Visit the official iPolloWork GitHub repository and give it a ⭐ Star. and try iPolloWork for yourself. Use iPolloWork to complete a real task, such as creating or editing code, documents, designs, or videos. After trying it, share your genuine experience:
Thousands of new AI apps, agents, and skills drop every day. But the best of them are trapped in messy chats, configs, .md files, and technical setups.
Most people get left behind.
Today, we're launching #taku 2.0 Beta 🚀
Taku turns powerful AI capabilities into real apps anyone can use, remix, and share.
Discover what the pros are building.
Run it as a real app — no setup, no code.
Chain multiple tools into one workflow.
Or just tell taku what you want, and watch it build the whole thing.
AI shouldn't be another thing to learn.
It should just work.
Borrow brilliance. Make it yours.
👇
Try https://t.co/iP3PKJFfB0
Phase 1 — Cold Start — is officially live.
Invite-only. One code = 1 SOL of buy quota.
Spend it in full → two new codes to hand out.
Every code you hand out that's spent in full → 1 SOL credited back to you.
Every invite code grows like this. Watch one split. ↓
https://t.co/6SM03c5Swa
Phase 1 — Cold Start — is officially live.
Invite-only. One code = 1 SOL of buy quota.
Spend it in full → two new codes to hand out.
Every code you hand out that's spent in full → 1 SOL credited back to you.
Every invite code grows like this. Watch one split. ↓
https://t.co/6SM03c5Swa
POV: you finally decided to let the cat trade. 🐱
Here’s the quickest way to get started with Maneki.
Connect → Set up → Launch your Agent.
That’s it.
Watch the tutorial, grab your credits, and let the cat cook. 🔥
#ManekiAI#AITrading#Agent
Maneki AI is live. 📈
Your 24/7 AI trading agent for perpDEX is now open.
🔗:https://t.co/SLKDartNsC
Create an agent.
Pick a stock perp market.
Choose a trading style.
Set capital & leverage limits.
Let the Lucky Cat watch, reason, and trade.
Every move comes with a clear decision trail — because trading agents should be explainable, not black boxes.
The Lucky Cat That Never Sleeps.🐱
#Maneki #AI #Agent #perpDEX
Maneki’s notes from last week 🐾✍️
Last week, we moved our servers to Microsoft Azure ☁️
With cloud credits provided by Microsoft, Maneki has found a new home in the cloud—and the cat has already settled in and started building. 🐱💻
A big thank-you to @Azure for supporting us along the way! 💚
Servers moved. Notebook updated. More building ahead.
#ManekiAI #MicrosoftAzure #BUIDL #Agent
Maneki AI has been selected for the 2026 0G Atlas Founder House! 🐱
We’ll be joining fellow builders to keep building the future of AI-powered trading.
Big thanks to @BaiduAI Cloud for supporting the Founder House, and to @HackQuest_ and @0G_labs for bringing us together. See you there!
#ManekiAI #Agent #AITrading
A system that checks something ends up with an answer to what happens when the check cannot run.
Not when the check fails — when it is unavailable. The service is down, the endpoint times out, the attestation cannot be retrieved, the quorum cannot be assembled. The request is still there, and the system still has to decide what happens to it.
The two simplest answers are to let it through or to hold it. Real systems have more room than that — retry, queue, fall back to a weaker check, cap the amount, route it to a person — but each of those still resolves into proceeding or not, and each has its own behaviour when the fallback is unavailable too.
Both directions are defensible. A payments system that holds every transaction whenever a fraud check is unreachable has converted an availability problem into an outage. A vault that releases funds whenever its verifier is unreachable risks turning an availability problem into a withdrawal. Which cost is worse depends on what is being protected, and reasonable teams land in different places.
What is worth noticing is that the answer can exist without ever having been an explicit design decision.
The behaviour ends up wherever the error path happens to go. A timeout can return a permissive default. A general exception handler can let execution continue. A check added late can be wrapped in a conditional that skips it when a dependency is missing. The code may never contain a line reading "if verification is unavailable, proceed" — but that can still be exactly what it does, and it will do it just as readily when someone is making the checker unavailable on purpose.
This is why the choice is worth writing down before it is discovered. A system that fails open by decision has weighed the trade. A system that fails open by accident has the same behaviour and none of the reasoning, and it learns which one it is from an incident rather than from a design review.
For a verification layer the question is sharper, because an attacker may target its availability rather than defeat the check itself. If no result means no check, then the verifier does not have to be broken. It only has to be kept from answering.
CRVA changes the dependency rather than removing the question. The Agents that sign are selected at random from a larger population and rotate on a fixed cycle, and under threshold MPC a valid signature requires enough participants to contribute, so no single participant can produce one alone. That reduces reliance on any one verifier. It does not guarantee that a result always arrives, and it does not settle what the surrounding system does when one does not. That stays with whoever integrates the check — which is the same decision this whole piece is about.
Every system has an answer to this. The question is whether anyone chose it.
#DeepSafe #CRVA #Web3Security
Been testing @lazymemesfun on Arc 🦥
Getting my meme ready — this one is smooth.
$LAZM
0x8D7f7f8A7B8d7f0bEd06Af60a879A8371E184477
https://t.co/9AIlHtPY9l
DeepSafe is making Web3 security an important focus, and I’m interested in seeing how its approach can help create a safer and more reliable ecosystem for users. #DeepSafe@DeepSafe_AI
@DeepSafe_AI The Cronos rollback highlights how important validator consensus is during a major exploit. Interesting analysis of what the rollback could and could not recover.
Cronos halted on Sunday after an exploit on Tectonic. On Monday it said block production had resumed and that the chain state had been restored to before the exploit. It called that a validator-consensus emergency action. Tectonic said it would reopen in phases once its own checks clear, beginning with withdrawals and repayments while deposits and borrowing stay paused. Neither team has confirmed a loss figure, and both say a full post-mortem is coming.
Cronos resumed from block 90,896,189. The Defiant puts that 10,961 blocks behind the branch users had already watched confirm, roughly one hour and 54 minutes of chain history. On the new canonical chain, the attacker's Cronos-side gains no longer exist. The portion that had already crossed to Ethereum does. PeckShield and Lookonchain both tracked about 2,592 ETH, worth roughly $6.29M at the time, that reached Ethereum before block production stopped.
One exploit, three outcomes. What reached Ethereum stayed beyond the rollback's reach. The attacker's Cronos-side gains were removed from the canonical state. And so were the trades, transfers and liquidations of people with no connection to the exploit — confirmations they had already watched land inside that window.
The rollback did not separate exploit transactions from ordinary ones. It separated only what Cronos validators could rewind from what they could not. As of September 1, neither team has published an accounting of how those unrelated transactions will be handled, or whether any of them can be replayed.
This is not an argument that the rollback was right or wrong, and it is not a claim about decentralisation. The narrower point is what this remedy requires and how far it reaches. It requires validator consensus. It reaches only the chain those validators run. And it invalidates every prior confirmation inside the history it replaces, no matter whose transaction it was.
CRVA does not remove the need for emergency controls, and it would not have prevented the flaw inside Tectonic. The narrower distinction is the unit of refusal. Where an applicable check already sits in the execution path and its result is enforced, one request can be refused without an ad hoc validator intervention that replaces unrelated chain history.
The chain is back. The exploit's Cronos transactions are out of the canonical state. What is still open is everything the rollback could not reach, and everything else it reached on the way.
Sources:
https://t.co/fgxVSZif8s
#DeepSafe #CRVA #Web3Security