Top Tweets for #ClanPractices

4 months ago

#Chad 🇹🇩 #Novel391 #CustomsDisorder #Borkou #Tibesti #OusmanBrahimDjouma #KouriBougoudiGold #ConfisquatedRevenues #ClanPractices #Neopatrimonialism #BorderLooting #AmDjarassNetwork 🇹🇩 TCHAD IN NOVEL N°391: WHEN FAMILY INTEREST OVERRIDES THE STATE! THE GREAT CUSTOMS DISORDER IN BORKOU AND TIBESTI! Chapter 1: The Family Decision! In the vast north of Chad, #Borkou and #Tibesti share a single customs constituency. This territory generates significant revenues for the provinces and the State, notably through transborder flows and minerals. The Kouri-Bougoudi gold-bearing site, in the north, has concentrated intense activity since the gold rush of the 2010s. The Director General of Customs, General #OusmanBrahimDjouma, nevertheless decides to detach the department of #Borkou from this constituency to place it under the authority of two posts in #Ennedi, occupied by one of his close relatives from Am-Djarass. According to internal sources, this decision was born during a family meeting where the cousin insisted on taking control of the revenues. A republican institution is thus fragmented by bloodlines. Instead of a clear administrative organization, overlaps and hierarchical confusion are created. In 2025, Chad's official customs revenues amounted to 239 billion FCFA, an amount deemed highly insufficient against a potential estimated at more than 3,000 billion with rigorous control. How can a high official thus subordinate the organization of the State to family interests? Why barter the authority of a single constituency for the benefit of bloodlines? Is the State built on family meetings or on texts and institutions? Chapter 2: The Cousins' Post At Kouri-Bougoudi, the head of customs is a close relative of the Director General. This zone generates between 200 and 300 million CFA francs per month. Yet, its manager refuses the authority of the head of the Borkou and Tibesti constituency. He reports directly to his cousin, the General. An illegal parallel hierarchy establishes itself. The revenues of a strategic post escape the official circuit and the concerned provinces. This deprives the State of vital resources in a landlocked country where customs complement oil revenues. Modernization efforts exist (digitalization, fight against cash payments), but they are contradicted by these clan practices. Who truly collects the 200 to 300 million monthly from Kouri-Bougoudi? The State or a family? How can an agent serve the Republic when his superior ignores the legal hierarchy in the name of blood? Chapter 3: The Anarchy of the Posts Family meetings organize the allocation of customs posts or the sharing of profits. The Borkou department is detached, Kouri-Bougoudi escapes provincial control, and relatives occupy key positions. The customs institution functions as a private business. This neopatrimonial governance transforms the public office into a family resource. It mines the legitimacy of the State, weakens revenue mobilization, and fosters fraud in strategic zones. Historically sensitive, Borkou and Tibesti risk seeing their fractures worsen when the administration appears clan-based rather than national. How can a Republic function when strategic posts are allocated in family meetings? Does the interest of the clan durably override the national interest? How far can the disorder go before institutions collapse? HassaИ Al-ProfessoЯ

$hassanal_Prof's tweet photo. #Chad 🇹🇩 #Novel391 #CustomsDisorder #Borkou #Tibesti #OusmanBrahimDjouma #KouriBougoudiGold #ConfisquatedRevenues #ClanPractices #Neopatrimonialism #BorderLooting #AmDjarassNetwork 🇹🇩 TCHAD IN NOVEL N°391: WHEN FAMILY INTEREST OVERRIDES THE STATE! THE GREAT CUSTOMS DISORDER IN BORKOU AND TIBESTI! Chapter 1: The Family Decision! In the vast north of Chad, #Borkou and #Tibesti share a single customs constituency. This territory generates significant revenues for the provinces and the State, notably through transborder flows and minerals. The Kouri-Bougoudi gold-bearing site, in the north, has concentrated intense activity since the gold rush of the 2010s. The Director General of Customs, General #OusmanBrahimDjouma, nevertheless decides to detach the department of #Borkou from this constituency to place it under the authority of two posts in #Ennedi, occupied by one of his close relatives from Am-Djarass. According to internal sources, this decision was born during a family meeting where the cousin insisted on taking control of the revenues. A republican institution is thus fragmented by bloodlines. Instead of a clear administrative organization, overlaps and hierarchical confusion are created. In 2025, Chad's official customs revenues amounted to 239 billion FCFA, an amount deemed highly insufficient against a potential estimated at more than 3,000 billion with rigorous control. How can a high official thus subordinate the organization of the State to family interests? Why barter the authority of a single constituency for the benefit of bloodlines? Is the State built on family meetings or on texts and institutions? Chapter 2: The Cousins' Post At Kouri-Bougoudi, the head of customs is a close relative of the Director General. This zone generates between 200 and 300 million CFA francs per month. Yet, its manager refuses the authority of the head of the Borkou and Tibesti constituency. He reports directly to his cousin, the General. An illegal parallel hierarchy establishes itself. The revenues of a strategic post escape the official circuit and the concerned provinces. This deprives the State of vital resources in a landlocked country where customs complement oil revenues. Modernization efforts exist (digitalization, fight against cash payments), but they are contradicted by these clan practices. Who truly collects the 200 to 300 million monthly from Kouri-Bougoudi? The State or a family? How can an agent serve the Republic when his superior ignores the legal hierarchy in the name of blood? Chapter 3: The Anarchy of the Posts Family meetings organize the allocation of customs posts or the sharing of profits. The Borkou department is detached, Kouri-Bougoudi escapes provincial control, and relatives occupy key positions. The customs institution functions as a private business. This neopatrimonial governance transforms the public office into a family resource. It mines the legitimacy of the State, weakens revenue mobilization, and fosters fraud in strategic zones. Historically sensitive, Borkou and Tibesti risk seeing their fractures worsen when the administration appears clan-based rather than national. How can a Republic function when strategic posts are allocated in family meetings? Does the interest of the clan durably override the national interest? How far can the disorder go before institutions collapse? HassaИ Al-ProfessoЯ$

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