The great books, side by side. From Homer to Wittgenstein: each work in its original language beside a new translation in modern English—and many to listen to.
“On this point I will insert a problem from that ingenious and studious promoter of real knowledge, the learned and worthy Mr. Molyneux, which he was kind enough to send me in a letter some months ago. It is this. Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, who has been taught by touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal and of nearly the same size, so that he can tell which is the cube and which the sphere when he feels one and the other.”
— John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
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“The difference of self-consciousness from the essence is therefore perfectly transparent. For this reason the differences within the essence itself are not contingent determinatenesses. Inequality could come only from self-consciousness; but because of the unity of the essence and self-consciousness, these differences are the masses into which this unity is articulated, permeated by its life. They are spirits clear to themselves and undivided, stainless heavenly shapes that preserve in their differences the undefiled innocence and unanimity of their essence.—Self-consciousness is likewise a simple, clear relation to them. They are, and nothing more: that is what makes up its consciousness of its relation to them. This is how Sophocles’ Antigone regards them, as the unwritten and unerring law of the gods: “not now and yesterday, but always it lives, and no one knows from where it appeared.” They are.”
— G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit
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“Its way of life is like the best that we enjoy for a short time. For it is always in this state (which for us is impossible), since its activity is also pleasure. (That is why being awake, perceiving, and thinking are most pleasant, and hopes and memories are pleasant because of these.) Thinking in its own right is of what is best in its own right, and the highest thinking is of what is highest. Intellect thinks itself by sharing in the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought by touching and thinking its objects, so that intellect and the object of thought are the same. For what is receptive of the object of thought, that is, of the substance, is intellect, and it is active when it possesses its object. So it is the possessing rather than the receptivity that seems to be the divine element in intellect, and contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, the god is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this is wonderful; and if in a better state, more wonderful still. And that is the state it is in.”
— Aristotle, Metaphysics
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“People look for retreats for themselves—houses in the country, beaches, mountains—and you too are in the habit of longing for such things more than anything. But this is all very naive, since you can retreat into yourself at any hour you like. Nowhere can a person retreat to that is quieter or more free from trouble than his own soul—especially someone who has things within him that he need only look into to be at once completely at ease; and by ease I mean nothing other than good order. So give yourself this retreat constantly, and renew yourself. Let the things you meet there be brief and elementary, enough, as soon as you encounter them, to wash away all your distress and send you back without resentment toward what you’re returning to. What is it, after all, that you’ll resent? People’s wickedness?”
— Marcus Aurelius, Meditations
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“Now, as there is an infinity of possible universes in God’s ideas, and only one of them can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for God’s choice, which determines him to one rather than another.”
— Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Monadology
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“Then I searched through what I knew and found myself devoid of any knowledge answering to this description, except for sense data and necessary truths. So I said: Now that despair has set in, the only hope of shedding light on difficult questions lies in what is clear, that is, in sense data and necessary truths. I must first make these secure. Then I will be certain whether my trust in what the senses give and my safety from error in necessary truths are of the same kind as the safety I used to feel in what I had taken on authority, and the safety most people feel in the conclusions of reflection. Or is this a verified safety, with no treachery or pitfall in it? So I set to work with great earnestness, examining sense data and necessary truths to see whether I could make myself doubt them. After a long effort at doubting, I reached the point where my soul would no longer grant safety even to sense data. It began to open itself to doubt about them, saying: Where does trust in sense data come from? The strongest of the senses is sight. It looks at a shadow and sees it standing still, not moving, and judges that there is no motion. Then, by experience and observation, an hour later, it learns that the shadow has moved. It has not moved all at once, suddenly, but gradually, particle by particle, so that it was never at rest.”
— al-Ghazali, Deliverance from Error
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“Above all, rather, the “summum bonum” [highest good] of this “ethic”—the acquisition of money, and ever more money, combined with the strictest avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment—is so completely stripped of all eudaemonistic, let alone hedonistic, considerations, and conceived so purely as an end in itself, that, measured against the “happiness” or “utility” of the individual, it appears at any rate as something wholly transcendent and utterly irrational. Man is oriented toward acquisition as the purpose of his life; acquisition is no longer oriented toward man as the means of satisfying his material needs. This reversal of what we would call the “natural” state of affairs, utterly senseless to unprejudiced feeling, is quite evidently as unconditionally a leitmotif of capitalism as it is alien to anyone who has not been touched by its breath.”
— Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
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“Again, the drunk believes that it is by a free decision of the mind that he says things which, when sober, he would later wish he had kept to himself. So too the delirious, the chatterbox, the child, and a great many people of this sort believe that they speak by a free decision of the mind, when in fact they cannot restrain the impulse to speak that they have. So experience itself teaches no less clearly than reason that people believe themselves free for this reason alone: that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. It teaches, moreover, that the decisions of the mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which therefore vary as the disposition of the body varies. For each person governs everything by his own affect; those who are, besides, torn by contrary affects do not know what they want; and those who have none are driven this way and that by the slightest impulse.”
— Baruch Spinoza, Ethics
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“Since this is a possible account, and if it were not so, things would come from night, and from “all things together,” and from what is not, these difficulties may be considered solved. There is something that is always moved with an unceasing motion, and this motion is circular (this is clear not only from argument but from the facts); so the first heaven would be eternal. There is, then, also something that moves it. And since what is moved and moves is intermediate, there is something that moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality. The object of desire and the object of thought move in this way: they move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For the object of appetite is what appears fine, while the primary object of wish is what is fine. And we desire something because it seems fine, rather than its seeming fine because we desire it; for thinking is the starting point.”
— Aristotle, Metaphysics
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“That is why the Prophet (peace be upon him) spoke as he did to the man he had told to give his brother honey for diarrhea. When the diarrhea grew worse after he gave it, the man complained to him, and he said: “God has spoken the truth; it is your brother’s belly that has lied.” Indeed, we say that someone who forbids the study of the books of philosophy to one fit for them, because some of the lowest sort of people are thought to have gone astray through studying them, is like someone who forbids a thirsty man to drink cool, fresh water, so that he dies of thirst, because some people have drowned in it and died. For death by drowning in water is accidental, whereas death from thirst is essential and necessary. What has happened to this art happens to all the other arts. How many jurists there have been for whom jurisprudence was the cause of little piety and of immersion in worldly affairs! Indeed, we find that most jurists are like this, though their art in itself calls for nothing but practical virtue.”
— Averroes, The Decisive Treatise
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“If we call the receptivity of our mind—its capacity to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some way—sensibility, then the faculty of producing representations itself, or the spontaneity of cognition, is the understanding. It lies in our nature that intuition can never be other than sensible: that is, it contains only the way in which we are affected by objects. The faculty of thinking the object of sensible intuition, by contrast, is the understanding. Neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. It is therefore just as necessary to make one’s concepts sensible (that is…”
— Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason
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““Well, these beds turn out to be of three kinds. One is the one in nature, which I think we’d say a god made. Or who else?”
“No one else, I think.”
“And one the carpenter makes.”
“Yes,” he said.
“And one the painter makes, right?”
“Let’s say so.”
“So painter, bed-maker, god: these three are in charge of three kinds of bed.”
“Yes, three.””
— Plato, Republic
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“In my view—a view that must justify itself through the presentation of the system itself—everything turns on grasping and expressing the true not only as substance but equally as subject. At the same time, it should be noted that substantiality includes within itself the universal, or the immediacy of knowing, just as much as that immediacy which is being, or immediacy for knowing.”
— G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit
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“Nor does this reasoning prove only that morality does not consist in any relations that are the objects of science. If examined, it will prove with equal certainty that morality does not consist in any matter of fact that can be discovered by the understanding. This is the second part of our argument, and if it can be made evident, we may conclude that morality is not an object of reason. But can there be any difficulty in proving that vice and virtue are not matters of fact whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action agreed to be vicious—willful murder, for instance.”
— David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature
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“To the laws of nature set out in Chapter 15, I would have this one added: “That every man is bound by nature, as far as he is able, to protect in war the authority by which he is himself protected in time of peace.” For he who claims a right of nature to preserve his own body cannot claim a right of nature to destroy the one by whose strength he is preserved; that is a plain contradiction of himself. And though this law may be derived by consequence from some of those already mentioned there, the times require that it be driven home and remembered.”
— Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
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“Again, with the things that come to us by nature, we first acquire the capacities and later exercise the activities (this is clear with the senses: we did not get our senses from seeing often or hearing often; on the contrary, we had them and then used them, rather than getting them by using them). But the excellences we acquire by first exercising them, as happens with the crafts too. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them: people become builders by building, for instance, and lyre players by playing the lyre. In the same way we become just by doing just things, moderate by doing moderate things, and brave by doing brave things. What happens in cities bears this out too: lawgivers make the citizens good by habituating them. This is what every lawgiver wants, and those who do not do it well miss the mark; this is what distinguishes a good constitution from a bad one.”
— Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
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“Since this Law is true and summons to the study that leads to knowledge of the truth, we Muslims know for certain that demonstrative study does not lead to anything contrary to what the Law has brought. For truth does not contradict truth; it agrees with it and bears witness to it. This being so, if demonstrative study leads to some kind of knowledge about some existing thing, then either the Law is silent about that thing or it mentions it. If the Law is silent about it, there is no conflict; it is like the rulings about which the Law is silent, which the jurist infers by legal reasoning by analogy. If the Law does speak of it, then the apparent sense of what it says either agrees with what demonstration has led to or disagrees with it. If it agrees, there is nothing to be said. If it disagrees, its interpretation (taʾwīl) must be sought.”
— Averroes, The Decisive Treatise
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“In everything that is to provoke lively, convulsive laughter there must be something absurd (in which, therefore, the understanding in itself can find no satisfaction). Laughter is an affect arising from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation into nothing. This very transformation is certainly not gratifying to the understanding, yet indirectly it gives very lively gratification for a moment. So the cause must lie in the influence of the representation on the body and the body’s reciprocal effect on the mind. It does not lie in the representation being objectively an object of gratification (for how can a disappointed expectation gratify?), but solely in the fact that, as a mere play of representations, it produces an equilibrium of the vital forces in the body.”
— Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment
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“This, then, is one kind of arrangement. Next let’s discuss the teaching and transmission of these things themselves: how, to whom and when each of them should be done. A shipwright, when he lays the foundations of his craft, first lays down the keels and sketches the shapes of the vessels; and I seem to myself to be doing the same thing, trying to distinguish the shapes of lives according to the characters of souls—truly laying down their keels, and rightly considering by what means and in what ways of life we’ll best be carried through this voyage of life. Human affairs aren’t worth great seriousness; yet we do have to be serious about them—and that’s our misfortune. But since we’re where we are, perhaps it would suit us if we could go about it in some fitting way.”
— Plato, Laws
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