Saudi Arabia just announced its East-West pipeline is pumping at full capacity: 7 million barrels a day. Headlines are calling it the Hormuz bypass. Let me tell you what that number actually means, and what it doesn't. 1/7
@FT Italy revised the plan six times, watered down 70% of targets, got enrollment to count as a labor market reform. Brussels kept paying. The Recovery Fund was meant to buy structural change. Italy showed you can negotiate the conditionality away and the money still arrives....
@business SEFE, the company Germany nationalised from Gazprom, is now signing Canadian LNG deals. The facility hasn't taken a final investment decision yet. Germany keeps signing supply agreements and calling it energy security. The infrastructure question always comes later.
@MichaelKugelman Pakistan built the mediation channel deliberately and said no to the Abraham Accords ask the same day it arrived. That's not an occupational hazard. That's a country that calculated what the room was worth and decided the invoice was payable on its own terms.
@Alihashem Iran wants partial release upfront, Washington hasn't committed. Better mediation makes the conversation more efficient. It doesn't close a substantive disagreement...
@zriboua Rachman isn't measuring winning by Iran's physical condition. He's measuring it by what Iran exits with. A country whose economy is collapsing but still retains Hormuz as a usable instrument next time has won the negotiation. The rial doesn't change what's in the deal.
@AmitSegal These aren't separate sticking points. Enrichment, Hormuz, and financial relief are the three things Iran used to force the US to the table. A deal that resolves all three is a deal where Iran exits with nothing it went in to protect.
@vtchakarova Qatar is mediating the assets track and being told to join Abraham Accords as part of the same deal. You can't use a country as your channel to Tehran and simultaneously make it a condition of the settlement. One of those asks has to give..
@_GhulamMustafa_ Trump is asking Riyadh to sign something that requires a concession from his other ally. The block isn't Saudi reluctance. It's Israeli policy.
The Mojtaba angle is the right one. A new Supreme Leader can't afford to be the one who trusted Washington and lost. Accepting generous terms isn't reassuring for Tehran, it confirms the trap theory. The rational refusal here isn't paranoia. It's the only move that doesn't risk his opening act.
@IftikharFirdous This is the same channel that got the first round done. China has the leverage over Tehran that nobody else has. Pakistan builds the room, Beijing convinces Iran to walk in. Munir going to Beijing after Tehran isn't a new development. It's the architecture working as designed...
@business Trump announcing the Strait reopening while Iranian state media contradicts it in the same hour. This is the fourth time this cycle. The gap between the US readout and Tehran's isn't confusion. It's both sides negotiating the press release harder than the deal.
@AlArabiya_Eng "Islamabad Declaration" is the right credit line. It's also only a credit line. Who verifies mine clearance, who scores compliance, who triggers consequences if 60 days go nowhere, the architecture is still missing...
@BarakRavid@axios The detail that matters most in your own reporting: nuclear concessions are deferred. The MOU solves Hormuz for 60 days. Enrichment, the 440kg stockpile, all "to be negotiated." Same wall, new deadline.
@vonderleyen Europe wasn't in the room, didn't shape the terms, and now "continues working with partners" to contain the spillover. That's not a policy position. That's a statement about watching others do diplomacy.
@mdubowitz Military pressure was always time-limited. You are describing a constraint that existed from day one, not a failure of the deal. The question was never whether to use leverage, it was whether leverage alone could produce a durable outcome.
The UK has spent ten years trying to prove one argument wrong: that economic integration and political integration can't be separated. Brussels keeps answering with the same wall. The proposal was rejected before the meeting started. That is not a negotiating position. That is the answer. 6/6
The EU rejected the UK's proposal to join the single market for goods before the two sides even sat down to discuss it. Not after negotiation. Before.
The June summit is already sliding toward July. Let me tell you what's actually happening here. 🧵
A year ago the May 2025 summit produced a "reset." Warm language, a framework, momentum. Twelve months later: the food and drink deal is still in draft, carbon market linking is still under discussion, and there's no confirmed date for the next meeting. The reset produced a rebrand. The distance between the two sides hasn't closed. It's been renamed.
5/6