@jeffye888@maelan_sdmr@cubeqube Yes. This is the Carvana playbook. You don’t often see competitor trade-in values as high as theirs. So incentive is all else equal go with less friction. They make the money on financing.
@nejatian@Opendoor I requested an offer for my seller clients 5 days ago and I've received nothing so far. Not an email, text, call, app notification. 'Contact Your Home Sales Advisor' link doesn't work on the Home's Assessment page. Please advise.
So where do we go from here?
After a strong Q1 earnings call showing, $OPEN continues to tread water in the $4-$5 price range. The team has shown strong execution DESPITE continued rate headwinds from the Iran War and oil-driven inflation but these unfavorable macro trends + AI compute bubble is crowding out the “housing comeback” trade (fairly so I believe).
But one question I keep asking myself is…
Why have the fundamental shops not built positions given the clear $CVNA + AI-driven narrative? Despite the X narrative, almost every major institutional position are quant / factor shops trading $OPEN on volatility or retail / strategics.
What we haven’t seen are the Tiger Cubs (Lone Pine, Coatue, D1, Viking, Tiger Global, Light Street), growth shops (Whale Rock, Altimeter), or opportunistic funds (Pershing Square, Third Point, ValueAct) come in at all.
So I chatted with Claude...
Why fundamental L/S shops haven't invested yet:
The mandate problem. Tiger Cubs and concentrated growth shops are quality-compounder vehicles by design — they buy proven durable businesses, not pre-inflection turnarounds. Front-running a recovery is literally out of process for them, not an oversight. They consistently arrive after trailing GAAP profitability validates the model (as they did with CVNA between $50–200, well off the lows).
The GAAP profitability gate. Most fundamental mandates have soft or hard rules against owning companies with persistent GAAP losses, especially when management metrics are "adjusted" and "forward-looking." Q1 2026's $173M net loss on collapsed revenue is a non-starter for risk committees regardless of how good the cohort data looks, and "12-month forward adjusted EBITDA breakeven" doesn't clear the bar.
The "obvious trade" problem. The CVNA parallel is the dominant retail and finance-media narrative, which means there's no proprietary edge available to a fundamental analyst pitching it internally. When the PM asks "what do we see that others don't," there's no good answer. These shops are specifically built to avoid consensus narratives where the work has already been done publicly.
The career-risk asymmetry. A 1% position that 5x's adds maybe 80 bps to fund return — meaningful but not career-defining. A 1% position that goes to zero in a name with retail-meme characteristics is a career event with LPs. The math doesn't justify being early when waiting for confirmation captures most of the upside with much less downside.
Structural business concerns the bull thesis underweights. Capital intensity (homes on balance sheet, leverage, working capital cycle) makes it incompatible with asset-light tech mandates. The iBuyer TAM has a behavioral ceiling because most home sellers want top dollar, not speed. There's no clean short pair for L/S books. And the AI/software repositioning remains an assertion until margin durability is proven across volume cycles.
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These all make sense to me - Opendoor 1.0 unfortunately burned money managers badly in the past (just ask Druckenmiller) and the scars are deep.
The team MUST continue to execute to prove the doubters wrong -> not just with narrative but with real GAAP-financial performance. That will take time.