@hahauenstein a) Gibt halt nicht das Gesprochene wieder, b) bezogen auf das tatsächlich Gesagte existiert sehr wohl eine linke Kritik der EU als technokratisches Konstrukt, das Demokratiedefizite aufweist und multinationalen Konzernen nähersteht als den 'normalen' EU-Bürgern und Arbeitnehmern
@StephanKaufman1 Dass dadurch hingegen kein cliff-Effekt einsetzt oder Liquiditätskrise getriggert wird wie ggf. bei vergleichbaren Downgrades in developing countries, ist klar.
@StephanKaufman1 Bzgl. internationaler Attraktivität der Währung und CHNs Intention, die Internationalisierung des RMB voranzutreiben, könnten Ratings perspektivisch aber schon einen Unterschied machen (v.a. vis-à-vis anderer, Non-USD Währungsalternativen wie dem Euro), oder?
@stffhaag Absolutely, there are a couple of policies that could deter investors and incite sell offs - and anticipation of such ‘market discipline’ may in fact have already led to a weakening of the political rhetoric.. will be interesting to see what will follow
https://t.co/AlTa09iZAG
@stffhaag I'm not sure whether this screenshot proves the argument though as (increased) uncertainty on behalf of investors would generally translate into falling bond prices on sec. markets (higher perceived risk of default), possibly this is rather about the electoral procedure as such
@michael_galant Are they though? Last IMFC communiqué @ Annual Meetings explicitly mentioned it would consider reviewing the surcharges policy. Brazil has put the issue on its G20 agenda as well so I'd argue the probability of concrete changes will likely increase in the near to medium term...
Adam Tooze👇correctly argues there are some huge imbalances in IMF country & global econ weights, esp 🇨🇳🇮🇳, compromising the IMF's legitimacy.
He's correct US couldn't likely now stomach higher 🇨🇳 share given 🇺🇸🇨🇳 stress.
But perhaps one impression merits clarifying.
@C__West@his_hamburg@dlfnova Ein sehr differenzierter und informativer Vortrag, vielen Dank! Hätten Sie womöglich zur Frage der Spannung von internationalem Wettbewerb einerseits und notwendiger grenzüberschreitender Kooperation andererseits (Bsp. mCBDC) womöglich noch weitere Lektüre oder Hörempfehlungen?
Worth thinking about Africa's "lost decade" that followed the correction in commodity prices in conjunction with the current fall off in capital flows to the continent ...
1/x
@TheoMaret Very interesting discussion, thank you! If I understood you correctly, at the IMF there is a review of the DSF ongoing/planned, do you have more information on the timeline and aspects this review would cover?
@JWMason1 How would you analyse the development of domestic currency/fin markets in this context? (e.g. public debt owned by domestic institutional investors or the like) Gabor et al. are rather critical but theoretically this could address the issue of external fin. dependency?
@MonaAli_NY_US Impressive... honest question, do you see enough incentives for public donors to rely on such a mechanism instead of the existing PDB ecosystem? (thereby potentially renouncing a governance model which favours their interests as well as preferred creditor status, for instance)?
@MarinaZucker@KevinPGallagher@ChinaGSProject Thanks for your reply. You've probably come across this IMF WP (https://t.co/h7I8XvS0X6) which seems to suggest a certain procyclicality of CHN Swap Lines since they take into account credit ratings and 'other factors'. Would be curious to hear your opinion on that
@MarinaZucker@KevinPGallagher@ChinaGSProject (i.e. I'd say 'accessibility' is one major aspect to consider here but 'quality' of rescue funding likewise - ofc, IFI conditionality is another factor here, as you mention)
@MarinaZucker@KevinPGallagher@ChinaGSProject Very interesting discussion. (How) do you respond to the claim of the authors that the interest rate charged for CHN swap lines is significantly higher than the ones offered by FED & IFIs? Doesn't this have implications for your argument on a potential recalibration of the GFSN?