"Le choc chinois 2.0 ne constitue pas une simple continuation des tendances antérieures, mais une nouvelle phase d’intégration commerciale mondiale"
Ma traduction
👉 https://t.co/cN8Ifa6f1h
Scale matters: China is much larger than during the first China Shock, so a given proportional shift in trade flows implies a larger global reallocation. The shock is also broader geographically and increasingly overlaps with advanced economies. (2/2) https://t.co/f4AbdsrkXX
ICYMI What is different about “China Shock 2.0”? It is not just an export surge: exports are rising much faster than imports reflecting more self-reliant strategy & pushing China’s trade surplus to unprecedented levels relative to the world economy. (1/2) https://t.co/f4AbdsrkXX
Remarkable statement by the person most responsible for closing all nuclear plants. German greens should really face a reckoning for their grand anti-nuclear crusade, which had two main achievements: citizens struggle with high energy costs and the planet is dirtier and warmer.
Scale matters: China is much larger than during the first China Shock, so a given proportional shift in trade flows implies a larger global reallocation. The shock is also broader geographically and increasingly overlaps with advanced economies. (2/2) https://t.co/f4AbdsrkXX
China Shock 2.0 is the most important trend in international macro! China is much larger than during the first China Shock, so a given proportional shift in trade flows implies a larger global reallocation. The shock is also broader geographically and in terms of sector it increasingl overlaps with advanced economies.
With Ece Fisgin, @AmSantacreu Eva Van Leemput and Kevin Vega.
What is different about “China Shock 2.0”? It is not just an export surge: exports are rising much faster than imports, reflecting a more self-reliant strategy and pushing China’s trade surplus to unprecedented levels relative to the world economy. (1/2) https://t.co/f4AbdsrkXX
What is different about “China Shock 2.0”? It is not just an export surge: exports are rising much faster than imports, reflecting a more self-reliant strategy and pushing China’s trade surplus to unprecedented levels relative to the world economy. (1/2) https://t.co/f4AbdsrkXX
New FEDS Note with co-authors: using both cross-state and cross-country evidence, we find labor markets with low population and labor force growth are not necessarily more recession-sensitive.
https://t.co/l4bRuhXkJU
The US labor market is entering a very different demographic environment: slower population growth, weaker labor force growth, and sharply lower net immigration.
In that world, should weak or negative payroll growth be read as labor market fragility?
Does slower population growth and near-zero job gains make the labor market more cyclically fragile? Given limited precedents in the aggregate U.S. economy, this #FEDSNote examines evidence from U.S. states and other countries. (1/2) https://t.co/Vz9KZ33KFP
@NakedKeynes@econJaredB There is no real debate here: Covid inflation reflects the imbalance between supply and demand. Both constrained supply (pandemic) and demand on steroids (stimulus) played a role.
https://t.co/kvuGQ7BxNf…
@NickTimiraos@darioperkins And recent research suggests QT is effective only if fiscal authorities do not react, and it comes with real cost for government debt.
https://t.co/4VNb0RomqY
1/ This is a very timely paper on QT by @F_Airaudo.
It asks a simple question: can a central bank use QT to fight inflation—potentially even while lowering policy rates? The answer is: it depends, and crucially on how fiscal policy reacts.
5/ Bottom line: QT only “works” if fiscal policy does not offset it. And even then, it comes with real costs (as always with Mon Pol).
It is a very clean framework for thinking about a policy tool that’s getting a lot of attention. Definitely worth a read!
1/ This is a very timely paper on QT by @F_Airaudo.
It asks a simple question: can a central bank use QT to fight inflation—potentially even while lowering policy rates? The answer is: it depends, and crucially on how fiscal policy reacts.
Last week at CER, @F_Airaudo presented work on quantitative tightening, showing how its disinflationary effects can depend critically on the fiscal-monetary policy mix. #Macroeconomics#MonetaryPolicy#CER
4/ In a fiscally-led regime, fiscal policy leans against QT by becoming more expansionary. That offsets the demand drag, so QT fails to tame inflation.
Interesting paper, and good to see the IMF pushing further on trade and industrial policy (IP) in the context of global imbalances.
That said, I think it misses key elements… 🧵
... and that makes it much harder to identify what is truly “excessive.”
In short: a useful paper, but it likely understates how much targeted, non-market policies shape global imbalances in practice, and how hard that is to measure cleanly.
Interesting paper, and good to see the IMF pushing further on trade and industrial policy (IP) in the context of global imbalances.
That said, I think it misses key elements… 🧵
Global imbalances are widening again, raising risks for economic growth and financial stability. Tariffs and narrow industrial policies rarely help, as our latest blog details. Rebalancing starts at home, with sound macroeconomic policies.
https://t.co/UfYUGEjUVy
Most importantly: measurement is key. To simplify: the IMF framework (EBA) defines “excess” imbalances as what is left unexplained by fundamentals (demographics, relative prices, ...) But if relative prices are policy-distorted (subsidies, cheap credit), then IP get baked into the “fundamentals”...