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Chaos is order yet undeciphered.

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When Opposites Look Familiar - Reza Pahlavi's Glorious Restoration and the Echoes of Khomeini's Revolution

1. The Unlikely Revolutionary

Rapidly escalating protests have shaken Iran to its core - and also proven many widely held assumptions about the country to be incorrect (or at least out of date).

The current state of the country - with a full internet blackout, phone lines outside the country cut, most flights cancelled, and fierce nightly battles in cities in every one of Iran's 31 provinces - was unthinkable two weeks ago.

12 days ago I had significant uncertainty about how protests by Tehran merchants would roll out, writing that, "if anyone tells you they know what way this will lead then you should immediately discount them as being unreliable" (I'll put links to my relevant previous posts at the end).

8 days ago I wrote, "It's unclear if the snowball is getting bigger or not. But it's still fairly small. It might get bigger. I'm not saying it's impossible. But we've been down this path before - and far further - and the ultimate result was not (and not close to) the overthrow of the government, a civil war, or anything like that".

And yet today I say with increasing confidence that the current wave of protests are the greatest challenge the Islamic Republic has faced to its power since the early 1980s, when it was simultaneously fighting armed Marxist militias at home while facing an Iraqi invasion on its western border.

Among Iranians (and Iran related political analysts) there is constant discussion about where these protests will go.

In every round of protests (in 2009, 2017, 2019, 2022, and more) some people of confidently claimed the fall of the Islamic Republic was imminent & yet were proven wrong. Will these go in the same direction?

Or is it possible Iran will fall into anarchy? Some fear scenarios in which secessionist groups and greedy neighbors tear Iran into pieces so it is no longer a unitary state.

More than anything one hears fears about a prolonged civil war with foreign intervention like what happened in Syria and Libya.

While these scenarios may be possible, there is another model that many are not taking account.

Unlike Syria and Libya, it is one that has already played out once in Iran before - within living memory.

In an interesting historical irony, this model, which was responsible for the overthrow of his father, is clearly the one that Reza Pahlavi, the exiled son of Iran's last Shah, is deriving inspiration from.

It is one that has a chance of success which is being, in my view, dramatically underrated (though it's by no means guaranteed). Particularly given it worked once.

To make it clear I am in no way saying Pahlavi is similar to Khomeini in personality or ideology. They are dramatically different figures. But there are clear similarities in their strategies.

Conventional wisdom about Iran for decades has been that monarchists & Reza Pahlavi do not have a serious base inside the country and that the majority of their supporters are just out of touch exiles in Los Angeles who are bitter at having lost their privilege in 1979.

And yet with his calls to action starting last Thursday, Pahlavi has completely blown this theory out of the water.

Protesters have turned out in the thousands cities big and small in every corner of Iran chanting his name, holding his pictures, and defiantly waving the pre-revolutionary lion and sun flag.

He is without any doubt the face of the movement and its leader. There was room to debate this before the calls to action, but it would be quite the stretch (whether one likes him or not) to deny that at this point.

The protests before Thursday had impressive turnouts, particularly in cities in less developed areas in provinces in the west. But they were largely controllable. Since his daily calls to action and specific times at night, it is like the entire country has exploded.

The internet crackdown doesn't just mean that Iranians cannot talk to the outside world. It also significantly impedes daily life in Iran & brings down a big part of the country's intranet (like banking applications) - to a level far more than the protests were doing. The situation has to be really out of control to trigger it.

Reza Pahlavi is a soft spoken person. His words come out awkward at times and his demeanor can be at times goofy. He does not resemble what one would expect a defiant revolutionary to be like. This is part of why so many have been and continue to be dismissive towards him.

And yet, in action, he has shown in the most powerful way possible that he has a massive base. These are not just likes online or faceless comments that can be dismissed as manipulated bots. They are people who are risking their lives and freedom to come out against all odds for this man.

Again, the parallels to 1979, where the Shah (and much of the world) dismissed a 78 year old cleric who hadn't been in the country for 15 years until it was too late, are unmistakable. There then, people didn't take his base (the disfranchised religious) seriously as a group that could not only overthrow the US backed monarchy, but also hold power.

How is it that Reza Pahlavi was able to defy all expectations and naysayers and get to this point?

2. How We Got Here

The standard all recent protests have been compared against are the 2009 Green Movement.

In terms of sheer numbers in the capital, the 2009 protests were (until this week) unrivaled & they were also the only wave of protests in which there was any level of elite defection seen.

They were also, until now, the only wave of protests with a clear leader.

And yet, these protests were not against the entirety of the Islamic Republic, but rather were a reformist rebellion to go back to what they saw as the original ideals of the revolution.

Yes it is true that many of the people on the streets didn't care for the entirety of the system and Mousavi was just an excuse for them. And yet (not unlike certain groups today), they largely accepted his leadership at the moment.

The slogans chanted and main demands were against the Supreme Leader (who Mousavi had also had disputes with while he was prime minister and Khamenei president), not the entire system.

In one incident, State TV showed a picture of Ayatollah Khomeini that had been ripped into pieces, making the case the protesters were anti revolutionaries. The protesters disputed this, responding the next day chanting "The one who stole the votes is the one who tore the picture".

One difference between 2009 & 1979/2026 was that Mousavi was inside Iran and eventually was subject to house arrest. However both Khomeini and Pahlavi had significantly more freedom in exile, allowing them to take very radical action.

Years later in 2017, another wave of protests were much more radical.

Protesters openly rejected both branches of the Islamic Republic's political spectrum, chanting "Reformist, Principlist, the Matter is Over". They also frequently chanted "Reza Shah, Bless Your Soul", praising the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty (a chant that later became a regular one heard in crowds in Iranian football matches).

This was the first time there were clear, undeniable chants in praise of the overthrown Pahlavi monarchy. This was something many analysts found curious, but largely dismissed the importance of. After all, respecting the grandfather or father did not necessarily mean an oath of loyalty to the son.

The 2017 and 2019 waves of protesters were fierce, but largely outside the capital and ended up getting severely repressed and then fading away.

Signs of appreciation and respect for the overthrown monarchy continued to grow at this time within society itself. One even saw guests on State TV occasionally speaking well of the era.

Many analysts attributed changing attitudes to overseas television stations like Manoto, but it is unclear whether Manoto (filled with former state tv employees who had recently left Iran) was the source of this sentiment or that the station was simply reflecting growing trends in society.

The Women Life Freedom protests in 2022 were the biggest wave in terms of geographic spread and were prevalent both in Tehran and the provinces. Yet the number of protesters did not reach the crowds seen in 2009 and the violence was not as extreme as what was seen in 2019.

These were also filled with radical, even sometimes profane slogans from the start, calling for a total overthrow of the system. And yet they were, like 2017 and 2019, leaderless. The state was eventually to exert its control and crush them (though they had a deep impact on society beyond politics, which I've talked about in other posts).

Months after the movement had lost most its momentum, a coalition of opposition groups including Reza Pahlavi tried to create a unified structure against the Islamic Republic. The coalition was largely out of touch with the country (and too late). It also fell apart quickly due to infighting.

Given the growing number of protest waves and decrease in time between them (there were other smaller ones I haven't mentioned here), many expected it to be only a matter of time before the next wave came.

And yet for almost 3 years, things were calm.

One reason was that many people got demoralized after the failure of Women Life Freedom to overthrow the government.

But additionally, there were hopes among some groups that the state, while still disliked, had chosen a more pragmatic path.

After Women Life Freedom, the state grudgingly withdrew from strong enforcement of the mandatory hijab (there were attempts but it was incomparable to the situation before).

After a near decade of conflict, there was a resumption of relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This raised hopes among some that there could finally be a move towards a more pragmatic foreign policy.

Then in 2024, President Raisi passed away in a helicopter accident. In the snap elections that followed, a reformist, Pezeshkian won. This election had one of the lowest turnouts in recent memory and was by no means a mandate or show of confidence in the system.

But Pezeshkian argued for a more restrained foreign policy and that Iran had no choice but to make concessions with Trump (who was not yet elected but expected to return).

Under Pezeshkian, the government continued a moderate retreat. Enforcement of the hijab decreased further. Many more concerts and mixed events were allowed. Some university students and professors that had been kicked out for political reasons were allowed to return.

There was a small, but noticeable change seen socially (but limited in nature and not living up to the few promises Pezeshkian had made). Dissatisfaction was still at record highs, but it seemed enough to keep away large scale protests for a time.

But there were also looming problems in the background that eventually became massive crises.

Israel assassinated the head of Hamas's political bureau in Tehran on the day of Pezeshkian's inauguration. It eventually expanded its war in Gaza to a campaign against Hezbollah, leading to new direct clashes with Iran. The prospect of war grew closer.

In the winter there were also natural gas shortages and power outages to both industry and residential areas at an unprecedented scale. And Iran's currency began a rapid loss of value, accompanied by inflation.

In the spring of 2025, serious negotiations began between Iran and the US over the nuclear program and sanctions relief. There seemed to be a path towards an escape from this unending conflict and renewal of the Iranian economy.

For the first time, the toman regained a great deal of value.

And yet by the summer, the talks reached a deadlock over the issue of uranium enrichment on Iranian soil, and Iran's accumulation of highly enriched uranium.

Then in June, there was the outbreak of all out war for 12 days.

Unlike many analysts arguing that current protests show there was not rally around the flag effect after the war (ignoring that the effect is by definition something temporary), I argued there was (see the link at the end for my post).

And yet, the government did not use this to do a major pivot. The war did not resolve the dispute between the US and Iran. Iran's hand appeared to be far weaker (the US achieved the goal of 0 enrichment and sanctions weren't taken off). And since then, there has not been the serious prospect of a deal to resolve the conflict (which to many Iranians means it will be impossible to fix the economy).

At the same time, the war had barely ended when the summer electricity shortages started. These were far more extreme than previous years, leading to significant hardship for the population and damage to the economy.

Meanwhile the prospect of many cities running out of water due to the ongoing extreme drought became very real and the government had to introduce water rationing in Tehran.

Day after day, the government struggled to deal with crisis after crisis. Power. Water. Gas. Subsidies. Inflation. Air pollution. And the growing prospect of another war.

People lost any confidence the government is capable of dealing with the problems at hand or to prevent the situation from declining further (see my post on the loss of confidence, linked at the bottom). This was like a ticking time bomb that just needed a spark to explode. And the merchant protests and strike provided that spark.

More importantly, Reza Pahlavi has provided leadership to guide the shape the resulting explosion and try to channel it towards a full overthrow of the Islamic Republic.

3. Reza Pahlavi's Role & the Road Ahead

On social media, even before this, there has been growing criticism (though not necessarily representative of everyone) of almost every other major opposition figure not directly in his camp. This includes several of the figures that were considered major parts of the 2022 protests.

Rapper Toomaj Salehi is derided by many as being MEK affiliated, while figures like Narges Mohammadi, Shervin Hajipour, Masih Alinejad, and Hamed Esmaeilion are dismissed as reformist. I'm not saying I agree with any of these labels, nor that they are made directly by Pahlavi, but that they are widespread and exist.

Meanwhile between 2022 and 2026, Reza Pahlavi's team was busy organizing themselves and making up for some previous deficiencies.

Pahlavi says that he does not want to take the throne, but rather be the leader of the transition period to a secular democracy (though he does seem to leave the option open of becoming a constitutional monarch if chosen).

His team has come out with a detailed plan called the Phoenix Project and Iran Prosperity Project laying out their goals for the first 100 days and beyond in different aspects of governance.

They also allege that they have organized networks inside the country and even are in touch with certain figures in the security services who want to defect (there is no proof of this yet).

It is clear that he also had a gameplan ready for when protests broke out & has been executing it effectively.

The plan is an accelerated version of the events of 1978-1979.

Every day, he releases at least one video (both on social media and on satellite TV channels that reach inside the country) calling for protests at a particular time. These are meant to be escalating pressure day after day and to move forward from taking streets to major squares, to city centers.

Meanwhile he is calling for massive strikes in key sectors of the economy, like oil and transportations workers.

He hopes that the combined pressure of massive street protests and locking up the economy will then lead to enough members of the security forces to heed his call to defect to bring about a full fall of the system.

Pahlavi's stance towards foreign intervention appears to have evolved over time. In previous years he fully opposed any sort of military intervention in the country.

He is still opposed any foreign ground troops being sent into Iran, but, to the best of my understanding, is ok with aerial attacks on the government to weaken their ability to push back on protesters.

Whether Trump or Netenyahu use military force to try to help the protesters remains an open question.

By threatening the use of force & demonstrating his willingness to take bold action (through a raid on Venezuela), Trump has clearly established a credible threat.

His mere threat has been enough to make the government very nervous and second guess any action because they fear an impending attack. This has some parallels (though with clear differences) of how some close to the Shah complained that Carter prevented him from cracking down on the protesters with full force.

Trump has very to lose from repeating his threat every few days. I expect him to continue to do so. He is consistently unpredictable, making it difficult to know if he will actually strike or not (which makes his threats effective).

It is very difficult to predict what will happen if he actually does strike. If the Islamic Republic feels an existential threat, it could lash out in extreme ways that could impact global energy markets and regional stability. While protesters may get emboldened, this could also open the door for even more extreme repression. Iran's neighbors fear this situation and desperately want to avoid it.

4. The Government Response

None of this means that the government is doomed and guaranteed to fall. The majority of rebellions fail. Overthrowing an entrenched regime that has strong willpower to fight and prevents defection is extremely difficult, even with foreign intervention (short of a full invasion like Iraq 2003).

Extreme suppression of the internet and communications is powerful and has worked in the past.

If this is not enough to be successful, I predict the government will increasingly turn to stoking fear of more bloodshed, destruction, and chaos.

These are all real fears of many Iranians. They remember the terror and destruction of revolution.

I talked with some older Iranians earlier this week who told me how they remembered scenes of dead bodies on the streets in their youth (during the 1979 revolution) and then saw films on social media of fights today and were filled with horror.

Another person remarked how the destruction done to the city was more than what was seen in the 12 Day War.

It's not unthinkable that the government will even allow a level of increased destruction and chaos to happen just to remind people of what could happen if they go away. The message is that even if people despise them, they won't like what comes after or the price it takes to get there.

On State TV one now sees the message constantly sent in different ways warning parents not to let their children join protests and risk getting killed. Some may dismiss these messages as desperate, but I've encountered multiple stories of (otherwise very antiregime) parents locking up their teenage or adult children at night or otherwise preventing them from going out during protest times due to fear for their safety.

Another fear of some pro-monarchy Iranians is that if the situation gets more out of hand, someone from the existing establishment will try to co-opt the protests either through a coup or deal with foreign powers and take power themselves.

Some names brought forth are the likes of Hassan Rouhani or Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf (though I have some doubts either would fully go forward with this). Others talk about jailed radical reformist Mostafa Tajzadeh.

But it is also important to remember this method was also tried in the dying moments of the monarchy by the Shah when he faced his rebellion - when he put former dissident Shapour Bakhtiar as prime minister in January 1979.

Bakhtiar did implement radical reforms. However it was far too late at that point. The Shah left Iran less than a month later. Bakhtiar's government collapsed after 36 days.

5. Conclusion

One major question is whether the consolidation currently seen around Reza Pahlavi is a phenomena seen out of total loyalty to himself, or is a tactical move by all coalitions to unite their efforts for now in order to try to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

I have heard from numerous people that they do not necessarily agree with Pahlavi or the people around him, but are willing to get in line for now because he has created a movement - and save their arguments over the future to the transition period.

However I think it should emphasized the Pahlavi does have a genuine base and that it has been growing for years. Furthermore if he somehow does manage to succeed (still challenging but no longer seen as impossible), it will certainly boost his credentials and increase his support.

This all may be getting ahead of ourselves. The government is under clear strain but has not fallen. There has not been elite defections yet. The movement has not yet completed its second week.

But even if they do crush this round, the underlying failures of the system remain. Short of an extreme change of direction, the status quo is unsustainable.

I recently listened to Khamenei's famous Friday sermon after the first week of protests following the 2009 elections. I then compared it to his most recent speech in Qom talking about these protests.

It was remarkable how much similarity there was between these two, over 15 years apart. He was just as defiant, blaming meddling and hypocritical foreign powers, and expressing confidence the Islamic Republic will overcome all challenges.

Keep in mind the speech in 2009 was before the intervention in Syria, before crushing American secondary sanctions, and before Trump. But just looking at the content one would be forgiven for thinking they were in response to the same event.

And yet one also cannot help but notice how much more frail his voice sounds today and how much older he's gotten.

At the ending of his speech two days ago he talks about how different arrogant leaders from the Pharoah and Nimrod to "Reza Khan and Mohamad Reza" were overthrown in the height of their pride and then compares this to Iran's enemies today.

One wonders if he also ever considered that the same principle could apply to his own rule.

Additional Reading:

My initial post on the protests: https://t.co/wq8YWPtpme

My post on January 2nd on the protests:
https://t.co/ubQwxKZPqr

My post on the rally around the flag effect after the war:
https://t.co/YOdhAT8m43

My post on the total loss of confidence in the government:
https://t.co/Rf2uNhbnlM

Observations on Visiting Iran last Fall:
https://t.co/Ix7ft1aJzU

Observations on Visiting Iran one year ago:
https://t.co/JvbW5n0tEz

[Chef @Floppy_Divac]

Time is a great teacher, but unfortunately
it kills all its students.

-Hector Berlioz

[Chef @Floppy_Divac]

Chaos is order yet undeciphered.

-Jose Saramago

[Chef @Floppy_Divac]

When small men begin to cast big shadows, it means the sun is about to set.

-Lin Yutang

[Chef @Floppy_Divac]

@paxtrader777 Forgot the baptized Al's!

[Chef @Floppy_Divac]

@unclebengi Still a bunch to track. You hardcore 😂

[Chef @Floppy_Divac]

@BullyEsq kinda gay so like a GOP Pete Buttigieg

[Chef @Floppy_Divac]

@DoctorNostrand @EricBalchunas The pamp is the point

[Chef @Floppy_Divac]

@RudyHavenstein Looks like Harvey W to me

[Chef @Floppy_Divac]

@Chris_arnade :) Noted, and many thanks!

[Chef @Floppy_Divac]

@Chris_arnade Really liked this one, Chris, but I have an unrelated question:

Is there anything you take/do to help your knees maintain all the miles you put on them? Mine are getting creaky!

[Chef @Floppy_Divac]

@paxtrader777 Praise God?

In 2000, Prevost allowed Father James Ray, an Augustinian priest, to reside at St. John Stone Friary in Chicago. Ray had been suspended from public ministry since 1991 due to credible accusations of sexual abuse of minors.

[Chef @Floppy_Divac]

@gxpxpxp @dale_dsll @spectatorindex and you can't refinance massive debts with high and climbing interest rates.

[Chef @Floppy_Divac]

@grok @capturedbycuz @LynAldenContact It's fiscal deficits that won't stop, not rising treasury yields.