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The most dangerous 🤡 of his generation still around today 🇹🇷 Cihat Yaycı ; “The Turkish Naval Forces will commence the MAVİ VATAN EXERCISE (the first of which we conducted during my tenure) in the Eastern Mediterranean, involving 92 ships, lasting 10 days, as of April 3, 2026. This exercise is an open and clear declaration on the ground of Turkey's determination to protect its sovereignty rights at sea. I believe that this activity, conducted under the name MAVİ VATAN EXERCISE in the Eastern Mediterranean, is not merely a training; it is also a strategic stance demonstrating to the entire world that Turkey will never, under any circumstances, allow its rights and interests in the Blue Homeland to be open to debate. Setting sail today with 92 ships under the name MAVİ VATAN EXERCISE is not just a display of naval power; it is also a manifestation of a geopolitical vision and a national resolve. Turkey does not retreat in the Blue Homeland, nor should it.”

Turkish President Erdogan: We are closely monitoring the increasing provocations and threats in the Eastern Mediterranean targeting the interests of our country and the Turkish Cypriot people. I want it to be known that we will never turn a blind eye to fait accompli, opportunism, or piracy in the Blue Homeland.

People are calling the Cyprus–Lebanon EEZ signature “historic”. It really isn’t. If you look at the basics law, geography and politics the whole thing collapses. First, the legal side: 🔸Türkiye is not a signatory of UNCLOS. 🔸The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is not a signatory of UNCLOS. 🔸Lebanon is a signatory of UNCLOS. That matters, but not in the way people think. UNCLOS does not give any state the right to draw lines that erase real coastlines or ignore “relevant coasts” just because they are politically inconvenient. A treaty cannot magically delete Türkiye’s mainland coast or the TRNC’s northern coast, and it cannot bind non-parties that were never at the table. Now the political reality on the island: The new President of the TRNC, Tufan Erhürman, and the President of South Cyprus just agreed on a basic understanding: no preconditions, no new demands, no unilateral steps, and a cautious attempt to rebuild trust. What happened next is very telling: South Cyprus almost immediately broke that understanding – new demands on the Turkish Cypriot side, followed by a unilateral EEZ move with Lebanon. You cannot talk about “federal solution” and “reconciliation” on one day and then sign lines over the head of the other side on the next. That’s not partnership, that’s expansion. Geographically, the deal is built on a fiction: It treats Cyprus as if it were a single, Greek-administered island. It completely ignores the TRNC coastline, which physically exists whether someone likes its political status or not. It acts as if a small island can project a huge EEZ wall that cuts off Türkiye, the dominant mainland coast in the Eastern Mediterranean. That goes directly against the core logic used again and again in maritime cases: proportionality, non-encroachment, mainland predominance, equitable result. If you ignore half an island’s coastline and the biggest mainland actor in the region, your line is politically loud but legally weak. Now, Lebanon’s side of the story, which everyone is quietly brushing under the carpet: For years, Lebanese lawyers, officers and energy experts have warned that the original 2007 Cyprus–Lebanon draft line cuts Lebanon short by thousands of square kilometres. Depending on which calculation you use, we’re talking roughly 2,500–5,000 km² of potential maritime area lost. That’s not a small number – that’s future gas fields, leverage, and strategic depth. On top of that, Lebanon already went through a painful maritime file with the Israel talks over Line 23, Qana, etc. The country knows exactly how sensitive one single line on a map can be. Instead of using that experience to renegotiate from a stronger position, Beirut now basically locks in the old 2007 structure with South Cyprus: 🔸still based on simple “median line” logic with the Greek Cypriot administration 🔸still ignoring what a coordination with Türkiye and the TRNC could have produced 🔸still accepting a map drawn from a Greek–Cypriot perspective In pure realpolitik terms: Lebanon gets a short-term PR victory and some apparent “clarity” for companies, but strategically it accepts a smaller sea, and it does so without bringing the main regional mainland actor Türkiye into the equation. This brings us to the Türkiye–Libya EEZ deal, which most people pretend doesn’t exist when they comment on today’s signature. When Türkiye and Libya signed their deal in 2019, they did one simple thing: they connected mainland to mainland. That corridor didn’t appear from nowhere – it came from applying a more realistic view of how islands work in maritime delimitation. Small islands do not automatically get full-effect EEZs when that would completely distort equity and cut off much larger coasts. The moment that corridor was drawn, the old Greek–Cypriot dream maps in the Eastern Mediterranean were intellectually finished. You can ignore that politically, but you can’t erase it from the water. So what does this Cyprus–Lebanon line actually do? It ignores Türkiye and acts like a non-UNCLOS party has to accept a line drawn without it. It ignores the TRNC, pretending its coastline doesn’t exist, even though the TRNC controls real territory and ports on that northern shore. It shrinks Lebanon’s maritime room, confirming the very losses Lebanese experts warned about for years. It contradicts UNCLOS principles (equitable result, relevant coasts, proportionality), even though South Cyprus constantly hides behind UNCLOS rhetoric. It undermines the new understanding between Tufan Erhürman and the South Cypriot president by going straight back to unilateralism. And it pretends the Türkiye–Libya corridor isn’t there, even though it already changed the strategic geometry of the Eastern Mediterranean. This is why I don’t call it “historic” in the positive sense. It is not a serious, inclusive, long-term solution. It is a political show move that: tries to lock in South Cyprus’ maximalist map, gives Lebanon less than it could have had with a wider regional approach, and writes Türkiye and the TRNC out of a sea where they are geographically central. On paper, it looks like a win. On the map, in the law and in the long run, it’s fragile. You can’t build a stable Eastern Mediterranean order on lines that delete others coastlines and violate your own political commitments.