Olivia
Online
Hellas Real Estate
@HellasProperty
Greece. Eurozone. Real Estate Tech
Ελλάδα
Joined November 2016
44 Following
58 Followers
2.2K Posts
Strip out the steel deals and the "#proptech funding holds up" headline doesn't really survive.
Stegra and Hydnum Steel are steelmakers — cleantech companies, really — not proptech, and arguably not even contech.
Their only claim to a place in this roundup is that steel eventually ends up in buildings, which is such a stretch that the author herself feels the need to pre-justify it, noting that proptech "is expanding beyond property-management software into areas such as construction, energy, infrastructure and climate technology."
That's a lot of hedging to include two deals.
And those two deals are doing a lot of work: $1.6B for Stegra plus $695M for Hydnum comes to $2.3B, or almost 26% of the $8.7B total the piece credits to proptech in 2026.
Take them out and you're left with about $6.4B — with the biggest genuinely proptech/AI deal of the year being Mews at $300M.
That's a very different story than the one the billion-dollar headlines suggest.
It's hard not to read the inclusion of two industrial/cleantech raises as a way of propping up a sector total that looks a lot thinner under a strict definition of proptech.
#Proptech Funding Holds Up, But Investors Are Placing Different Bets.
So far in 2026, global real estate-related startups have pulled in about $8.7 billion in seed- through growth-stage financing.
https://t.co/IpDc7VgJQ5
#Europe #RealEstate #AI
#Greece vs. #EU vs. #EuroArea: House Price Index, Annual % Change, Q1 2006–Q1 2026
(Basing: Eurostat notes a rebasing the house price and rent indices have been rescaled to the new base 2025)
Greece has been decelerating from a much hotter pace: In 2025, apartment prices increased by an average annual rate of 8.1% (revised data), compared with an average increase of 9.1% in 2024.
Euro area/EU deceleration: Price growth continued to accelerate... reaching +5.5% in the euro area and +5.8% in the EU by Q1 2025.
Thereafter, house price growth eased slightly, to +4.7% in the euro area and +5.1% in the EU.
Q1 2026
Greece: +5.7% — Bank of Greece, Index of Prices of Dwellings in Urban Areas (nationwide apartments) apartment prices are estimated to have increased on average by 5.7% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026.
By age: 6.0% for new apartments and 5.5% for old apartments.
By region: 5.2% in Athens, 6.4% in Thessaloniki, 5.4% in other cities and 6.9% in other areas of Greece.
Euro area: +4.7% and EU27: +5.1% — Eurostat House Price Index. In the first quarter of 2026, house prices, as measured by the House Price Index, increased by 4.7% in the euro area and by 5.1% in the EU compared with the same quarter of the previous year.
Prior quarter: In the fourth quarter of 2025, house prices increased by 5.1% and 5.4% in the euro area and EU, respectively.
Real Residential Property Price Indices, (2015=100), and Price-to-Income Indices, (2015=100), 1995–2025, comparing the #EU against Australia, Canada, China, Japan, the UK, and the US.
Several EU countries individually show very sharp increases. Price‑to‑income ratios have also risen in many advanced economies, with the EU median roughly stable but the upper tail (high‑pressure countries) becoming more stretched.
EU median affordability is not the worst globally, but the upper tail of EU countries is now among the most stretched worldwide, house‑price growth in the EU is driven more by supply constraints, unlike the pre‑GFC credit‑driven boom.
internationally, house price increases have created affordability pressures across many advanced economies, not just Europe. It states that since 2015 the median EU property price and price-to-income trajectory has been broadly similar to — or even somewhat more favorable than — other major advanced economies shown in this chart. However, the EU median masks large within-EU divergence, with certain member states seeing much sharper affordability deterioration than the aggregate suggests (cross-referencing Figure 4 in the main text, EU27 price-to-income ratio).
#HousingMarkets #RealEstate
Δείκτες τιμών κατοικιών & λόγου τιμής/εισοδήματος (2015=100) 1995-2025: #ΕΕ έναντι Αυστραλίας, Καναδά, Κίνας, Ιαπωνίας, ΗΒ, ΗΠΑ. Διάμεσος ΕΕ σταθερή, αλλά χώρες ΕΕ επιδεινώνονται έντονα. Αύξηση λόγω έλλειψης προσφοράς, όχι πίστωση. #HousingCrisis #RealEstate
Real Residential Property Price Indices, (2015=100), and Price-to-Income Indices, (2015=100), 1995–2025, comparing the #EU against Australia, Canada, China, Japan, the UK, and the US.
Several EU countries individually show very sharp increases. Price‑to‑income ratios have also risen in many advanced economies, with the EU median roughly stable but the upper tail (high‑pressure countries) becoming more stretched.
EU median affordability is not the worst globally, but the upper tail of EU countries is now among the most stretched worldwide, house‑price growth in the EU is driven more by supply constraints, unlike the pre‑GFC credit‑driven boom.
internationally, house price increases have created affordability pressures across many advanced economies, not just Europe. It states that since 2015 the median EU property price and price-to-income trajectory has been broadly similar to — or even somewhat more favorable than — other major advanced economies shown in this chart. However, the EU median masks large within-EU divergence, with certain member states seeing much sharper affordability deterioration than the aggregate suggests (cross-referencing Figure 4 in the main text, EU27 price-to-income ratio).
#HousingMarkets #RealEstate
#Eurozone, #Greece, #HousingCrisis: Additional Inequality Caused by Housing Costs, and Euro Area: Net Wealth by Tenure (Owner vs Tenant)
The IMF’s analysis shows that #housing costs are becoming a major driver of inequality across Europe.
In 2024, housing costs increased measured disposable-income inequality in every country examined, but the effect was particularly pronounced in Greece, where the increase in the Gini coefficient was the largest in the chart, at around 12 percentage points.
At the same time, ECB Distributional Wealth Accounts data show a widening wealth gap between homeowners and renters in the euro area: since 2009, owner net wealth has risen far more strongly than tenant net wealth, reaching roughly €650,000 versus €90,000 per household by 2025.
The IMF concludes that rising housing costs therefore do more than create an affordability problem—they can reinforce the divide between those who own housing and those who rent, making access to homeownership and wealth accumulation increasingly difficult for renters.
#PropTech #RealEstate #AI: American Real Estate: What Confuses Europeans.
1. Agent licenses and titles — no national license; each state regulates independently, while NAR adds branding.
Legal tiers: Agent/Salesperson (works under a Broker) → Broker (can operate independently) → Managing/Associate Broker (state-specific roles)
NAR, not law: Realtor (NAR member) / Realtor Emeritus (honorary status)
Deal roles: Listing Agent, Buyer's Agent, Dual Agent, Referral Agent
Not necessarily agents: Property Manager, Escrow/Title Agent
2. No civil-law notary — title companies, escrow and title insurance handle functions Europeans associate with the notary/title system.
3. Commissions — sellers traditionally paid both sides; since 2024, buyer-agent compensation is separately negotiated and not offered through covered MLSs.
4. Property taxes — set locally, can rise yearly, and may be reassessed after a sale.
5. HOAs — private associations that can make rules, fine owners and place liens.
6. "As-is" sales — governed by contract and disclosure laws; buyers may waive inspections.
7. Earnest money — a contract deposit that may be refunded or forfeited depending on contingencies and contract terms.
8. 30-year fixed mortgages — unusually common in the US, supported by a deep secondary market; much less common in Europe.
#RealEstate #AI: Η τεχνητή νοημοσύνη έχει μπει για τα καλά στο real estate και στους κτηματομεσίτες στην Αμερική. Η υπερβολική της χρήση στις φωτογραφίες όμως έχει πλήξει την εμπιστοσύνη και έχει προκαλέσει παράπονα στους αγοραστές για παραπλανητικές αγγελίες με φωτογραφίες επεξεργασμένες από AI — αυτό που αποκαλούν «housefishing» ή «real estate slop».
Οι περισσότεροι κτηματομεσίτες στην Αμερική δεν τη χρησιμοποιούν μόνο για να επεξεργάζονται φωτογραφίες.
Μερικά παραδείγματα:
Μια κτηματομεσίτρια στην Πασαντίνα της Καλιφόρνιας χρησιμοποίησε το Claude για να φτιάξει οικονομικά μοντέλα και να πείσει τους πελάτες της να ρίξουν την τιμή στο σπίτι που πουλούσαν και νατο πουλησουν γρηγορότερα ώστε να μην πάρουν bridge loan (βραχυπρόθεσμο στεγαστικό που κλείνει προσωρινά το οικονομικό κενό μέχρι να εξασφαλιστεί η οριστική ή μακροπρόθεσμη χρηματοδότηση) για το νέο που ήθελαν να αγοράσουν.
Άλλοι τη χρησιμοποιούν για αυτοματοποίηση: μόλις πάρουν μια καταχώρηση, το σύστημα παραγγέλνει πινακίδες, μάρκετινγκ κ.λπ.
Μόλις ο κτηματομεσίτης υπογράψει το συμβόλαιο με τον πωλητή, κανονικά πρέπει να κάνει μια σειρά από απαραίτητες εργασίες, όπως:
να παραγγείλει τις πινακίδες «Πωλείται»
να κανονίσει κάποιον να τις στήσει στο ακίνητο
να φτιάξει και να στείλει το μάρκετινγκ (φωτογραφίες, κείμενα, ανάρτηση στο MLS, social media κ.λπ.)
να οργανώσει τα υπόλοιπα απαραίτητα
Βοηθάει επίσης στη συγγραφή κειμένων, στην ανάλυση δεδομένων και στη δημιουργία περιεχομένου.
Για τους αγοραστές δείχνει πώς μπορεί να φαίνεται ένα σπίτι μετά από ανακαίνιση (π.χ. πώς θα είναι μια βεράντα) ή βοηθάει στην αναγνώριση αρχιτεκτονικών ή διακοσμητικών στοιχεία
Σύμφωνα με το άρθρο, το 82% των επαγγελματιών ακινήτων στις ΗΠΑ χρησιμοποιεί ήδη τεχνητή νοημοσύνη στην καθημερινή του δουλειά.
Πρακτικά όμως το «χρησιμοποιεί AI» στο άρθρο είναι πολύ ευρύ. Μέσα μπαίνουν και αυτοί που έγραψαν μια αγγελία με τεχνητή νοημοσύνη, και αυτοί που φτιάχνουν οικονομικά μοντέλα, και αυτοί που αλλάζουν φωτογραφίες. Δεν σημαίνει ότι 8 στους 10 έχουν στήσει ολόκληρο σύστημα αυτοματισμού.
Το νούμερο εντυπωσιάζει, αλλά λέει περισσότερο «το δοκίμασαν / το έχουν μέσα στη δουλειά τους» παρά «η δουλειά τους τρέχει πια με τεχνητή νοημοσύνη».
#PropTech: How Realtors in the US Are Really Using AI in the Age of “Real Estate Slop”.
https://t.co/WDzlk8sAL1
Financial & decision modeling
Visualizing renovations & design
Back-office workflow automation
Photo decluttering & virtual staging
Low-cost video tours from photos
#Ελλάδα: Η #Αθήνα ξεχωρίζει στην ελληνική αγορά των εμπορικών ακινήτων: το 2025 ηγείται σε αύξηση τιμών και ενοικίων, ενώ #Θεσσαλονίκη και υπόλοιπη χώρα έχουν πιο ήπια άνοδο. Οι τιμές πιο ευμετάβλητες από τα ενοίκια. Ισχυρή ανάκαμψη 2022-25 μετά κρίση και την πανδημία. #ακίνητα
#Athens Pulls Away: #Greece's Retail Property Market Splits in Two #CRE
2025 Trends: Athens leads growth in both prices and rents, while Thessaloniki and the rest of Greece show more moderate increases
Retail Price Index (RPI) — Year‑on‑Year Change 2007–2025 II
The Retail Price Index measures how the estimated market value of retail properties changes compared with the same period of the previous year.
2022–2025: Strong positive growth in several regions, especially Athens and Thessaloniki, indicating renewed investment interest and rising retail property values.
2020–2021: Pandemic‑related volatility.
2014–2019: Gradual stabilisation and mild recovery.
2009–2013: A sharp decline, reflecting the deep recession and collapse of commercial demand.
Retail Rent Index (RRI) — Year‑on‑Year Change 2007–2025 II
The Retail Rent Index tracks changes in rental prices for retail properties compared with the previous year.
It uses the same data sources (MFIs + REICs) and the same semi‑annual frequency.
2022–2025: Noticeable recovery, with several periods of positive rent growth, especially in Athens and Thessaloniki.
2020–2021: Pandemic‑driven declines.
2014–2019: Stabilisation and gradual improvement.
2010–2013: Deep negative rent growth, consistent with the collapse in retail turnover and widespread renegotiations.
Prices have generally been more volatile and, in the recent upswing, often stronger than rents.
Rents adjust more slowly because of lease inertia, legal constraints on rent reviews, and longer contracts.
Athens frequently shows larger swings (deeper fall in the crisis, stronger rebound later).
Thessaloniki and Rest of Greece often move with a lag or smaller amplitude.
#RealEstate #AI #PropTech: Why PropTech Has More Room to Grow in the US Than in Europe.
The US real estate market is, in many ways, more complex — and that complexity ends up creating more room for technology to step in.
PropTech keeps moving faster in the US for a simple reason: the American real estate transaction is built as a layered process.
A single deal can involve a listing agent, a buyer’s agent, a broker, a mortgage lender, a title company, an appraiser, an inspector, an attorney — and often a few more specialized providers depending on the state.
The exact roles and agency structures shift from one state to another.
But the underlying idea stays the same:
More participants. More handoffs. More data. More friction. More opportunities to automate.
Underneath all this, the US market is also fragmented in ways that aren’t always obvious. Property records are handled locally. There are hundreds of MLS systems. Agents are licensed state by state. Mortgage, title and transaction systems were built independently over time.
Thousands of companies and professionals have to connect these systems and workflows.
And every connection can turn into a software opportunity.
Europe works differently.
European real estate can be complicated too, but much of that complexity comes from the fact that each country has its own system. Germany is not France. France is not Spain. Spain is not Italy or Greece.
Different registries. Different legal processes. Different languages. Different financing structures. Different roles for agents, lawyers and notaries.
This makes cross‑border PropTech much harder to scale.
The key difference isn’t just fragmentation.
The US has one large market with a complex ecosystem inside it.
Europe has many markets, each with its own ecosystem.
You can see this clearly when you look at real‑estate agents.
In many European markets, a transaction may revolve around one main estate agent or agency, with a notary or lawyer stepping in at the legal stage.
In the US, the same transaction can involve several specialized roles — listing agent, buyer’s agent, broker — with different agency structures depending on the state.
So one European workflow can turn into several software opportunities in the US.
More roles. More data flows. More problems to solve.
That’s why complexity can actually be an advantage for PropTech.
The US doesn’t necessarily have a simpler real estate market.
In many ways, it has a more complicated one.
But it has something Europe often doesn’t:
a very large market where that complexity repeats itself.
When the same complicated problems happen millions of times, technology has a much bigger market to solve them.
This isn’t about saying the US is better or Europe is behind.
The two markets simply evolved differently.
Europe is fragmented across markets.
The US is fragmented inside one market.
And that difference matters for PropTech.
#RealEstateTechnology #HousingMarket
Why PropTech Has More Room to Grow in the US Than in Europe
https://t.co/cLSyYeOImb
#PropTech #Europe #US #RealEstate
Επενδύσεις σε #Ευρωπαϊκά #ακίνητα το β΄ τρίμηνο 2026: 59,1 δισ. ευρώ (+10% ετησίως), ισχυρότερο από το 2022. Α΄ εξάμηνο ~118 δισ. Κυλιόμενο 12μηνο 266,8 δισ. (+18%). Ο οικιστικός τομέας κυριαρχεί και αντέχει. Τα γραφεία σταθεροποιούνται. Κάτω από ιστορικούς μέσους όρους. #CRE
#European #RealEstate Investment in billions of Euros Q2 2026
2024–2025: Investment rebounded significantly, climbing back up toward €260B in 2025.
2026 Status (H1): The total volume as of mid-2026 stands at around €118B. Because this only captures the first half of the year (through June 30), it indicates that annual activity is pacing steadily with the post-2023 recovery trajectory.
Q2 2026 investment: €59.1bn, up 10% YoY — the strongest Q2 since 2022
Rolling 12-month (R12M) volume: €266.8bn, up 18% YoY
Domestic investors: 54% of acquisitions vs. 46% cross-border
Transactions: 2,244 in Q2; 10,321 on R12M basis
Still below historical norms: Q2 was 8% below the 10-year Q2 average (narrowing to 7% below on R12M basis)
Living
The largest and most resilient sector in recent years. Its share grows significantly after 2018 and remains dominant through 2025–2026.
Office
Historically the largest sector (2011–2019). Its share declines after 2020 but begins to stabilise in 2025–2026.
Recurrent taxes on immovable property as % of GDP: OECD
#Eurozone countries rely far less on recurrent taxes on immovable property than the UK, US, Canada, while #Greece stands out inside the Eurozone as one of the highest property‑tax jurisdictions, both in GDP share and in fiscal weight.
Why Greece is structurally high-tax on property
ENFIA is broad‑based and stable.
Greece compensates for low direct taxes (10.4% of GDP) with high indirect and property taxes.
Property taxation is a predictable revenue source in a system with historically volatile income‑tax collection.
Greece taxes immovable property more heavily (relative to GDP) than most of the Eurozone, including larger economies like Germany (not clearly labeled but typically low, ~0.4%), Spain, and the Netherlands.
Only France and Belgium among euro-area countries clearly tax property more heavily than Greece in this dataset.
The Eurozone as a bloc tends to cluster on the lower half of the ranking compared to Anglophone countries (UK, US, Canada, Australia, Israel), which dominate the top of the chart.
This is somewhat notable given ongoing debates in Greece about ENFIA (the Greek unified property tax) — the data suggests Greece's recurrent property tax burden is already comparatively high within the euro area, not low.
Recurrent taxes on immovable property as % of GDP: OECD
#Eurozone countries rely far less on recurrent taxes on immovable property than the UK, US, Canada, while #Greece stands out inside the Eurozone as one of the highest property‑tax jurisdictions, both in GDP share and in fiscal weight.
Why Greece is structurally high-tax on property
ENFIA is broad‑based and stable.
Greece compensates for low direct taxes (10.4% of GDP) with high indirect and property taxes.
Property taxation is a predictable revenue source in a system with historically volatile income‑tax collection.
Greece taxes immovable property more heavily (relative to GDP) than most of the Eurozone, including larger economies like Germany (not clearly labeled but typically low, ~0.4%), Spain, and the Netherlands.
Only France and Belgium among euro-area countries clearly tax property more heavily than Greece in this dataset.
The Eurozone as a bloc tends to cluster on the lower half of the ranking compared to Anglophone countries (UK, US, Canada, Australia, Israel), which dominate the top of the chart.
This is somewhat notable given ongoing debates in Greece about ENFIA (the Greek unified property tax) — the data suggests Greece's recurrent property tax burden is already comparatively high within the euro area, not low.
Σύγκριση δεικτών τιμών #κατοικιών, #ενοικίων και λόγου τιμής/εισοδήματος #Ελλάδας, #Γερμανίας vs #ΕΕ 2005-2025. Ελλάδα: τιμές +5,7% Q1 2026 (επιβράδυνση από 8-9%), ισχυρή άνοδος μετά το 2018. Ενοίκια έπεσαν και ανέβηκαν απότομα. Γερμανία +1,4%, ομαλότερη με διόρθωση 2022-24.
Nominal house prices, rental prices and the standardised house price-to-income ratio, all indexed to 2005 = 100, for #Greece and #Germany versus the #EU from 2005 to 2025
#HousePrices:
Greece (Bank of Greece): apartment prices up 5.7% y-o-y in Q1 2026, decelerating from 8.1% in 2025 and 9.1% in 2024. Strong post-2017 boom, well above the 2005 baseline in your chart.
Germany (Destatis): house prices up 1.4% y-o-y in Q1 2026, up 3.0% in Q4 2025 — fifth straight quarterly rise, but 3.2% for all of 2025 was Germany's first full-year gain since 2022, after the 2022–24 stagnation/dip visible in the chart.
Greece is decelerating from a much higher growth rate; Germany is only just resuming growth from a post-2022 correction. Greek nominal prices have grown faster on a 2005 basis for most of the period shown, but Germany's line still sits at a higher index level.
Rents:
Greece: rents dropped for years post-crisis (Eurostat: cumulative decline of about 9% over the 2015–2025 window) then reversed sharply — Eurostat's latest annual reading has Greek rents up 5.0% y-o-y, one of the EU's highest; a Q1 2026 comparison shows up 8.1%. This matches the late, steep upturn in your chart's Greek rental line.
Germany: rents have risen steadily and more gradually across the whole period — no comparable crash-and-rebound, consistent with the smoother yellow German line in the chart.
Price-to-income ratio:
Greece: dropped sharply 2009–2017 (income/wage stagnation plus price crash), then only partially recovered — still below its 2005=100 baseline through most of the series, now edging back up as price growth outpaces income.
Germany: broadly flat-to-rising for most of the period, with a visible spike around 2021–22 (cheap credit, price boom) followed by a pullback as ECB rates rose — the correction the chart shows around 2022–24.
Context (ECB)
Both countries' post-2022 kinks track the same driver: ECB rate hikes pushed housing-loan rates from near-zero to roughly 3.3–3.6% by 2026, cooling affordability everywhere — but Germany's price correction was sharper and faster than Greece's, whose valuation-based (not transaction-based) index tends to smooth out swings.
Bottom line:
Greece shows steeper price growth, more rent volatility, and a weaker income recovery. Germany shows smoother price and rent trends, but a sharper boom-and-bust in the price-to-income ratio around 2022.
#Europe: Tenure Structure & Housing Cost to Disposable Income: #Renters vs. #Owners (with or without mortgages): IMF
- #Greece, Italy, Portugal: family-based transfers → more outright owners, fewer renters.
- Denmark has strong social housing, but EU-SILC classifies ALL Danish tenants as market-rate — so Denmark won't show a high reduced-rent share in this chart.
- Market-price renters: highest burden, ~28–34% of disposable income (not 30–35%).
- Reduced-rent renters: lower burden than market renters, but NOT the lowest overall. Order low→high: owners w/o mortgage → owners w/ mortgage → reduced-rent renters → market-price renters. Not "10–15%."
- Owners w/ mortgage: mid-range burden, rises with interest rates.
- Owners w/o mortgage: lowest structural burden, but energy costs still bite (e.g. Greece).
- Southern/Eastern Europe: owner-majority. Greece: >60% outright owners (IMF confirmed). Other GR breakdown figures (~12% w/ mortgage, ~10-12% market renters) are chart estimates, not published figures.
- EU-wide (Eurostat, 2024): 44.2% outright owners, 24.3% owners w/ mortgage; 21.1% market renters, 10.5% reduced-price/free.
- Greek housing stock is old/inefficient: only 7.4% reach energy class B+; Greek homes use ~65% more energy/m² than Portuguese ones (Portugal invested 2.5x more in upgrades). ENFIA + maintenance add to outright owners' costs.
- Renters most vulnerable: EU-wide, below-60%-median-income households spend 38.2% of disposable income on housing vs. 16.2% for above-60%
- Greece amplified: Athens rents +50% (2019–2024) vs. salaries +27% (IMF's own Greece data): house prices +85% since 2017 vs. disposable income +47%; rent inflation hit 10% in 2025.
Μερίδιο πιστώσεων ακινήτων στο σύνολο ιδιωτικών πιστώσεων #Ευρώπης/#ΕΕ/ΕΟΧ, 2019 έναντι 2025.
#Ελλάδα κοντά στο τέλος (~17-18% το 2025, από ~35% το 2019) — από τις μεγαλύτερες μειώσεις.
Μέσος ΕΕ 29,1%. #RealEstate
#Europe: Share of real estate credit in total private sector credit 2019 vs. 2025
It measures the share of #realestate credit (mortgages + real‑estate corporate loans) in total private‑sector credit for each #EU/EEA banking system
#Greece is near the bottom, around 17–18% in 2025, down slightly from ~35% in 2019 — one of the largest declines shown
The chart compares each country's real estate credit exposure — the proportion of total private-sector lending tied to real estate — in 2019 versus 2025, ranked from highest to lowest 2025 exposure. It measures how concentrated bank lending books are in property, a key financial-stability indicator the EBA tracks for prudential risk assessment.
#HousingCrisis: The European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2026 on the housing crisis in the European Union with the aim of proposing solutions for decent, sustainable and affordable housing (published in the Official Journal of the EU, C/2026/4004, 26 August 2026) carefully avoids placing short-term rentals among the main causes of the housing crisis — a silence that looks more like a choice than an omission.
Long live lobbying!
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