Top Tweets for #Lide

I'm not adding to my $LPK position... This is a long one, but I encourage all $LPK investors to read through it in detail. I highlight risks people just aren't factoring into the thesis. -> But TLDR: $LPK's patents are overblown, driving a potential erosion of their "moat". - $LPK's primary growth engine is the mass-adoption of LIDE systems for TGV formation & precision glass-core processing in HPC packaging - But, this is delayed by industry-wide yield and qualification hurdles - They also face an 18-24 month bridge where it needs to fund heavy restructuring costs —-- -> $LPK patents: $LPK seems to be framed as an impenetrable "Patent Fortress" on X due to over 600 glass-related patents. But the semiconductor IP landscape suggests this moat may be quite porous. The Korean Patent Office protected $LPK's “earthworm structure” (Sep 25) - the physical signature left by LIDE’s controlled blister chain formation. This faces several practical hurdles: - Proving infringement requires showing that a competitor’s process leaves this exact signature. At the nanoscale, this requires high-resolution SEM or TEM analysis, which is costly and time-consuming for large-scale monitoring. - LIDE is a two-step process. In semiconductor manufacturing, subtractive steps (like etching) can entirely remove the physical evidence of the initial modification, making it difficult to prove a specific laser path was used once the final via is formed and metalized. Then you have $INTC's internal pool also: $INTC is pivoting from a customer to a competitor in the IP space. Earlier this yr, $INTC signaled a move to license its own pool of 600+ glass substrate patents to equipment and material partners. This could commoditize the TGV process and allow latecomers to buy their way into the standard, effectively neutralizing $LPK's attempt to act as the industry's sole gatekeeper. -> Threats to $LPK's market share: Samsung's investment in JWMT's LMCE technology directly mirrors the LIDE process steps (laser modification + chemical etching). By keeping this tech in-house and forming a glass-core JV w/ Sumitomo Chemical, Samsung is building a moat around its own ecosystem that $LPK just won’t be able to penetrate. And yes, this is another reason why $LPK's patents on the LIDE process may be marginalized. Then you also have other competitors like E&R/Philoptics who are focusing on Bessel beam systems to increase VPS. If competitors can achieve 1.5-2x the TGV throughput for standard patterns, $LPK may lose its "yield leader" status in HVM environments. And no patent infringements to $LPK either since these systems create smooth paths through glass that do not rely on the LIDE-specific "earthworm" structure to achieve HVM yields. Then you have China: Manufacturers like BOE are leveraging their dominance in display glass processing to move into semiconductors. Their ability to produce panels at scale creates an economy that pure equipment makers like $LPK (which rely on selling individual machines), may struggle to compete with on price. -> Timing & qualification gaps: While $INTC's "Clearwater Forest" Xeon 6+ (2026) validates the material itself, mass production across the industry is not expected until 2027–2030. Customer qualification cycles for glass substrates take ages - usually 18–36 months. Imo, this creates a high risk of $LPK running through its cash reserves before LIDE revenue becomes a dominant driver for the business. -> TAM reality check: The IC Substrate market is fcst to reach $31B by 2030, but the glass-core substrate portion remains a high-ASP niche expected to be valued in the "multi-hundred million dollars" by then. Imo, people on X are overestimating the immediate revenue impact for an equipment builder like $LPK - they aren’t going to service even a fraction of the TAM given the competitors in the space + the rate they’re moving at e.g. Samsung via joint ventures with JWMT. -> Geopolitical chokepoints: The MATCH Act seeks country-wide prohibitions on chokepoint tools to China. If LIDE is classified as such, $LPK could be barred from its fastest-growing market. Especially since Chinese players like BOE and Han's Laser are currently pivoting heavily toward glass substrates. Again, adversely impacting fwd earnings. -> Supply concentration: Upstream, the supply of high-performance T-glass fiber cloth is highly concentrated e.g. Nittobo, PPG, and Taiwan Glass. This naturally creates potential structural bottlenecks that could easily delay substrate production regardless of $LPK's tool readiness. A factor that I don’t see many talk about here. -> Financials: 2025 Performance: - Revenue fell 6.2% to €115.3M - Order intake fell to €91.6M (down from €114.3M), and the backlog was significantly reduced to €27.1M $LPK have a fairly decent B/S though driven by: - Equity ratio improving to 73.2% at Y/E 2025 - FCF turned positive at €9.7M - Debt remains minimal, providing a solid runway through the transformation. To achieve sustainable double-digit EBIT margins by 2028, $LPK is: - Closing its Furth site and consolidating production at Suhl - Reduced headcount by ~6% For 2026, official guidance calls for revenue of €105–120M (solar drag dominant) and adj. EBIT margin of -3.0% - +4.5%, with restructuring costs alone at 3–4% of revenue. This extends the “Valley of Death” into 2026, but funds the structural pivot. —--- Final summary is that $LPK needs to execute this year to convert hype into sustained re-rating. But the glass-core tailwinds could position $LPK as a way to play the AI packaging inflection. Just not for me rn given the risks mentioned, but good luck to those with a high-concentration in $LPK.