The bull case for gold has become extremely consensus over the past year, but the market may be underestimating how vulnerable the metal becomes if global bond yields continue repricing structurally higher.
Gold fundamentally performs best when real yields are falling, liquidity is abundant, central banks are easing aggressively, and confidence in fiat systems is deteriorating faster than the opportunity cost of holding non-yielding assets.
But the macro backdrop may now be changing. US Treasury yields are already above 5% on the long end while Japanese bond yields are breaking multi-decade highs after decades of deflation. If Europe eventually follows the same direction, the world could be entering a structurally higher cost-of-capital regime.
That matters enormously for gold because gold itself produces no cash flow, no coupon, and no yield. When investors can suddenly earn 5%+ from US Treasuries backed by the deepest and most liquid bond market in the world, the opportunity cost of holding gold rises materially.
This becomes even more dangerous because positioning in gold increasingly looks crowded. Over the past several years, the market narrative around de-dollarization, central bank buying, fiscal deficits, geopolitical fragmentation, currency debasement, and inflation fears has attracted enormous capital into gold simultaneously.
That is precisely why our view here is highly anti-consensus. Most investors still reflexively assume that geopolitical stress, fiscal deficits, and inflation automatically translate into higher gold prices. But the market may be underestimating how different this macro regime could become if real yields remain structurally elevated and liquidity conditions tighten globally.
Our view is that the market is also underestimating the potential impact from a broader unwind of the yen carry trade. For decades, ultra-low Japanese rates effectively supplied cheap leverage to global markets. Investors borrowed yen and recycled that liquidity into equities, bonds, commodities, EM assets, technology names, and gold itself.
But once Japanese inflation accelerates and the BoJ is forced toward normalization, that carry structure becomes unstable. If yen volatility rises sharply while Japanese yields continue moving higher, leveraged positions globally may begin unwinding aggressively. And historically during deleveraging events, investors do not sell what they dislike. They sell what they can.
Gold is highly liquid and heavily owned. That makes it vulnerable during liquidity squeezes even if the long-term thesis remains intact. Ironically, the stronger the dollar and real yields become, the more difficult the environment becomes for gold despite elevated geopolitical uncertainty.
There is also another underappreciated issue: if inflation itself becomes structurally sticky while central banks remain forced to stay tighter for longer, gold may no longer benefit from the assumption of endless monetary easing that dominated the post-2008 period.
This is especially true if the Fed under a more hawkish regime evolves toward something resembling a modern Volcker framework where preserving the dollar system becomes more important than continuously supporting asset prices.
That does not necessarily destroy the long-term strategic role of gold entirely. Central bank diversification, geopolitical fragmentation, and debt sustainability concerns still provide structural support over longer horizons.
But tactically, we maintain a negative view on gold and see a meaningful probability of a drawdown exceeding 10% if global yields continue repricing higher and carry trade unwinds accelerate.
The biggest risk to gold may not be inflation disappearing. It may be the return of real yield competition and a violent unwind of global leverage simultaneously.