What I'd put in the runbook:
1. Assume key compromise from minute one
2. Rotate the derivation root
3. Move funds out of every address derived from it
4. Then say "contained"
Keys first, statements second. #Web3Security#Custody
"Contained" is not contained if the attacker still holds the keys.
Mercado Bitcoin's Nov 2 hack is the clearest example of this I've read all year. A short breakdown 🧵
The lesson for anyone building custody:
Turning off a payout service stops requests that go through it. It does nothing to a private key someone already holds.
If deposit keys come from one master key, that root is the real blast radius.
Crypto protocols will earn ~$5.6B onchain this year. Hackers have already taken $8.7B. Since 2017: ~57 cents stolen for every $1 earned. DeFi doesn't have a growth problem. It has a security problem.
6/ Core devs and auditors are meeting app developers on Mon Nov 16, 14:00 UTC (ACDT #103) to look at the impact on deployed contracts.
Agenda: https://t.co/Ju9Ff98uSh
Ethereum's next upgrade could break smart contracts that hardcode gas numbers.
If you write Solidity, it's worth checking your code before Glamsterdam ships. 🧵 #Ethereum#Solidity
5/ My checklist:
• no hardcoded gas values
• send ETH with call(), not transfer()/send(), plus checks-effects-interactions and a reentrancy guard
• re-run gas tests with the new costs
• make gas limits configurable if you must have them
7/ I'm a Solidity engineer (4 yrs, DeFi on Arbitrum + Canton). I break down one real exploit a week.
Follow for the next one.
What's the worst oracle fallback you've seen?