Is buying venture backed company and turning them around as simple and easy as people make it look like online?
A friend who raised $15M to do this a few years ago moved on and said that he won’t do this again. Knowing what he knows, he says unless you are willing to operate the business by joining the company full time, you are unlikely to make money.
He bought minority and majority stakes in companies along with debt investors in a 2-3 companies over 4 years.
This year, he decided that the model is not going to scale and the returns are not worth the effort.
His firm sold their stake in all the companies, returned whatever capital they got, and moved on to something new.
Turning around any reasonable sized company is quite difficult even with AI.
The business models are evolving and product moats are getting destroyed everyday.
If you are interested in this world, try to find a company first. One that you like so much you want to run it.
Then try to figure out if you can buy it and at what price. Then engage the founders to figure out if they are willing to engage.
The whole process will cost a couple hundred thousand dollars and about 9 months even for a small scale company (excluding acquisition price).
Realistically, give it a year.
Every founder who said they would keep exploring new ideas while at their current company never took any real action.
Founders "believe" that their companies can be run on autopilot. That they can use that time to explore other ideas. When the new idea takes off, they'll just switch their focus.
But it never happens in practice. Almost never.
The simple reason is that there is no such thing as a company on autopilot.
Founders do a lot of "free work" for their companies. They know the company like the back of their hand.
They make snap decisions, solve problems quickly, stay available outside of business hours, their LinkedIn still says cofounder (present), and clients trust them.
They are never able to really walk away. There's always a feature request, an improvement, a customer call to prevent churn, a bug fix, an edge case, or something that keeps them engaged enough.
If you want to focus on your next thing, you have to be 100% into evaluating your next idea, building conviction, hiring a team, traveling, meeting, and closing customers.
Half baked approach doesn't work.
A founder friend sold his company for $20M in an equity deal and walked away after 1 year.
The reality of acqui-hires seems rosy from the outside - that strategic buyers will pay a lot of money, and founders consider that real.
It's odd to think: why would someone walk away from millions of dollars of equity - even if it's paper money?
From the outside, it's difficult to understand how difficult it is to fit into a new company with your team. You have to completely change the way you operate; your goals are decided by others, you don't get the resources, but you are still expected to deliver on aggressive targets.
Most founders say they'd do it again, even if they knew the outcome at the time of acquisition, because they don't have other options.
Some of these founders also can't exercise their vested equity because it could result in taxes. The acquirer has its 409A, so founders will need a lot of money to exercise options, and if the share price is higher than the 409A price, it can trigger a tax liability.
If the founders don't exercise their options, they get literally $0 upside.
How this works in practice:
1. Connect Claude Code or Cursor to Jitsu (one MCP URL, sign in once)
2. Tell it: "I'm adding a signup event. Make sure it lands right."
3. It ships the event, watches it arrive live, checks the transform, and fixes what's off
4. Anything that changes your setup waits for your approval
It reads freely. It never touches config without asking.
Open source. Free to start. 💜
Talent acquisitions are at peak. Founders run companies for 1-2 years, then sell to a big public tech company or to someone who has already hit escape velocity.
It's common in competitive tech categories, like building a specific model or a technical product related to AI agents, coding, etc.
I believe it's the right move for the founders.
It's a reasonable personal outcome. Investors get their money back, or equity in a bigger company, and the team can keep operating.
Customers are left hanging. It also lowers their trust in buying from new startups.
But overall, it's the right move for the ecosystem.
Depending on your business, there's an alternative route - you can get acqui-hired but sell your product, tech, customers, and revenue to Helium Ventures (@heliumventureco).
We'll work with our teams, support customers, and keep building the product.
It's a true win-win for everyone involved.
If you are talking to strategic buyers who want you and don't know what to do with the company, DM us.
Helium Ventures acquires and operates venture backed companies, even if the team is getting acquihired by a strategic buyer.
We add our teams to your company, transition quickly, and make sure your product lives and customers stay happy.
In some cases, you'll want to lock in an acqui-hire before selling the company, and that works too.
We are happy to help.
Stuck founders with less than $5M ARR realize that strategic acquirers want them, not their company.
Strategic acquirers want to buy learning and fast execution more than a few million in ARR.
The logic is something like this:
If they are strategic, they are relatively bigger than you.
If they are big and have money, they are also growing revenue quickly.
Your revenue doesn't materially help them because it's less likely to make a dent in their growth.
If they buy your tech, product, and revenue, they have to support it - which means investment and bureaucracy.
You probably moved quickly and have a lot of tech debt. Now this tech debt needs to be integrated with the acquirer's existing systems, which needs resources.
And that becomes a distraction.
The acquirer needs to decide if allocating resources to integrate your tech debt is better than building in-house, because with AI, building in-house is easier/faster.
It'll work seamlessly with their existing stack.
But what about the customers you acquired over the years? Why would they not want them?
Because they can acquire those customers on their own. They don't need a small company's logos - unless those logos have something unique that the strategic one can't get to.
So strategics are more interested in buying people than tech or revenue.
There are tons of examples out there of this outcome.
Most founders make the mistake of thinking that their revenue and product/tech are more valuable to strategics than they are. And they pitch the wrong thing.
If you're ever selling your company, learn one word before signing an LOI:
Retrade.
Here's how it works:
1. A buyer agrees to a price.
2. You sign the LOI and agree to exclusivity.
3. You stop talking to other potential buyers.
4. Due diligence starts. Suddenly, the buyer finds reasons to lower the price.
Now you're stuck negotiating with one buyer, with all your other options gone.
And here's the catch:
The purchase price in an LOI is usually non-binding. The exclusivity clause can be binding.
I asked @rohitdotmittal how @heliumventureco approaches this.
His answer:
"We never retrade. We close every LOI we offer."
That's a pretty important principle in M&A.
A buyer's offer means very little if they don't stand behind it.
raising venture is easy. getting a company acquired is 10x harder - nobody's running after you.
that's @rohitdotmittal for you, YC W16 alum, someone who raised $375Mn in equity + dept, sold his company for millions of $$, and is now the CEO of @heliumventureco and @jitsucom.
he's seen 9 figure deals die at the finish line because the buyer changed CEOs
In the video I speak with Rohit about his journey at YC, raising venture and running his own company to now running his own PE firm and acquiring venture backed companies upto $10M ARR.
We also talk about what makes Jitsu a great product for mid market/enterprise customers and what the future roadmap is going to look like.
Full session's in YouTube. Link's in the first comment.
Super excited for this one
This is a series of questions from a YC-backed founder who raised $2M and then sold his company to Helium Ventures.
What's the best thing Vlad did as a second-time founder?
Helium Ventures is not just for YC.
We are open to chatting with all venture-backed founders.
Hundreds of non-YC venture backed founders reach out to Helium to figure out the right options for their company.
Our promise to founders is that we'll do our best to help, even if we are not the right option.
In the long term, we see ourselves as adding value to the startup community and continuing its legacy.
Our DMs are open.
This founder sold his company to Helium Ventures after going through the Y Combinator S20 batch and raising about $2M.
In this conversation, he shares what he likes most about YC.
Give it a listen.
Vladimir was a Y Combinator S20 founder. He raised $2M in equity and then sold his company.
I talked to him about his YC experience and what he learned.
Every founder takes away something different, but most agree that YC makes them move way faster.
Vlad saw that "everyone made the same mistakes." He got past those mistakes and built faster with everyone around moving at a fast pace.
We acquire and operate venture backed companies.
We are vertical and business model agnostic but focused on startups with primarily US clients.
Our operating model focuses on improving the product and investing in GTM after acquisition.
The founders can choose to stay with us, be lightly involved, or not be involved at all.
We are open to buying companies where the team has been acquihired and is looking for a new home.
Our process is straightforward. We offer clear terms and offer a high certainty of close.
We have announced a few acquisitions:
- InsurGrid (Insurance tech platform for brokers and agencies)
- Jitsu, YC S20 (Open Source Customer Data Platform)
- Maroo, YC S21 (CRM and Payments for Events Industry)
- ThatsTheOne (Wedding Planning Software)
You can learn more here: https://t.co/VfpE0SNiul
Most people don't get the power law in venture. And it's only getting more extreme.
Some startups return 100x for investors. I'm sure startups like Airbnb, DoorDash, and many others have returned 100x to 1000x for many of their early supporters.
That's the kind of return investors get excited about.
Imagine an investor runs a $25M fund. They invested $500k in your seed, or even $1M.
Now you are at $1M ARR. You haven't hit escape velocity, and you're looking for exit options.
You find something that pays you 2x-3x ARR, but you are not satisfied. You fight and spend months to get it to 3.5x ARR.
Even with that acquisition multiple, the return on capital could be 1x or maybe 1.2x.
They invested $500k, so they'll get $500k or $600k.
Garry is exceptional; he returned 55x DPI, but let's still think about the average 5x DPI.
Their fund is $25M. They're aiming for a 5x DPI on their fund - so total $125M.
Now, as a founder, you are spending your life fighting for an additional $100k because you think you have to make investors whole.
If you don't, then somehow the investor's life will be changed.
The difference in return for them between $125M and $125.1M is 0.08%.
It's not even a rounding error for their fund.
As a venture-backed founder, you should always do your best for investors, but you don't help yourself or them by grinding for an extra 0.08% when the startup isn't working out.
The better approach is to find a 100x opportunity.
Series A and Series B are the hardest rounds for founders today.
Founders launch a vertical AI SaaS company. They reach $1M-$3M ARR in 2 years or $5M-$10M in 3-4 years.
They go out to market with their 1x-3x growth. Almost no interest from investors.
If it's not the right category or a deep, long-term conviction bet, most investors stay away.
Founders are stuck with large pref stacks and a market that doesn't value this growth. They are neither sustainable (at their current burn) nor venture-fundable (without growth).
The exit options (if available) don't leave much for the team. In most cases, founders are required to join the acquiring company (but they aren't interested).
I talk to many founders who have been misadvised, and they keep grinding without making progress.
The Series A or B that didn't happen won't magically happen in 1 year with a little more progress. If the market moves much faster than your company progresses, you will always be behind. If you are told today to hit some metrics and come back, the market will have already moved by the time you return.
AI rollups are valued differently by investors and the public markets. The best public benchmark is Constellation Software, and now Bending Spoons (too new).
I looked at:
- Constellation Software
- Thrive Holdings
- Commure (GC-backed)
- HATCo (GC-backed)
- Bending Spoons
The multiples also vary based on their vertical/focus, acquisition approach, and value add approach.
eg. Constellation Software is a vertical agnostic acquirer of lower middle market legacy B2B SaaS companies, while Commure is a vertical focus buyer of middle market legacy healthcare companies
Almost all companies are valued significantly higher than what they pay for acquisitions. Constellation has the lowest gap, while Commure has the highest.
They are all buying legacy companies, but the newer ones are selling an AI-transformation story focused on EBITDA and revenue growth.
A few interesting things tidbits:
- Commure is valued at 40x revenue, but paid 2.8x revenue to acquire Augmedix
- Constellation has the most history and pays 1-1.5x revenue, and is valued at 3.6x revenue
- Bending Spoons paid less than 3x revenue, but is valued at 13x revenue
It remains to be seen how many of these companies sustain their valuations.
As we build Helium by acquiring venture backed companies, we believe long term investors will always value compounding capital growth more than short term transformation stories.
As AI grows, more acquirers will come to market and advance legacy companies to new technology.
Recently heard about a PE-backed company almost blocking an acquisition of a venture-backed startup with their ROFR.
This startup got an acquisition offer from the PE-backed company, with high earn-out hurdles. They were skeptical of the tech effort needed to build and run the tech. So they squeezed the founders with the offer, and then also added a 1 year ROFR.
It took 5 months to complete diligence, and then PE backed out at the last minute. Then they did not waive the ROFR when the startup got another offer.
When founders make contact with PE, they realize venture is a utopia and VCs are angels.
Because there's less competition in acquisitions, the bar is quite low. Acquirers are used to dragging for months, being flaky, and not closing.
Founders deserve to be treated better. We hope to raise the bar for acquirers at @heliumventureco.