my single best take and the best take in the universe is that western militaries must train a culture of sobriety. it's a major cultural flaw. zero leeway, no cope about letting "the boys relax". it's a psychologically devastating remnant of the past which bullshit luxury expo wars allowed us to keep. we know better. there is other and better joy to be found. do something meaningful for your soldiers, not something that gets them or others killed, which is the already obvious, but furthermore it just introduces mental processes that wrecks them for life. by definition it's the worst and most dangerous substance use. and the positives are entirely fake. it's self-inflicted damage.
This website has really exposed to me the depths of third world antisemitism, how corrosive and all-encompassing this is, and why we need to prevent this in the West at all costs.
Good emphasis on FSB always having the last laugh. I think what people got (rightfully) excited about was that Prigozhin, for the blink of an eye, created momentum that seemed to be above FSB's methods of enforcement. Briefly, VKS and the geography of Moscow seemed to have been more of a determining factor than anything FSB could have pulled out of a hat. Most likely just on the surface, there is reporting FSB methods did contribute to him taking the deal. But the fear factor of Wagner did fold entire cities including associated military command and there was no remedy in FSB's toolkit. They will of course make adjustments to ensure that never happens again.
My career with CIA operations against Russian intelligence reinforced one lesson above all: analytical discipline matters more than wishful thinking, and, despite all their bungling, the Russians are more adaptive and resilient than we give them credit for.
That's the focus of my latest @thecipherbrief column marking the third anniversary of Prigozhin's mutiny.
⚠️Let's stop allowing rumors and speculation to replace the reality of a formidable adversary in the Russian Intelligence Services that we have neglected to confront for far too long.
👉Rather than revisiting the sensational headlines from June 2023, I examine what the episode actually teaches us today; these are lessons we need to remember with all the speculation anew of "Putin's weakness", alleged coup rumors, and other unfounded speculation.
☑️In the article I cover the REALITY of how:
🔹 Russia can be both weak and resilient.
🔹 Elite conflict does not necessarily signal regime collapse.
🔹 Putin's intelligence and security architecture was built to survive crises.
🚨As discussions about Russia's future intensify once again, I believe it's worth separating evidence from optimism.
Many of these ideas are drawn from years of research that also informed my book and research that went into it: Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks: Russian Intelligence and Putin's Secret War (@USNIBooks).
If you read the article, I'd be interested in hearing your perspective.
#Russia #Intelligence #ForeignPolicy #SecurityStudies #Ukraine #RussianIntelligence
👉"The Continued Myth of Russia’s Imminent Collapse: Lessons from Prigozhin’s Mutiny Three Years On"
https://t.co/EAipUb6Bke
every data center story says it uses "as much power as 100,000 homes" like that's a scandal. an aluminum smelter pulls five times that and it's why airplanes are cheap. measuring industry in homes is how you train a country to believe building things is a crime
Not getting my hopes up. This isn't anything more than reminding IRGC of what bombs feel like. IRGC is contained by gulf states not treating their airspace like pocket pussy, they can't chimp out, they need to make sure regime change stays a bothersome and distant possibility
It was only Auschwitz and it was only for prisoners you could work to death. Furthermore you have to understand that you can easily grab any cop's gun out of the holster and swallow it. It's a 3 second movement