s legitimacy crisis cannot be resolved through better narratives or more coherent values communication, but rather lies in the very model of supranational integration itself.
Read the article here: https://t.co/IHRbMbtWKj
Part two of a paper in which I argue that the EU has historically compensated for its lack of democratic legitimacy by cycling through a series of (self-)legitimising narratives — from postwar peace to market integration to “European values” — and reflect on how these have systematically failed to resolve the core tension between technocratic governance and democratic self-rule, and indeed have actually exacerbated this tension, leading both to an intensification of the EU’s imperial project but also to a growing backlash against it.
In part one, I examined the theoretical and historical foundations of the EU’s legitimacy problem and showed how the peace narrative — the EU’s original legitimising frame — was never founded on genuine popular mobilisation but on elite-managed integration deliberately insulated from democratic politics, and how it has now been definitively exhausted by the war in Ukraine.
In this second part, I trace the EU’s successive attempts to legitimise deepening integration through economic and normative narratives — from the shift to market-based justifications in the 1980s, through the sacralisation of the euro and the rise of “Social Europe” as a rhetorical fig leaf, to the emergence of a “Europe of values” in the early 2000s.
Read the article here: https://t.co/2S2MG5eIYa
cioè deve tenere conto delle necessarie salvaguardie, che hanno un costo.
Ne discende che per avere un sistema energetico sicuro occorre che i redditi crescano.
Sposare il paradigma "bassi costi per bassi prezzi per bassi salari" significa restare esposti a qualunque shock ⬇️
Dopo avere infragilito l’intero sistema energetico europeo, con la irragionevole e fallita combinazione rinnovabili/elettrificazione, ora l’unione scarica il costo delle sue scelte disastrose sui cittadini.
E qui si capisce bene quello che dicevo a Radio Roma Sound: è sempre la vecchia storia di Ricardo. La sinistra vuole satollarvi di paccottiglia cinese esattamente per gli stessi motivi per cui gli industriali inglesi volevano il free trade in agricoltura: pagarvi du’ spicci.
(dunque un confronto si può fare anche qui, senza bisogno di salire su un ring...)
Secondo @micheleboldrin, dunque, il crollo degli investimenti è da addebitarsi alla destinazione della spesa ad altra voce (le pensioni).
Il fatto che tale crollo sia avvenuto in concomitanza con l'intervento che in modo più drastico ha contenuto la dinamica della crescita (in termini assoluti) della spesa pensionistica (la legge Fornero, remember?), smonta immediatamente questa narrazione (che è propagandistica, questa sì).
Cari saluti.