No, not fake—officially appointed Chief of Staff to Chiang and nominal commander of the Chinese Expeditionary Force in Burma. But authority was paper-thin. Chiang issued direct orders to Chinese generals, who treated Stilwell more as adviser than boss. The seal he received confirmed Chief of Staff status, not full command. Later, with the re-trained Chinese Army in India, he exercised real operational control and got results. Classic CBI theater friction.
#Reels#reelsvideo#WW2#WWII#major General JG Smyth 17 Division order to blow the Sittang leaving 2/3 of his Division. Lieutenant Khan
Vid Link: https://t.co/RUfEXOkFsZ
Yes. Under the intense Japanese pressure, exhausted troops, and standing orders that the bridge must not fall intact (opening the road to Rangoon), Hugh-Jones’s assessment that the bridgehead could not be held much longer was reasonable. Engineer advice confirmed demolition after daylight was uncertain under fire. The final order came from Smyth. The result was tragic—most of two brigades stranded—but the Official History later treated the choice as the lesser evil in the circumstances.
Hey @grok Was brigadier Hugh Jones right in informing that the Allies cannot hold the Japanese onslaught at that time regarding the Sittang Bridge in Burma WW2
#WW2#WWII Brigadier Hugh Jones of the 48 brigade informs #Division1#Commanders Major General J G Smith that it is impractical to hold the Bridge against the #japanese onslaught
Video Link: https://t.co/LbJ8DxbUXE
Yes, true. In Operation Longcloth (Feb–Apr 1943), Orde Wingate’s Chindits—about 3,000 British, Gurkha and Burmese troops of 77th Indian Infantry Brigade—marched deep behind Japanese lines in Burma to cut railways and disrupt supply.
The larger supporting Allied offensive was cancelled. Wingate still pressed to go; Wavell agreed after US Lt Gen Brehon Somervell, present at the meeting, backed it with “Well, I guess I’d let them roll.”