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Quick recap.💁‍♂️ https://t.co/Ya135Ln9EF Same, but in a much more boring manner: 21 Nov 2013 - Euromaidan protests began after Yanukovych broke his promise to sign the EU Association Agreement, suddenly turning away from Europe towards the Kremlin’s "trade union"—the exact opposite of his election program. 17 Dec 2013 - russia’s Ministry of Defence published a tender to make medals "For the Return of Crimea" with the date of operation on it "20.02.14 - 18.03.14". It was before Maidan escalated, before Yanukovych fled, and even before the "Nuland" nonsense. 2 Feb 2014 - Several russian military aircraft transported unauthorised personnel to airbases at Kacha, Gvardiyske, and Khersones. 20 Feb 2014 - russian troops killed the first Ukrainian serviceman in Crimea, marking the actual start of military aggression. 21 Feb 2014 - Yanukovych signed an agreement with opposition leaders (guaranteed by the EU) to hold early elections and reform the constitution. He fled the country later that night. 22 Feb 2014 - Parliament unanimously voted (328-0) to remove Yanukovych for abandoning his duties. Even members of his own Party of Regions supported the motion. Oleksandr Turchynov, as Speaker of Parliament, was appointed acting president. No parties in parliament were changed during this process. 27 Feb 2014 - russian "unidentified green men" seized the Parliament in Simferopol, Crimea, in an armed coup. This was followed by a naval blockade operation on 3-6 Mar. 12 Apr 2014 - russian special forces without insignia seized key locations in Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, marking the start of the war in Donbas. 25 May 2014 - Presidential elections were held in Ukraine. Petro Poroshenko was elected president with 55% of the vote. 14 Jul 2014 - First russian border crossing into eastern Ukraine (Donbas) along with cross-border artillery attacks. 17 Jul 2014 - Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 was shot down by a russian BUK missile over Donbas, killing 298 civilians. Later on 17 Nov 2022, a Dutch court convicted Igor Girkin (Strelkov), Sergey Dubinsky, and Leonid Kharchenko for their roles in the MH17 attack. All were linked to russian intelligence. 5 Sep 2014 - Minsk Protocol signed: A ceasefire agreement between Ukraine, russia, and separatists, mediated by OSCE. russia never upheld it. 23 Dec 2014 - Ukraine's parliament voted to repeal the country's non-aligned status and work towards NATO membership. And so, "NATO expansion" nonsense was born. 24 Jan 2015 - Russian-backed forces shelled Mariupol with Grad rockets, killing 31 civilians — one of many ceasefire violations. 12 Feb 2015 - Minsk II signed, attempting to revive peace efforts, but violations continued.

NEW pessimistic post from Igor Girkin about predictions for 2025 🔥🔥🔥 Full text: Speculations on what would be good not to come true (for the coming year 2025) So, the situation for the Russian Federation is characterized negatively: by the end of the third year of the war, none of the tasks declared earlier as “goals of the NWO” has been fulfilled or is close to fulfillment: 1) The “Zelensky regime” has not been overthrown, but is holding on tighter than in 2022. “Under the war” the ‘derusification’ of Ukraine continued at an accelerated pace, the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate was reformed, Nazi propaganda ‘brainwashed’ the population, hatred of Russia not only did not decrease, but increased manifold. 2) No “demilitarization of Ukraine” was achieved. On the contrary, - in front of our front there is a huge (several hundred thousand) group, armed hardly better than before the beginning of SWO, well organized, experienced, resistant and (despite the fatigue from the war) not showing any signs of soon disintegration. Part of this group is fighting on the territory of the “old regions” of the Russian Federation - in the Kursk region, from where our troops have failed to dislodge the enemy for more than 4 months. The AFU is increasing missile and drone attacks on the deep rear of our troops, reaching up to the Volga and beyond, hitting industrial and infrastructural facilities on an increasing scale from month to month. 3) The territories of the “new regions” (except for the Luhansk People's Republic) have not been liberated from the enemy: the enemy continues to firmly hold the capital and the right-bank part of the Kherson region, the capital and a significant part of the Zaporizhzhya region, and significant territories of the DNR. Our successes in Kharkiv region are insignificant and have not gone beyond the purely tactical. There is no chance that all “constitutional” territories of the Russian Federation can be liberated militarily in the near future. To summarize - the NWO - in the form in which it started - has failed (has not achieved its objectives). At one time one general, looking at the field of an already lost battle, said to Napoleon: “The battle is lost, but we still have time to win a second one.” (this was at the Battle of Marengo, which ended with the defeat of the seemingly victorious Austrian army). The point is that General Desaix brought reserves with him and they completely changed the course of the battle. Do we and the enemy have reserves? In the first case - the answer is ambiguous. Theoretically, yes. There are, and very significant. We still do not have a country at war, only the army is at war. There has been no mobilization of the armed forces and industry (the rear, the entire economy, etc.), except for individual (non-complex) measures of a “one-off” nature. As a result, we still have a significant mobilization potential, which, theoretically, could be used. But “in practice” - we have a completely opposite and depressing picture: the army, which did not receive timely and sufficient means for a decisive victory, is exhausted and exsanguinated. Its forces are still enough to hold the front and even in some places (“turtle step”) to move forward with difficulty, winning purely tactical (but very “expensive”) successes. But the prospects for a strategic victory - to defeat the opposing forces of the enemy and force him (at least!) to sign a peace “on our terms” are more than doubtful. Simply put, our troops can “stall for time in the hope of chance” for quite a long time, but they cannot win. In its current form, at least. Will general mobilization help us now (I emphasize!)? - I find it difficult to answer this question unequivocally. On the one hand, Napoleon (as in the battle of Marengo) would have been able to skillfully use all the reserves that came up. On the other hand, we somehow do not have “Napoleons”. Both the country, the army and the population are already very tired of the three-year bloody and not very successful, to put it mildly, military campaign. The industry acutely feels the shortage of technical resources, and the stock of military equipment is apparently close to exhaustion (“thanks” to the “Syrian adventure”, “sales” for free/on credit from Rosoboronexport, “gifts” to “our African friends”, etc., etc.). I am not sure (I have no information, but I have my doubts): can the Ministry of Defense now arm, clothe, educate, train, organize, feed, form into units and formations, and then put into combat at least half a million more fighters? And for a strategic victory over “Ukraine” alone (I emphasize!) we need no less (and as if not one and a half or two times more), and these half a million should be “put to the front” not by “bringing water in glasses”, but at once or (in the extreme case) in two or three steps. In addition to the “technical points” there is a second question: how will the country/people feel about this very general mobilization now - after “three years of bloody drudgery”? Instead of the long-awaited large reserves for the front, won't we get “fuel” for a revolt of the mobilized? Similar to what happened in Petrograd in February 1917? And there are prerequisites for this, as there are (I am more than sure of it) and forces in the so-called “elite” ready to initiate such a revolt, the discontent of the “liberal-western” part of which is hardly a secret for the country's leadership and special services. It seems that I am not alone in thinking of such negative options.... Perhaps they are taken into account in determining the “course for the earliest possible peaceful settlement”, which has already been openly proclaimed (just today I heard it performed by the patriarch): “Peace, you say? - Well, as we know. “A bad peace is better than a good war.” But will Moscow expect this very “thin peace”? - I personally doubt it... And to demonstrate the validity of my doubts, I am going to characterize the situation (according to my estimates, of course) in the camp of the enemy. And I state: while waging an all-out war, the AFU has reserves. They have them both now and in the near future. According to various (reaching me) data, from 150 to 300 thousand newly mobilized soldiers are undergoing combat training in the EU countries. Plus, a part of the military is being trained in the so-called “Ukraine” itself. Let's subtract (for a fair account) 100 thousand deserters, “evaders”, etc. - and still we will get another 200 thousand enemy soldiers at the front by the spring of 2025. Let's assume that half of them will go to re-staff the broken and shattered units and formations. But even 100 thousand soldiers is, in fact, 3-4 full-fledged corps (or two armies). Which the enemy is preparing (receiving equipment from the U.S. and Europe, which are the “inviolable rear” of the AFU) not for a “truce”, but, of course, for his new offensive. And until it “burns” these (as well as newly created) reserves in a new attempt to break through our front, the so-called “Ukraine” will not agree to any truce. Even if it is suddenly “cut off” supplies of arms and equipment from the U.S. (supplies from Britain, France and Germany will continue this year with a 99% probability). That is - in the next 4-6 months there will be no truce for sure, and the further depends solely on how successfully and efficiently our Armed Forces will repel another “onslaught” of a strong, experienced and well-armed enemy. I would like to believe that the “attack” will be as successful as it was in the summer of 2023, but even when it becomes a fact from an assumption, the question of “what to do next?” will remain on the agenda. - will remain on the agenda. Since there is only one “Ukraine” fighting against us today, and who might join it tomorrow is an uncertain question. But there are “candidates” - “limited participation” of NATO troops - already discussed and even put on the agenda at the highest level in the EU countries. Romania's participation in the liquidation of the unfortunate Transnistria is very likely, and after the events in Syria, it is even awkward to discuss the “reliability of a Turkish friend”.... In order for vultures to be afraid of “flying to the corpse of their prey”, it is necessary to be able to show that we are “still very much alive”. And this again requires real successes on the front. And they will not be achieved if large and well-trained (and also manageable!) reserves are not prepared. “Our song is good - start again...”. Perhaps these words can be put in the title of this letter. If it reaches you, of course. Igor Strelkov