The theories differ in implications involving: whether efficiency & growth matter along with distribution, democratic legitimacy of antitrust rules, utility of economic analysis, & source of the critical threat to democracy today. 2/2
My new paper on the political economy of antitrust compares two theories: capture by big business vs. an informal or tacit political settlement among interest groups to pursue inclusive economic growth. https://t.co/ED11gpjlNR. 1/2
“What About the Supreme Court? The Lurking Threat to US Antitrust Reform”
My new essay highlights problems created by Trinko and Amex
It’s particularly timely given the role of Trinko in recent appellate decisions in NY v Meta and Epic v. Apple
See https://t.co/7w9e8V7r5O
It's #ThrowbackThursday again?! Time for a vintage #OurCuriousAmalgam podcast ep. #137 Have We Been Down This Road Before? What History Can Teach Us About the Current Rethinking of #Antitrust, w/@jbbecon Listen at https://t.co/qcmbcQRpSi. Brought to you by @abaantitrust
The utility of “competitive process claims” in strengthening #antitrust enforcement should not be obscured by wider debate about the #consumerwelfare standard, writes @ProfGavil (@howardlawschool)
https://t.co/DelmMRce1Y
My piece with Fiona Scott Morton on "The Life of Antitrust's Consumer Welfare Model" is up this morning. It focuses mainly on how the Supreme Court has articulated the goals of antitrust. https://t.co/Et3f5IDF5Q
Steve Salop has written a provocative piece proposing a "Reasonable Competitive Conduct" antitrust standard that combines elements of judicial decisions, consumer welfare, rule of reason reform, and increased attention to vertical conduct. https://t.co/jfcbaJ5zIr
What are the best books to read before--or after--you learn antitrust law?
My answer: https://t.co/MthH4EzfiI
Authors: Ellis W. Hawley, Walter R. Brooks, @delong, Bruce Greenwald & Judd Khan, @CarlShapiro & @halvarian
This is a fascinating article with concerns about market powe in the real estate pricing software market (RealPage’s purchase of LRO) in addition to questions about algorithm-supported tacit collusion in the rental market.
https://t.co/rSnia8ma7t
@MartinSGaynor Non-purposive involves natural and predictable responses—think non-zero conjectural variations. For purposive think of repeated games, for example with Nash reversion.
@MartinSGaynor I think that could work for evaluating what Joe and I call non-purposive coordination. I’m less confident for what we call purposive coordination.
@conlon_chris Joe Farrell and I wrote a paper about ways of thinking about coordinated effects of horizontal mergers that might interest you. Some ways of doing so likely require market definition, but others are more closely related to diversion ratios. https://t.co/nVznllx3g6
@Sherman1890 But... I mostly teach them for the reasons you mention. Also because some students end up at DOJ/FTC/Consulting and judges still care about SSNIPs, etc.
@jbbecon is right. "Competitive process" is a nothingburger that means anything you want it to; that's why left, center, and right have all cited in support of their own positions. A goal that cannot be measured by reference to output or innovation is no goal at all.
“If legislators want to strengthen the antitrust laws by addressing the standard for a violation, they can do better than by instructing courts that conduct violates the antitrust laws if it ʻharms the competitive process’,” @jbbecon for @NetworkLawRev at https://t.co/ATzAUSf0hq
@wavesblog The book is Slouching Towards Utopia by @delong. It’s a wide-ranging, thought-provoking, accessible, informed, and convincing economic history of the long 20th century (1870-2010)—and well worth reading.