Itay Bookstein

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[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@ty_xplorer @Yoplait64008243 @serhatascii @gidonsaar It's about fighting depraved barbarians holding hostages in tunnels and putting their own civilian population at risk by hiding among them and fighting plainclothed. Where was Deif eliminated, remind me? And Sinwar?

[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@serhatascii @gidonsaar Türkiye is an authoritarian, colonialist state sponsor of Islamic terrorism. It houses Hamas leaders and supports the Muslim Brotherhood. Neighbouring states have already taken notice of its bellicose, revanchist rhetoric. Go gaslight and project your sins onto someone else.

[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@DoctorMayu @DanLinnaeus @DrCaseyBabb Nice inversion. From the time of the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, every Hudna is precisely Muslims biding their time until they estimate violation will end favorably. Maybe they should calibrate their insane favorability calculations, they're really off since 48.

[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@EK94227386 @Brightremoval @Saul_Sadka @BrilliantMaps Direct your retcons elsewhere. https://t.co/aW2wCbyad5

[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@BolourNoah @DrewPavlou Even if one were to accept this overbroad, meaningless generalization, that's more an indictment of Christianity than a commendation of Islam.

[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@talshalev1 @CNN Step 1: move goalposts.
Step 2: generate a misleading headline.
Step 3: launder credibility through established institution.

You're expected hold yourself to higher standards, Tal. When the conclusions are nonsensical, you're supposed to investigate. You should be ashamed.

[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@ethan1saacson @infantrydort I think LOAC is largely irrelevant in the court of public opinion where receptive media outlets promote unsubstantiated highly emotive terrorist info warfare narratives in dereliction of journalistic ethics.

[NGO Monitor @NGOmonitor]

🚨Exclusive Hamas files tell the untold story of a KGB-style system for infiltrating and controlling the entire humanitarian aid industry in Gaza, including international NGOs. 🧵

Through designated “guarantors,” Hamas steered humanitarian projects while NGOs stayed silent about Hamas’ abuse.

The details you weren’t supposed to see >>

[Hen Mazzig @HenMazzig]

Over 200 celebrities are calling for the release of convicted terrorist Marwan Barghouti, who is serving multiple life sentences for orchestrating attacks that killed innocent Israelis and a Greek monk during the Second Intifada.

The diverse range of celebrities who signed the “Free Marwan” petition includes Paul Simon, Hannah Einbinder, Ilana Glazer, Miriam Margolyes, Mark Ruffalo, Ian McKellen, Benedict Cumberbatch, Tilda Swinton, Josh O’Connor, Annie Lennox, Sting, Brian Eno and author Margaret Atwood.

The same voices who were silent when Jewish babies were taken hostage and murdered in cold blood now advocate for the freedom of a convicted murderer.

Stop pretending it’s about human rights. It never was.

[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@Saul_Sadka @wetDHMO 96, but who's counting

[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@entropyrian https://t.co/RZZrZzfFHQ

[dan linnaeus @DanLinnaeus]

As asserted in the post, the Mamdanis are self-proclaimed Twelver Shi'i from the Khoja Shia Ithna Asheri in Uganda (Eastern Africa).

The East African Khoja Ithna‑‘Ashari formation is a South Asian mercantile diaspora largely from Kutch/Kathiawar in Gujarat that consolidated in coastal East Africa in the late 19th–early 20th century building self‑governing jamaat or congregational institutions that handled religion, welfare, education and dispute resolution across Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.

Over time, a substantial sub‑group from Nizari Isma‘ilism (Seveners) shifted to Twelver Shi‘ism. Those jamaats federated regionally after World War II, creating the Federation of Khoja Shia Ithna‑Asheri Jamaats of Africa (Africa Federation, “AFED,” 1946), and later joined the transnational World Federation of KSIMC which was itself established in 1976. This network connects local jamaats to a regional African federation and a global umbrella (WF) that provides religious education, welfare logistics and juristic resources. None of this structure, in itself, presupposes subordination to an Iranian state clerical apparatus; it is a diaspora community governance lattice characteristic of Usuli Twelver communities outside Iran.

Doctrinally, the community is Twelver (Imami/Ja‘fari) and overwhelmingly Usuli. Usuli Twelver practice organizes religious life around marja‘ al‑taqlid (sources of emulation) whose juristic handbooks (risāla/‘amaliyya) guide lay observance; this model emerged historically from the 18th–19th‑century Usuli‑Akhbari debates and produced the modern marja‘iyya in Najaf and Qom.

Heirarchy and structure explained: “Ja‘fari” denotes the legal school; “Usuli” denotes the method and authority structure; and “marja‘/taqlid” denotes the practical mechanism by which laypersons follow juristic rulings.

East African Khoja institutions have long embedded this Usuli architecture, translating ‘amaliyya, inviting mujtahid representatives, and structuring madrasah curricula accordingly.

The key analytic implication is that authority for day‑to‑day practice flows through whichever marja‘ a given household selects, often Najaf‑based scholars historically, but sometimes from Qom's circles—as such, not automatically through Iran’s political doctrine of wilayat al‑faqih. This is an important categorical separation: a shared Twelver doctrinal family does not, by itself, establish institutional fealty to Iran’s ruling clergy.

This is why analyzing the ideological positions and it's parallels to a particular school of though has analytic metric: ie, quietist non-political individual and social activism, versus revolutionary pvolictis and activism.

In the context of rising politically and ideologically motivated violence in America, it is legitimate to raise concerns about a mayoral candidate and a Columbia professor who openly shield self-authorized, moralized/sacrlized violence.

——���—
1. Zohran Mamdani’s last name reflects centuries of intercontinental trade, migration and cultural exchange – Religion News Service (The Conversation republish)
https://t.co/Hl0akVqHby
2. In Conversation with Mahmood Mamdani – Warscapes
https://t.co/YYhjRymW51
3. Africa Federation – Federation of KSI Jamaats of Africa (official site)
https://t.co/IqdSHBK6W5
4. About – The World Federation of KSIMC
https://t.co/VV0gCxleAf
5. An Outline History of Khoja Shia Ithna Asheri in Eastern Africa – Khojapedia
https://t.co/iGjHwHQuza
6. Kampala – Khojapedia
https://t.co/UMZ47k1FYV
7. Khoja Shia Ithnasheri Jamaat, Kampala – Facebook About (address: Plot 108 William Street)
https://t.co/Epr3AhZEdd
8. Grand Opening Ceremony of the Bilal Secondary School in Kampala, Uganda – Africa Federation
https://t.co/2DqFrmvrq5
9. Bilal Uganda Launches Al‑Zahra Tailoring Centre for Women – Africa Federation
https://t.co/RStTIK3ulW
10. Shi‘ite Doctrine: Hierarchy in the Imamiyya (marja‘ al‑taqlid) – Encyclopaedia Iranica
https://t.co/o7HvGWYP7X
11. Akhbāriyya – Encyclopaedia Iranica
https://t.co/BSg67jHYgb
12. Twelver Shi‘ah: Meaning, History, Beliefs – Encyclopaedia Britannica
https://t.co/TK7q5pTBNy
13. Iraq: The Shi‘ah – Encyclopaedia Britannica
https://t.co/zeXh1M2vRa
14. Qom – Encyclopaedia Britannica
https://t.co/9OUdCUn7Te
15. Formation of the World Federation, 1976 – Khojapedia
https://t.co/cUadmH4baB

[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@entropyrian https://t.co/pEMo9WABDq

[dan linnaeus @DanLinnaeus]

Mamdani’s activism is consistent with Siyasi jihad.

Al-jihad al-akbar, the internal struggle for moral purification and cultivation of societal virtue, is understood as the greater jihad within shi’i twelver quietist and sunni thought. Shi‘i scholars widely accept it, albeit only metaphorically. The quietist position is that true Islamic governance cannot exist until the Mahdi returns, so any attempt to seize political power in his absence is ultimately flawed or illegitimate. That is the twelver tradition of al-Sistani and najaf and karbala clerical thought in Iraq.

But in Qom, the revolutionary twelver wilayat al-faqih is central to governance and belief; the Iranian ayatollah sees it his duty to be the guardian of the jurist (12th Imam: al-Mahdi) to prepare the ground for end of times. For them Siyasi jihad (political jihad) is obligatory against oppression and unjust rule. This is the activist/revolutionary position of Mamdani’s father and Zohran Mamdani’s brand of jihad.

Mahmood, a prominent political scientist, explores these themes across works like Good Muslim, Bad Muslim (2004), where he differentiates al-jihad al-akbar (internal/moral struggle) from al-jihad al-asghar (external/defensive struggle). He frames modern "jihad" as a political response to colonialism and imperialism rather than purely religious fanaticism. Columbia University prof. Mahmood Mamdani wrote: “Does not the suicide bomber join both aspects of our humanity…in that we are willing to subordinate life-both our own and that of others—to objectives we consider higher than life?” in his 2004 book Good Muslim, Bad Muslim.

Zohran embodies this activist approach through his advocacy against systemic oppression. DSA was a leading organizer in the coordinated transport artery and transport hub shut downs across the city in the wake of October 7 including Brooklyn Bridge, Manhattan Bridge, Williamsburg Bridge, Holland Tunnel, Grand Central Station, and caravans of vehicles that circled LaGuardia and John F. Kennedy airports. This aligns with his revolutionary emphasis on resisting unjust rule—albeit in a secular, non-theocratic context focused on social justice and political activism rather than overt efforts at establishing a Shi'a state. Mamdani’s activism is thus consistent with Siyasi jihad.

It is out of deep respect for the efforts of Gulf nations, who have harmonized classical Islamic jurisprudence with the post-Wesphalian Peace international order, through wali al-amr and al-‘ahd-al-Ibrahimi, that analysts disaggregate Mamdani’s brand of activism and its Islamist revolutionary fingerprints from legitimate well-intentioned political participation in the American project.

Incidentally, Mehdi Hassan’s Islamist hasbara is what qualifies him for the same categories; in his case, Mehdi exemplifies what happens when the interrupting cow grows up to be a political jihadi.

[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@harukaawake The purpose of commie agitprop is to agitate. Truth content is immaterial to that goal.

[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@DanLinnaeus @jwf2m7hrqr Random Acts of Barbarism.

[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@DanLinnaeus Thanks for dissecting the evil apologia of Mahmood Mamdani. Utterly revolting. Barbarism incarnate.

[dan linnaeus @DanLinnaeus]

When Mahmood Mamdani writes that the suicide bomber “joins both aspects of our humanity … in that we are willing to subordinate life—both our own and that of others—to objectives we consider higher than life,” that one phrase, “and that of others” does a lot of heavy lifting as he collapses martyrdom and mass murder.

Mamdani’s question teaches something precisely because it’s morally confusing—how easily the language of “humanity” can be hijacked to excuse inhumanity. Self-sacrifice, or the voluntary renunciation of one’s own life for others, can be morally noble because both agency and consent are intact. All societies in one form or another valorize those who made the ultimate sacrifice for the welfare of others.

Yet, Mamdani positions it aside other-sacrifice, the taking of another’s life for one’s own ideals, the very opposite of self-sacrifice. He violates the categorical imperative: no human being may be used merely as a means to an end, even a “higher” one. In joining the two, Mamdani erases the moral boundary between autonomous self-giving and heteronomous killing, yet he does so repeatedly in interviews and texts—not in an isolated slip, but persistently insisting on placing the two side by side as though sacrifice and murder were two peas in a pod.

He isn’t illustrating something he then condemns. He instructs us to stop stigmatizing suicide bombing as “barbarism” and instead recognize it as the purest expression of a distinctly modern logic. He repeats variations of this framing in interviews for years afterward, arguing that we must “destigmatize” the tactic, reject designating it as “barbarism” and instead see it as a rational, modern response to asymmetrical warfare—the poor man’s air force, essentially.

There’s a difference between fighting a self-defensive war, which is basically the only kind of war that is today permitted under international law, in order to defend your people, your country, your family, and way of life—where you’re fighting other soldiers and you’re trying to avoid harming uninvolved civilians. There’s a difference between that and any other form of killing. It’s one thing, self-defense, but in the modern project, we don’t accept the idea of killing for ideas as humane at all.

Self-defense, whether individual or collective, is recognized as a right precisely because it protects life from immediate threat. The moral logic is preservation. But killing for an idea, to impose a belief, redeem a cause, or avenge an abstract injustice, is the opposite: it instrumentalises life. Modern law and moral philosophy both reject it.

Deontologically, the move is indefensible: he denies the equal moral status of other persons’ agency and treats their lives as means to one’s own transcendence. Mamdani describes a phenomenology of zeal as humanity; yet it is merely what humans are capable of when they elevate ideals above life. But he construes it as an anthropological normalization, not a moral condemnation. It’s ethically unsound, clearly even repugnant. There is no drawing a moral equivalence between martyrdom and murder.

What he effectively instructs is that it is a core part of our humanity to believe in a cause so deeply that we are willing to sacrifice our own life and by the way, irrespective of how you feel about that cause, yours too, and your family’s, and anyone standing close to you while we’re at it, and that, according to him, is what “joins our humanity”.

And every semester, more eighteen-year-olds sit in his class and learn that the word “humanity” is stretchy enough to cover turning a school bus into smoke if you just really, really believe in something. How is this man teaching university students at Columbia, explain it to me like I’m six years old. How? And how for goodness sake did NYC, the city hit hardest by 9-11, vote his son into the mayor’s office the year before its 25th anniversary when he apologizes for and valorizes that ideology? How!

cit.

[The Telegraph @Telegraph]

🔴 Israeli football fans were banned from Villa Park on the back of “entirely fictitious” information, a former attorney general has claimed.

Read more: https://t.co/DmUbVwlbew

[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@DanLinnaeus It is good to see that Japan still has a spine, even as other Western democracies seem all to happy to sell theirs for a toxic mix of Islamism appeasement politics, moral preening, and whatever infrastructure projects France can turn a profit on in Hezbollebanon.

[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@SenFettermanPA @giselefetterman @UPMC Wishing you a speedy recovery, Senator.

[Itay Bookstein @ibookstein]

@arusbridger Injuries self-inflicted. Victim card declined.