The Catholic Church does not teach that everyone who dies in friendship with God necessarily first goes to purgatory before heaven. There are ways to avoid purgatory, namely, by the forgiveness of one's sins and the removal of all temporal punishment due to one's sins before death. For example, if one dies shortly after baptism without committing any subsequent sin, they will go straight to heaven, because baptism forgives all sin and removes all the temporal punishment due to one's sins. The same is true if one is martyred for the faith, which, again, forgives all sin and removes all the temporal punishment due to one's sins. Or if one dies shortly after completing a plenary indulgence without committing any subsequent sin. The thief on the cross, though not strictly a martyr, was made a "partner" in martyrdom and exhibited perfect contrition, as early Church Fathers wrote (even calling him a martyr in some cases). The Church simply teaches that not all who die in friendship with God attain this level of perfect contrition and charity, which would require purification before one can enter heaven.
So, if that's your argument, then what was the point of originally defending Rees-Mogg's citing Aquinas and appealing to what was "widely recognized by contemporaries as necessary and proportionate"? Because that gets to the substance of Feser's critique (the morality of the bombings), rather than certain words Feser uses in that critique. You seem to have shifted from the former to the latter. That's why I laid out the three options above, which was meant to specify exactly what it is you are objecting to: a critique of Rees-Mogg's defense of the morality of the bombings, or simply using abrasive words in that critique (even if one agrees with the substance of the critique).
"If war is the answer for a nation in this fallen world, it is fought by the logic of power not morality."
Sed contra:
"The strict conditions for legitimate defense by military force require rigorous consideration. The gravity of such a decision makes it subject to rigorous conditions of moral legitimacy." (CCC 2309)
That still won't work, because a conscious being still has a soul of some sort, even if not a rational one. But a simulation of consciousness is no more genuine consciousness (and therefore in possession of a non-rational soul) than a simulation of intelligence is genuine intelligence (and therefore in possession of a rational soul).
"What do we lose?"
The continued abandonment of a proper philosophical anthropology, in favor of one that cannot see the ontological distinction between human intellect and a simulation, will only deepen and hasten a utilitarian approach to human life - and in ways we perhaps can't even currently imagine. That's what we stand to lose.
"What do we lose?"
The continued abandonment of a proper philosophical anthropology, in favor of one that cannot see the ontological distinction between human intellect and a simulation, will only deepen and hasten a utilitarian approach to human life - and in ways we perhaps can't even currently imagine. That's what we stand to lose.
@FeserEdward Trump: "I got Roe overturned."
Also Trump: " I regret nominating the justices that were crucial to getting Roe overturned because they aren't loyal enough to ME."